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ABSTRACT 
The Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an economic organisation 
among 16 countries of Africa south of the Sahara. One of the main objectives of ECOWAS is to 
join the member countries in a complete monetary union with a single currency and a single 
central banle A major disadvantage to a country of being a member of this form of monetary 
cooperation is the loss of independence in carrying out monetary policy. 
This study is an examination of the degree to which Nigeria is likely to lose independent 
monetary policy by participating in the ECOW AS monetary union. Since the monetary union is 
still at the proposal stage, the issue is addressed by examining the following question: Can 
Nigeria conduct an effective independent monetary policy by changing the quantity of the money 
stock in the economy? 
According to the money multiplier theory of the money stock determination, successfully 
changing the money stock requires the following: Firstly the money multiplier should be stable 
and predictable, and secondly, the monetary base should be exogenously controllable. Although 
the money multiplier and its determinants in Nigeria are found to be stable and predictable, both 
closed and opened economy analyses seem to suggest that the monetary base is endogenous. 
Specifically, it is found to be determined by the demand for money. This implies that the 
monetary base and therefore, the money stock can only be changed by changing the money 
demand. In this case the successful conduct of monetary policy will require a stable money 
demand function which is significantly linked to a control variable. Various specifications 
showed that the Nigerian money demand function is stable. However, the only control variable -
the interest rate is not significant, suggesting that it cannot be used to affect the money demand in 
a significant way. 
These findings suggest that the Nigerian Monetary Authorities have a very limited 
independent monetary policy, and therefore there may be little to lose by participating in the 
ECOW AS monetary union. 
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The Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) is an economIC 
organisation of 16 countries of Africa South of the Sahara. It formally came into 
existence in May 1975 when the treaty establishing it was signed by 15 of the potential 
member countries. The islands of Cape Verde joined in 1979, bring the total membership 
to the present number. The idea for forming ECOW AS was inspired by the 1965 
resolution of the United Nations Commission for Africa, calling for regional economic 
organisations to be formed in all parts of Africa. 
The goal of ECOW AS as given in the treaty and the protocols was to achieve by 
stages the following: 1) The elimination between member states of custom duties and 
similar charges 2) The abolition of non-tariff restrictions on trade among member 
countries 3) A common customs tariff and commercial policies towards third countries 4) 
Free movement between members of persons, services, and capital 5) Harmonisation of 
agricultural policies and promotion of common projects in member states 6) Joint 
development of transport, communication, energy, and other infrastructural facilities, 7) 
Harmonisation of economic and industrial policies of members and elimination of 
disparities in development 8) Harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies, (West 
Africa Magazine 19th Nov. 1984). In short, the aim was to establish what Robson, 1987 
refers to as an economic union among the member countries. 
Although some indigenous languages are spoken across the frontiers of ECOW AS 
countries, 1 at present the countries use French, English, and Portuguese as their lingua 
franca. Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia use English, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo use 
1 Hausa,for example. is spoken in no less than one half of the member countries. while Yoruba. 
Vai. and Mandingo are each spoken in no less than three countries of the sub-region. 
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French, and Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau use Portuguese. This language-divide has 
been the basis for trade and other forms of relationships between countries of the sub-
region since the early 1960s. For example, the French speaking countries are already 
members of an economic organisation (Communaute Economique de l' Afrique de 
l'Ouest - CEAO). In fact, seven of the French speaking countries are members of the 
long established monetary union (The West African Monetary Union - W AMU), with a 
single currency (Communaute Financiere Africaine - CFA franc) and a single central 
bank (Banque Centrales des Estats de l' Afrique de I 'Ouest - BCEAO). The success of 
ECOW AS will, among many other factors, depend on overcoming this divide. 
The total area of ECOWAS countries is about six million square kilometres, 
covenng different vegetations and climatic conditions, (see map above). The 
northernmost countries of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, which are also the largest 
countries area wise, are nearly deserts with very sparse vegetations. The middle area 
covering Burkina Faso, the northern part of Nigeria, The Republic of Benin, Togo, Ghana 
and Guinea are savannah area, while the southernmost areas are tropical rain forest. The 
variety of climatic conditions characterising the different areas of the sub-region ensure 
that ECOW AS countries are endowed with a wide variety of natural resources; ranging 
from diamonds and bauxite in Sierra Leone, uranium and phosphate in Niger and 
Senegal, to crude oil in Nigeria. 
The ECOW AS sub-region IS not only endowed with a rich variety of natural 
resources, but human resources as well. The combined population of the 16 member 
countries was about 190 million in 1988, with Nigeria alone accounting for about 60 
percent of the total. Over 50 percent of this total population, are between the working 
age of 15 to 64 years old. This coupled with the sizable endowment of natural resources 
means ECOW AS potential, in terms of production and market, is tremendous. 
According to the World Bank classification, ECOW AS countries are among the 
lowest income countries in the world, except possibly Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. The 
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combined GDP of the ECOWAS countries in 1988 was about 62.7 billion $US, with an 
average GDP per capita of 331 $US. Cape Verde with 796 $US had the highest while 
Guinea Bissau with 143 $US had the lowest. Nigeria's GDP per-capita of 267 $US was 
far below the average, yet Nigeria alone accounted for over 47 percent of the total GDP 
of ECOWAS, (see Table A2.1). 
Tables (A2.2 to A2.5) show that the legal recorded trade among the member 
countries of ECOW AS is very small. The total imports and exports of the ECOW AS 
countries in 1988 were 14.27 and 15.59 billion $US respectively. Out of this, only 7.5 
percent of the imports and 6.9 percent of the exports went to member countries of 
ECOWAS, while 68.5 percent of the imports and 78.91 percent of the exports went to the 
industrial countries. In fact, by 1990 the percentage of imports and exports to/from 
ECOWAS to ECOWAS had declined to 7.07 and 5.7 percent. Although the percentage 
of imports from the industrialised countries remained almost the same, that of exports 
went up to 83 percent in 1990. 
A number of factors account for this dismal level of intra-ECOWAS trade. Firstly, 
there is a high degree of non-complementarity in the production pattern of these 
countries. In other words, countries of the sub-region produce similar kinds of goods and 
therefore cannot trade with each other. For example, in 1988, agriculture, natural 
resources and the service sectors' contribution to GDP was over 80 percent in all the 
member countries of ECOWAS, while that of the manufacturing sector was less than 20 
percent, (see Table A2.6). This situation can be partly explained by the fact that all 
countries of ECOW AS were colonies until about 30 years ago, and had their production 
geared towards satisfying the similar raw material needs of the different metropolitan 
countries. The production patterns adopted then are still in place, since as mentioned 
above the largest percentage of ECOW AS countries' trade is still with the former 
metropolitan countries. 
The second impediment to intra-ECOW AS trade IS the lack of adequate 
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transportation and communication networks, implying a large economic distance between 
members which reduces comparative advantage differences. Intra-regional roads in most 
cases are footpaths, only good for using donkeys and bicycles, while telephoning some of 
the member countries is only possible through a third country. The trans-ECOWAS 
highway project and others of similar nature are undertaken by ECOW AS with the sole 
intention of reducing this bottleneck. 
Thirdly, the prohibitive level of tariff and other restrictions on trade with the 
member countries has been a major impediment to intra-ECOWAS trade. The main 
reason behind the setting up of the community was to remove these types of 
impediments. The treaty establishing ECOW AS outlined a timetable for achieving this 
end and therefore for the establishment of an economic union within 15 years (by 1985). 
The first two years (1975 - 1977) were designated as the period for consolidating all 
existing duties and taxes between the member countries. During this period, members 
were not to increase existing customs duties or taxes, nor introduce new ones. Four years 
after the consolidation period (by 1981) all non-tariff barriers to trade were to be 
eliminated. Five years after that (by 1985) all import duties between the member 
countries were to be eliminated and a common external tariff be mounted. However 
since ECOWAS did not become operational immediately after signing of the treaty, the 
trade liberalisation scheme was redrawn and the starting point shifted to May 1979. The 
revised scheme had three separate components - liberalisation of trade in unprocessed 
goods, in traditional handicrafts, and in industrial products. 
Since unprocessed goods form the basis of the little trade going on among the 
countries of the sub-region, and since it is believed to constitute the main input to the 
young industrial sector, it was decided that all duties, taxes and non-tariff barriers to 
trade on these goods be eliminated by 1980. There was to be no compensation to 
importing countries for loss of revenue because taxes and duties paid on unprocessed 
goods were negligible to start with. 
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All import duties and taxes, and non-tariff barriers to handicraft trade were to be 
abolished by 1981. As in the case of the unprocessed goods, no compensation was to be 
provided to importing countries for any loss of revenue. Handicraft industry was looked 
upon by the community as an effective base for developing manufacturing skills, 
(ECOW AS Secretariat, 1985). 
On Industrial products, the decision was to simply move the commencing date for 
the trade liberalisation programme from 1975 to 1979. By the end of 1982, there was no 
visible achievement recorded in the community's trade liberalisation programme. The 
main problem was the lack of a clear cut definition of a community product. The 
decision stated that for a product to qualify for community product status, it must be 
produced by an enterprise possessing an "acceptable level" of indigenous ownership. As 
a result of this problem, Nigeria, for example, refused to open its market to manufactured 
goods of French owned companies in Cote D'Ivoire. 
In May 1983, a definite stand was taken on this issue. It was agreed that the 
minimum desirable level of national participation in the equity capital of industrial 
enterprise whose products were to benefit from preferential taxation, was to be realised 
gradually. As from May 1983, at least 20 percent indigenous capital ownership was 
required: by May 1986, 40 percent and by May 1989, 51 percent. The Authority also 
decided that for the trade liberalisation programme to succeed, a common customs 
nomenclature, and a common customs and statistical standards for all countries of the 
organisation were required. Accordingly, a year later (in 1984) a common customs 
declaration form for use in all member states was adopted. 
For the purpose of dismantling tariff barriers, countries of the community were 
classified into three groups, according to their income, and industrial products into 
priority and non-priority products. The countries in group one (Cape Verde, The Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) believed to be the least 
prosperous, have 8 years to eliminate all tariff barriers on priority products and 10 years 
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on non-priority ones. The second group of countries (Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo) have 6 and 8 years for priority and non-priority products. The last 
group of countries (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal), believed to be the most 
prosperous, have 4 and 6 years to eliminate tariff on priority and non-priority products. 
The elimination was to start at the same time (on the 28th May 1983) in all the member 
countries. In the interim period, member countries were to be compensated for revenue 
losses incurred as a result of the elimination of tariff on originating industrial products. 
Although the official recorded trade among the member countries is very small, the 
amount of unrecorded underground trade that exists is believed to be quite substantial. 
This type of trade predates the present boundaries. For example, as far back as the 17th 
century, traders in Katsina, now northern Nigeria, were known to have been taking 
donkey loads of tobacco to the present day Niger, and using the proceeds to take stock 
down to what is now southern Nigeria, and buying kola nuts to take back to the north, ( 
West Africa Magazine, June 30, 1975). The present day boundaries set up during the 
colonial era are to a large extent, ignored and traditional trade (now classified as illegal 
underground trade) actively goes on across the frontiers. A successful economic 
integration in that region could therefore be built upon these traditional trade links 
Another major impediment to intra-ECOWAS trade is the existence of so many 
non-convertible currencies in the region. At present there are 11 different currencies in 
the community. As mentioned earlier, seven of the member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Mali, Senegal and Togo) have a single currency called the CFA 
franc and have a single central bank (BEAO). An arrangement with France guarantees 
the convertibility of this currency. The arrangement is such that BCEAO is to keep the 
pooled foreign exchange reserves of the member countries in the French Treasury in an 
account known as "the operation account". The member countries of WAMU have no 
payments impediments regarding trade with each other. Although the CF A francs issued 
to the different member countries are, for accounting purposes, differentiated by a letter 
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at the beginning of the numbers on each currency note, all CFA francs have the same 
value and are fully acceptable in all member countries. The fact that most of the intra-
ECOW AS trade is between the member countries of W AMU may point to the 
importance of the ease with which payments for trade can be made. 
All payments and receipts for trade with non-operation account countries, which 
include the other member nations of ECOWAS are carried out through France, with the 
French franc serving as vehicle currency. The official exchange rates between the CFA 
franc and the French franc is fixed at 50 CF A to 1 French franc. The exchange rate for all 
other currencies are arrived at by using the rate quoted in the Paris exchange market for 
the currency concerned, and the fixed rate between the CFA franc and the French franc. 
For example, in 1980, the average rate for the Nigerian naira in terms of the French franc 
was 0.756 franc for 1 naira. The official exchange rate for naira in terms of the CFA 
franc was therefore, 37.80 (50 x 0.756) CFA for 1 naira. An importer from Nigeria 
would have to exchange the naira into French francs and then to CFA francs before 
effecting payments for transactions with any member country of WAMU. All other 
currencies in the region, except the Liberian dollar, are completely non-convertible, and 
all transactions would have to be carried out using a third currency. 
To alleviate this particular bottleneck to intra-community trade, ECOW AS has in 
the short-run sought to establish a clearing house where payments between member 
countries can be settled, and in the long-run to form a complete monetary union. 
Accordingly the West African Clearing House (W ACH) was established and started 
operation in July, 1976, (Osagie, 1979). All current account transactions, except 
purchases of oil from Nigeria and payments for goods originating from a third country 
can be settled through the WACH. 
The clearing mechanism in W ACH is similar to clearing transactions by a national 
central bank of cheques submitted by commercial banks. W ACH acts like a central bank, 
while the national central banks take on the role of commercial banks. All transactions 
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would have to go through a commercial bank and a national central bank. If, for 
example, a business man in Nigeria purchases some goods from a firm in Ghana, he 
would first of all direct his commercial bank to make the payment. The commercial bank 
in Nigeria would pay to the Central Bank of Nigeria the amount in naira. The Nigerian 
Central Bank will notify its counterpart in Ghana, and the Clearing House, where the 
account of the Nigerian Central Bank is debited while that of the Central Bank of Ghana 
is credited by that amount. The Clearing House will also, in its own right, inform the 
Ghanian Central Bank of the transaction. The Central Bank of Ghana will then credit the 
account of the exporter firm's commercial bank, and the commercial bank will credit the 
exporter finn's account in Ghanian currency. At the end of every month, the Clearing 
House would tally up the balances of each member state and debit balances are then 
settled. 
Although the final balances with the clearing house can be settled in pounds 
sterling, French francs, US dollars, Swiss franc or Deutschmarks, they are recorded in a 
numeraire unit called the West African Unit of Account (W AUA), whose value is fixed at 
par with the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This helps to protect the values of 
monetary claims and payments from exchange rate changes that might arise if any single 
currency were used. The SDR and by definition the WAUA is measured in terms of a 
basket of currency rather than any single currencies. 
After the difficulties of the fonnative years, the West African Clearing House took 
off modestly. In the year 1982/83, 158.31 million WAUA worth of transactions went 
through it. The value of transaction reached its peak in 1983/1984 with an amount of 
224.40 million W AUA. Since then this value has been declining, such that in the year 
1988/1989 only 28.22 million WAUA worth of transactions passed through it. The main 
problem has been the delay in settling the debit balances. For example, by the end of 
1982, the total accumulated debt was 9.2 million WAUA (about 10 million US dollars). 
By the end of 1985, the debt position had worsened to 50.1 million WAUA (about 55 
9 
million US dollars), with the oldest debt recorded, about 40 months in arrears. There are 
three main reasons for this problem; Firstly, commercial banks, through which the 
clearing mechanism begins and ends, often failed to demonstrate adequate grasp of the 
mechanism. Secondly, Central Banks in the sub-region have suffered acute foreign 
exchange shortages due to deteriorations in their external earnings, and therefore could 
not undertake settlements as and when due. Lastly, WACH itself has had difficulties 
notifying national central banks of their debtor/creditor positions, thus causing the 
balances to build up. 
As mentioned earlier, W ACH is only an interim measure. In addition to its dismal 
performance so far, W ACH has not totally eliminated the use of hard currencies for 
intra-ECOW AS trade. ECOW AS has a monetary cooperation programme which 
ultimately intends to establish a single currency and a single central bank for all the 
member countries. 
The legal bases of the ECOW AS monetary cooperation programme are Articles 
2(h) and and 36 l(b) of the treaty. These articles stipulate the pursuit of harmonisation of 
the monetary policies of the member states as soon as possible. The programme 
however, did not take a definite shape until May 1987. Studies commissioned by the 
community established that the idea of a single monetary zone in the sub-region is 
desirable and feasible. It suggested that the ideal system is the one that operates among 
the seven WAMU countries, who are also members of ECOWAS. In other words, the 
ideal system is a single currency with a single central bank for all the 16 member 
countries. This was supposed to be achieved in three phases. The first phase, which was 
expected to last four years (1986 - 1989), was to be the adjustment phase, where 
exchange rates, credit and fiscal policies of the member countries were to be harmonised 
under the supervision of a coordinating committee. Based on a successful completion of 
the first phase, the second phase (1989 - 1990) was expected to see the setting up of 
functional structures, and the last phase (1991 - 1992) would see the replacement of the 
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national currencies by a common one and turning of national central banks into branches 
of the ECOW AS wide central bank. Except for the monetary reforms undertaken by 
individual member countries as part of structural adjustment sweeping across developing 
countries all over the world, there has not been any visible signs of progress. However, 
these reforms have led to a greater harmonisation of exchange rates of the member 
nations that the the Executive secretary of ECOWAS believes that flit is now easier for 
the member countries to adopt fiscal and supply side measures to sustain and strengthen 
the monetary situation and lead to the creation of a single monetary zone" (West Africa 
Weekly Magazine, 28th May - 3rd June, 1990). 
The issue of monetary cooperation has occupied a place of prommence m 
discussions among not only the member countries of ECOW AS, but of many other 
regional economic organisations all over the world. In Europe, monetary union is 
occupying centre stage in discussions among the member countries of the EEC. For the 
South East Asian organisation, a study by Dodsworth and Diamond (1980) suggested that 
it could be beneficial for countries of the region to have a monetary cooperation 
programme. In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also discussing 
monetary cooperation among the member countries. 
The theoretical approach to the issue of monetary cooperation among nations is 
divided into two. The traditional approach, dubbed as the "theory of optimum currency 
areas" bases the desirability of a country or a region taking part in a monetary 
cooperation programme (defined in terms of having their exchange rates fixed to each 
others) on the effect it will have on standard objectives of full employment, price 
stability and balance of payments equilibrium. According to the pioneering work of 
Mundell (1961), the single criterion for a group of regions or group of countries to have 
their exchange rates fixed to each others is the degree of factor mobility within the group. 
If factors of production are highly mobile, it is possible for the standard objectives to be 
attained under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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McKinnon (1963) is of the view that the appropriate criterion is the degree of 
openness of the economies of prospective member nations. To him openness is defined 
in terms of the ratio of tradable goods and services (importables and exportables) to non-
tradable ones. The more open is the economy, the less effective it would be to use the 
exchange rate as a tool for correcting external imbalance. He argued that using the 
exchange rate may in fact lead to an instability of domestic prices. A group of regions or 
countries that are highly open, according to the above definition of openness, would do 
better to fix their exchange rates and use monetary and fiscal policies to correct any 
external imbalances. 
According to Kenen (1969), the degree of product diversification should be the best 
criterion. A country or region that produces a large number of different kinds of products 
can afford to have its exchange rate fixed and thus be a member of a currency area. The 
rationale is that change in the external demand of one of the many products of this 
country will have a lesser effect on unemployment than if the country were a 
monoproduct country. Countries or regions that produce a variety of products should 
therefore come together to form a currency area, while mono-product countries should be 
currency areas themselves and have a flexible exchange rate with the rest of the world. 
Other criteria put forward include a degree of financial integration, similarity in the 
rates of inflation, and a high degree of policy integration, etc. (see Ishiyama, 1975 for a 
survey). 
The alternative approach to the question of which countries or regions should join in 
a monetary union does not concentrate on a single criterion. Instead, it evaluates a whole 
range of costs and benefits to a country, and weighs one against the other. If the benefits 
are found to be more than the costs, a country should join the monetary union, and vice 
versa. 
Although the theory of optimum currency areas is defined in terms of countries 
having their exchange rates permanently fixed to each other, monetary cooperation 
12 
among nations may take other forms. The ultimate monetary cooperation entails the 
establishment of a single central bank, which issues one currency for all the member 
nations, coordinates their monetary policy and pools their foreign exchange reserves (the 
proposed ECOWAS type). Some of the likely benefits of this kind of monetary 
cooperation are as follows: Firstly, a common currency, especially in a group of 
developing countries will be more stable than an individual country's currency. This is 
partly because a single member country cannot unilaterally act in a manner that will 
affect the value, and partly because internal and external shocks would be spread across 
the member countries. Eitherway, this stability is likely to improve the investment 
climate and thus encourage investments (especially foreign investments) in the region. 
Secondly, risk of exchange rate variation that is likely to exist if member countries have 
different currencies will be eliminated, thus promoting intra-regional trade. Thirdly, it is 
likely to lead to foreign reserves savings. Countries do not have to use foreign currency 
for intra-regional trade, thus reducing the needs for its use. This also encourages intra-
regional trade. This is particularly important for developing countries who are usually 
faced with a chronic shortage of foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, having one 
central bank with pooled reserves means individual countries could dispense with 
institutions whose sole function is to manage foreign exchange, and divert the resources 
elsewhere. 
Although there are some benefits to a country in becoming a member of the above 
type of monetary cooperation programme, there are also some offsetting costs associated 
with it. The most obvious of these costs is the loss of autonomy in the pursuit of 
independent national macroeconomic policies; specifically, monetary, fiscal and 
exchange rate policies. The quantity of money to be supplied each period is determined 
through some collective decision making body like a union-wide central bank. National 
governments virtually surrender the power to alter the money supply when and as they 
see fit. This implies that sudden shocks to the economy cannot be responded to 
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immediately, as the union-wide decision making body may only meet at certain fixed 
intervals, e.g yearly, or quarterly. In addition to the constraint on independent monetary 
policy, there also might be limitations on some aspect of fiscal policies. For example, it 
is highly likely for government deficit financing through the central bank to be fixed by 
the union-wide monetary authority. This constraint will be most serious for developing 
countries where, a large percentage of government deficits are financed through 
borrowing from the central bank. Even if a looser kind of monetary cooperation is 
envisaged, a meaningful cooperation will at least require that exchange rates of the 
member countries be permanently fixed to each other. As in the cases of the monetary 
and fiscal policies, decisions to change the exchange rate can only be taken collectively. 
The exchange rate as a tool, for example to improve competitiveness, is no longer 
available to the individual member nations. 
Another cost is that this type of monetary UnIon is likely to enhance rather than 
reduce imbalances between member countries. It is likely for the capital markets to be 
integrated, such that capital is absolutely free to move from one member country to 
another. However, if there is a differential in the rate at which member countries grow, 
capital will be attracted away from slow growing countries to fast growing countries 
because the unit labour cost in the latter is likely to be lower. This will worsen 
unemployment in the slow growing countries. In the context of developing countries, 
capital and investment could be attracted to the more developed member countries 
because there may be more advanced infrastructure and other industries that provide 
linkages and external economies. These more developed member countries will then 
become the poles of growth at the expense of the least developed ones. 
In this study, one of the likely costs of the ECOW AS monetary cooperation 
programme for Nigeria will be investigated. Specifically, the degree to which Nigeria is 
likely to lose the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy will be examined. 
Since the monetary cooperation programme is still at the proposal stage, the issue will be 
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handled in an indirect manner, by addressing the following question: Are the Nigerian 
Monetary Authorities able to conduct an independent monetary policy at present or in the 
past? A negative answer to the above question means that the cost associated with the 
loss of monetary policy independence will be negligible since it never had any to start 
with. Being a pioneering one, this study is not expected to give a conclusive answer to 
the vital question of whether Nigeria should be a part of the ECOW AS monetary union. 
To answer that, the other likely costs plus the likely benefits of Nigeria's membership 
would have to be evaluated and weighed. 
The study is organised in six chapters. In chapter 1 a reVIew of the Nigerian 
financial sector is presented with the aim of providing necessary background information 
for the subsequent chapters. Specifically, the historical developments of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and its function as the main agent of monetary policy and fiscal 
policy is analysed. The implications of the ECOW AS monetary integration with respect 
to these vital functions are also examined. The commercial banks and their importance 
as agents of monetary and fiscal policies are also briefly considered. Further, the 
developments of the Nigerian money market and the capital market are also reviewed. 
The historical development of exchange controls in Nigeria coupled with some ingenious 
ways adopted to achieve a realistic level of the exchange rate for the Nigerian naira are 
also analysed. 
The aim of chapter 2 is to investigate econometrically the stability and predictability 
of the Nigerian money multiplier. According to the money multiplier/monetary base 
theory of money supply determination, for a given, stable and predictable money 
multiplier, the monetary base can be altered to achieve a certain level of desired money 
stock in the economy. If the money multiplier is not stable and predictable, it is 
impossible for the Nigerian monetary authorities to be certain of the value the money 
stock is ultimately to take when the monetary base is altered. In this case the monetary 
authorities would not be able control the money stock and may not have any independent 
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monetary policy. It is the belief of this study that it is not enough to simply observe the 
year to year fluctuations of the money multiplier and come to a conclusion about its 
stability or lack of it. In Nigeria there have been various kinds of internal and external 
shocks which affected the money multiplier. Instead, the money multiplier and its 
components (currency and reserve ratios) will be modelled econometrically and the 
empirical models used to investigate the ease with which future values of these variables 
can be predicted. Approaching the issue in this manner, shocks and regime shifts to the 
economy can be handled by the use of dummy variables. 
The main premise behind the analyses of chapter 2 is that the monetary base can be 
exogenously controlled by the monetary authorities, which in fact may not be true. This 
issue, and critique of the money multiplier approach as a theory of money supply 
determination is developed in chapter 3. It has been argued that the money multiplier 
approach is deficient because the basic money stock equation is nothing more than an 
identity. As an identity, it lacks the behavioural content to be a theory. A model for 
money stock determination should be broad enough to take into account explicitly the 
behaviour of all the participating agents. In other words, money should be treated as one 
of many assets in the portfolio of an economic agent. With regard to the monetary base, 
Post Keynesians argue that it is endogenous and not exogenous. The monetary base, 
defined to be equal to the currency in circulation plus the reserves of the commercial 
banks, changes in direct response to changes in the demand for credit. An increase in 
credit demand leads to an increase in credit, and thus deposits. A component of all 
deposits would have to be held as reserves, thus increasing the banks' reserves and the 
monetary base. It is the increase in money (deposits) which leads to an increase in the 
monetary base and not the other way round. According to this line of reasoning, central 
banks can neither control the monetary base nor the money stock. 
One way of putting the Post Keynesians' proposition to an empirical test is for the 
direction of causality between domestic credit and the money stock on the one hand, and 
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the money stock and the monetary base on the other hand, to be determined. Causality 
running from domestic credit to money, then from money to the monetary base indicates 
that the monetary base and the money stock are endogenous. The Granger-Sims 
causality test is used to determine whether the Nigerian monetary base and the money 
stock are in fact endogenous as postulated by the Post Keynesians. If the monetary base 
is endogenous, even if the money multiplier were stable and predictable, the money stock 
cannot be controlled by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The only way the money stock can 
be changed for monetary policy purposes is to change the demand for it, or use direct 
credit control. 
Controlling the money stock by changing the demand for it will require a stable 
demand function which is significantly linked to the control variable. The issue of 
stability of the Nigerian money demand function is taken up in chapter 4. Three separate 
specifications of the money demand function (partial adjustment, levels and changes, and 
error-correction and cointegration) will be estimated using the Nigerian data. 
Chapters 5 and 6 introduce open economy elements. So far the monetary base is 
looked at through the liability side of the central bank's balance sheet. Using the assets 
side the monetary base can be defined as the sum of net foreign and the net domestic 
assets of the central bank. The central bank cannot change the monetary base through the 
foreign assets component because the foreign assets (mainly the foreign exchange 
reserves), are determined by external conditions. Any change in the monetary base can 
only arise by changing the domestic component. According to the monetary approach to 
the balance of payments theory, a sustained change in the monetary base is impossible 
because any change in the domestic component is offset by an equal but opposite change 
in the foreign component. This would seem to suggest that the monetary base is 
endogenous and cannot be controlled by the central bank. 
Chapter 5 critically assesses the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
theory. It also derives and discusses the equation often estimated to measure the degree 
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of offset to the domestic component of the monetary base by the foreign component 
(reserves flow equation). One of the major assumptions behind the monetary approach 
theory is that countries do not sterilise balance of payments deficits and surpluses. The 
equation used to test this contention - monetary policy reaction function - is also derived 
and discussed. Furthermore, a theoretical possibility of reconciling the monetary 
approach and the Keynesian approach to the balance of payments is explored. 
Criticisms of the reserves flow equation include the fact that it is derived from the 
money market conditions alone, to the exclusion of all other sectors of the economy, and 
the fact that it is a long-run analysis where the domestic prices, interest rates and income 
are assumed to be optimally given. In chapter 6, the offset coefficient is derived in the 
context of a macro-model which includes not only the money market, but goods market 
and the external sector of the economy. Furthermore, domestic prices, income and 
interest rates are allowed to change, and thus effectively give the offset coefficient in the 
short-run. In the second part of the chapter, the reserve flow equation, the equation 
derived from the macro-model, the monetary policy reaction functions plus an exchange 
rate change reaction function will be estimated with a view to measuring the offset 
coefficient for Nigeria. An offset coefficient value of minus one means that the monetary 
base in Nigeria is endogenous and therefore, cannot be controlled by the Central Bank. 
The overall summary and conclusion of the findings are then presented. Two 




A Review of the Nigerian Financial Sector 
1.1 Introduction 
The Nigerian financial sector is the most developed in ECOWAS. It has had a 
functioning central bank since 1959. Like any other modern central bank, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria performs the traditional function of being the guardian of the financial 
system of the country. Its primary function however is that of planning and executing 
monetary policy. Of the many tools of monetary policy open to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, only a few have been used effectively. Open market operations have never been 
used in the country. The liquidity and other ratios have been used but not effectively, 
because the actual observed ratios have always been higher than the prescribed ones. The 
most often utilised tool is the sectoral and overall credit control. Every year the Central 
Bank directs commercial banks and other financial institutions, as to the total percentage 
of credit expansion and the distribution of this credit to the different sectors of the 
economy. Besides the primary function, the Central Bank of Nigeria has been a vehicle 
for Government deficit financing since its establishment. 
Nigeria also has a fair number of commercial banks, both domestic and foreign 
owned. There is also a functioning money market since 1960. Both the volume and the 
value of instruments traded in the money market have grown tremendously. 
One of the two organised stock exchanges in the region is in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
Stock Exchange was set up in 1961 and since then it has expanded its trading in both 
government and private stocks and shares, especially since the oil boom of the early 
1970s. There is every possibility for the Nigerian Stock Exchange to be a centre for all 
ECOW AS, when the ECOW AS monetary integration programme takes off. The other 
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stock exchange which is in Cote d'Ivoire, was established in 1976, and it IS at a 
rudimentary stage of development compared to the one in Nigeria. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide background information for the rest of the 
thesis. Hence, it is descriptive and concentrates on the institutional details.! The 
remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: In section 1.2 a discussion about the 
historical development of the Central Bank of Nigeria, and its functions, with a special 
emphasis on that of being an agent for monetary and fiscal policy is carried out. Section 
1.3 looks at the development of commercial and other banking activities in the country, 
while section 1.4 deals with the money market; and section 1.5 concentrates on the 
Nigerian capital market. The historical development of the exchange control measures in 
Nigeria, coupled with some new developments in the foreign exchange market are 
examined in section 1.6. Section 1.7 presents a summary and conclusion to the chapter. 
1.2 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
The beginning of central banking in Nigeria, and the whole of the former British 
West Africa, dates back to the era of the West African Currency Board (WACB), first 
formed in 1912. The WACB was not a central bank in the modem sense of the word. It 
issued currency and exchanged domestic currency for foreign currency (pound sterling) 
when the need arose. It did not have the power to carry out independent monetary policy. 
Money supply went up or down in accordance with changes in the foreign reserves 
position of the country. This meant that the money supply went up automatically in 
years of good exports and vice-versa. 
A functional central bank (the Central Bank of Nigeria - hereafter referred to as the 
CBN) was established by the Central Bank Ordinance of 1958, and became operational in 
July 1959. Functions of the bank, as stated in the ordinance, are to issue currency in 
Nigeria, to maintain external reserves in order to safeguard the international value of the 
1 For a comprehensive discussion a/the Nigerian financial system see Nwankwo, 1980. 
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Nigerian currency, to promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure for 
Nigeria, and to act as a banker and adviser to the Federal Government of Nigeria, (CBN 
Economic & Financial Review, June 1979). 
The CBN is fully owned by the Nigerian Government, who appoints the Governor 
and the members of the Board of Directors. At present, the Bank is organised into four 
main sections - The Governors!Deputy Governor's office, Monetary and Banking policy, 
Operations, and Management and Staff Services. Under each section are departments 
headed by a head of department or its equivalent. As of December 1987 there were 27 
departments and autonomous units. 
The primary function of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), like any other modern 
central bank, is the formulation and execution of the country's monetary policy. The 
objective of monetary policy in Nigeria is to achieve the following: a real growth of the 
economy, stable prices, and a healthy balance of payments. The starting point of 
fonnulating monetary policy in Nigeria, is for the CBN to carry out a general review of 
the existing economic and financial condition of the country. The next step is for it to 
design the future course of the economy. The CBN would then submit the design of the 
future course of the economy, the policy objectives of the design, and the monetary 
policy tools that can be used to achieve the policy objectives, to the Federal Government 
as a proposal. The Government after consultations with the relevant ministries, releases 
the Central Bank proposal as a monetary policy circular. The CBN then sends the 
circular to the financial institutions. A typical monetary policy circular issued, would 
contain the amount of bank credit expansion and the sectoral distribution of that credit 
for that year. It would also contain the interest rate structure for the economy, and the 
required minimum cash and liquidity ratios. 
Although all the modern tools of monetary policy are open to the CBN, it has so far 
used only a few. Open market operations in the traditional sense of the term - buying and 
selling government securities, with the sole intention of enhancing or reducing the 
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abilities of the financial institutions to extend credit has never been undertaken in 
Nigeria. This is partly because of the narrowness (perceived or real) of the Nigerian 
money market, but most importantly, because of the effect it will have on the interest rate 
and thus the cost of government borrowing and deficit financing. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria has the power not only to set the required liquidity 
ratio for all commercial banks, but also to define and vary what constitute a liquid asset. 
The Central Bank can also set different liquidity ratios for different types of deposits and 
for different banks. The liquidity ratio was first set in 1958 at 30 percent, but later in 
1962 reduced to 25 percent. It remained at that level until 1987 when it was raised to 30 
percent again. Furthermore, the ratios were the same for all banks and all types of 
accounts. The required liquidity ratio in Nigeria has been an ineffective tool of monetary 
restraint. In addition to the fact it has been virtually fixed at the same level since its 
inception, the actual liquidity ratios of the banks have always been greater than the 
prescribed ones. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria is also empowered, for the purpose of maintaining 
monetary stability of the economy, to issue, place, sell, repurchase, amortise or redeem 
securities known as the stabilisation security. It can issue and sell this security to any 
commercial bank or financial institution it deems fit. This instrument was used for the 
first time in 1976 to control the inflationary pressures arising from the rapid expansion in 
the commercial banks liquidity brought about by the increase in oil revenue in Nigeria. 
The Central Bank can also use variables that affect the cost of money. Specifically, 
it can control the minimum rediscount rate which is linked to the commercial banks' 
savings and lending rates. Unlike the other tools, the Central Bank has been actively 
using the discount rate for monetary policy purposes since 1962. The discount rate was 
first changed in 1963 - reducing it by 0.5 percent to 4 percent. In December 1964, it was 
raised to 5 percent and in May 1968 it was reduced to 4.5 percent. The discount rate 
remained at that level until April 1975 when it was further reduced to 3.5. However, in 
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the face of the inflationary pressure caused by the monetisation of the Government's oil 
revenue, the rate was raised to 4 percent in April 1977, and then to 5 percent in 1978n9. 
Since then the discount rate has been continuously rising, such that by 1987 it has 
reached 15 percent. Prior to 1987, not only did the Central Bank control the discount 
rate, but all other interest rates as well. However, since 1987 it only fixes the discount 
rate to indicate the desired direction of change in all other interest rates. These frequent 
fixings of the interest rates seem to indicate that Nigeria, for monetary policy purposes, 
targets the interest rate and allows the monetary base to adjust. 
The most widely used tool for monetary policy purposes is credit controls. The 
CBN, in addition to setting a ceiling on aggregate credit expansion for the economy, also 
issues directives to financial institutions to allocate a certain percentage of the total credit 
in any given year to a certain specific sector. The attractiveness of this tool, unlike the 
other tools, lies in its ability to affect the money stock directly. For the purpose of credit 
allocation, the economy is divided into preferred and less preferred sectors. The 
preferred sector, includes agriculture, small scale industries, etc. The ceiling on total 
bank credit expansion to the private sector in 1985 was 7.0 percent; of which 75 percent 
was to go to the preferred sector, and 25 percent to the less preferred sector. The actual 
increase in bank credit achieved for that year was 5.5 percent, 1.5 percent short of the 
ceiling. Allocation to the preferred sector also fell short of the guide line by 6.8 percent. 
As far as these standard tools of monetary policy are concerned, they are either 
never used by the Central Bank, or where an attempt has been made, they resulted in a 
minimal level of success. This may mean that there is very little to lose by surrendering 
their use to an ECOWAS-wide Central Bank. 
Besides the traditional function of fonnulating and executing monetary policy, the 
Nigerian Central Bank has been a major source of government deficit finance. The CBN 
acts as a vehicle for government deficit finance, firstly by organising and issuing debt 
instruments like the Treasury Bills, Treasury Certificates, etc. and secondly by 
23 
purchasing some of the debt instruments issued. Quite often the Central Bank ends up 
buying the largest percentage of the debt instruments issued. For example, out of the 
111.15 billion naira worth of treasury bills issued in 1988, the Central Bank purchased 
over 80 percent (89.02 billion naira). The total treasury certificate issued that year was 
about 6.5 billion naira; out of which the Central Bank purchased about 69 percent (4.74 
billion naira) of this total. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1.1 below, nearly 50 percent 
of the total Government domestic debt outstanding, since 1980, was owed to the Central 
Bank. Of all the functions of the Central Bank of Nigeria, that is likely to be lost in the 
event of the ECOWAS monetary union, it is the loss of this particular one that may cause 
the most concern to the Government of Nigeria. However, this may not be entirely a bad 
thing, since it is likely to instill some discipline into the government deficit spending in a 
manner not possible for the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Table 1.1 
Holdings of the Fed. Gov. Domestic Debt 
(Millions of naira) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Central Bank 2859.2 6046.6 8022.5 11347.4 10701.4 11521.9 17721.6 19163.6 28353.9 
Comm. Banks 2978.9 2135.2 3168.5 5459.7 8998.2 10669.1 4968.3 8219.8 6774.6 
Merchant Banks 60.1 70.9 176.6 388.8 895.0 1165.1 159.9 290.5 243.0 
Non-Bank Public 2020.2 3192.2 3479.9 5028.4 5080.4 4595.9 5601.4 9126.7 11659.6 
h'otal 7918.4 11444.9 14847.5 22224.3 25675 27952 28451.2 36800.6 4703l.1 
Sources: CBN Economic and Financial Review 
1.3 Commercial Banking 
The first commercial bank in Nigeria, and indeed in all of the former British West 
Africa, was the West African Banking Corporation (WABC) which started operation in 
Nigeria in 1891. This bank, besides providing normal banking services to the expatriate 
traders, was also the sole importer of the British coins into West Africa. It carried out 
this function until the formation of the West African Currency Board in 1912. 
The West African Banking Corporation (WABC) changed its name to the Bank of 
British West Africa (BBWA) in 1893, to the Bank of West Africa (BWA) in 1957, the 
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Standard Bank of Nigeria in 1969, and the First Bank of Nigeria in 1979. The second 
commercial bank to be established in the region was Barclays Bank DCO. This bank, 
formed in 1926, had branches in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. In Nigeria, 
the name of the Bank was changed to the Union Bank in 1979. The third major bank was 
the United Bank of Africa (UBA) established after World War II. These pioneer 
commercial banks in Nigeria were completely foreign owned with lending practices that 
were discriminatory against indigenous businessmen. Indigenous banks became a 
necessity to cater for the rapidly growing indigenous business class. The first indigenous 
bank in Nigeria was the short-lived Industrial and Commercial Bank which was 
established in 1924 and went bankrupt 6 years later in 1930. The indigenous commercial 
banks that survived till today include The National Bank of Nigeria established in 1933, 
The Wema Bank established in 1945, and the African Continental Bank established in 
1948. By the end of 1950 there were seven established commercial banks operating in 
Nigeria. By 1963 the number of commercial banks (foreign owned, indigenous, and 
mixed) has risen to 16 (Brown, 1966). At the end of 1980, there were 20 commercial 
banks with 740 branches operating all over the country. By 1987, the number of 
commercial banks has increased by more than 50 percent to 33, while that of the 
branches has gone up by more than 100 percent to 1,483. The total assets of the 
commercial banks have also risen from about 434 million naira in 1965, to over 64 
billion naira by the end of 1989, (see Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 
Total Assets/Liabilities 
eM ill ions of naira - End of Period) 
Year Ending 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Central Bank 239.08 452.33 4,104.40 9,357.4 15,727.6 91,903 
Commercial Banks 434.28 1,152.04 4,308.00 16,340.5 31,997.9 64,874.20 
Sources: CBN Economic and Financial Review (Various Issues) 
In addition to their regular functions, the commercial banks in Nigeria playa very 
important role in the financing of the Federal Government deficits. A large percentage of 
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government bonds issued are subscribed to by the commercial banks. For example, in 
any given year between 1980 and 1987, the non-bank public subscribed to less than 10 
percent of the treasury bills issue. The remaining 90 percent was shared between the 
Central Bank and the commercial banks. The percentage of the yearly issues purchased 
by the commercial banks varied from year to year. In 1980 the commercial banks 
purchased 70.6 percent of the total issue, while in 1987, only 18.7 percent of the total 
issue was purchased by the commercial banks, (CBN Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts, various issues). The decline in the share of government securities purchased 
by the commercial banks during the late 1980s is due to the liquidity squeeze they 
experienced, brought about by the tight money policy of the government to control 
inflation. The extent to which commercial banks are involved in government deficit 
financing can also be seen from the amount of the total government debts owed to them 
since 1980, (see Table 1.1 above). 
Merchant banking in Nigeria also grew from 6 with 12 branches in 1980 to 16 with 
33 branches in 1987. By the end of 1987, total merchant banks' assetslliabilities stood at 
about 12.3 billion naira. There are also 4 specialised development banks (Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry 
(NBCI), Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative Bank (NACB), and the Federal Mortgage 
Bank of Nigeria (FMBN». All 4 development banks are fully owned by the government. 
Their assetslliabilities as at the end of 1987 were 852.9, 406.8, 550.2 and 584.3 million 
naira respectively. The Nigerian Financial market also has 87 registered insurance 
compames. 
Despite the number of commercial banks and branches operating in Nigeria at the 
moment, the country is still considered to be under-banked, compared to the industrial 
countries of the West. As at the end of 1980, the ratio of bank branches to the population 
in Nigeria was about 1 to 1 million people. The number for the UK was 1 to 4000, while 
that of the US was 1 to 6000. At present indigenous banks do not operate in the different 
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member countries of ECOW AS. Regulations about establishing and runmng a bank 
differ across the member countries. The ECOW AS monetary integration programme is 
likely to harmonise all rules relating to banking activities and expand the prospects for 
Nigerian indigenous banks to open branches in the other member countries. This may 
also enhance the trade within the region, since it is easier for transactions to be carried 
out through branches of the same bank than otherwise. 
1.4 The Money Market 
The legal starting point of the Nigerian money market was the Treasury Bills 
Ordinance of 1959. This Ordinance empowered the Nigerian government to borrow 
money by issuing treasury bills (TBs) through the CBN. The CBN designed and issued 
the first TBs for 4 million Nigerian pounds in April 1960. At the initial stage the TBs 
issue was restricted to 10 percent of the estimated revenue of the Federal Government 
during the year. As time went on, this limit was relaxed. In 1961 it was increased to 20 
percent of the expected revenue, and then to 40 percent in 1962, to 50 percent in 1963, to 
100 percent In 1969, and to 150 percent in 1971. Due to the continuous over-
subscription of the Treasury Bills, another short-term money market instrument 
(Treasury Certificate) was introduced to the Nigerian money market in 1968. In April 
1975 three more instruments were introduced, with the aim of creating an additional 
investment outlet for the Commercial banks. 
1 Certificate of Deposits:- This is basically an inter-bank debt instrument to provide 
avenues for commercial banks to deploy their short-term surplus funds in a readily 
marketable instrument. It was also expected to create sources of funds for the 
issuing houses, such as the merchant banks. The negotiable certificate of deposits 
have a maturity range of between 3 and 36 months. If a certificate of deposit is of 
less than 18 months maturity, it is treated as a demand liability, and also classified 
as a liquid asset which is rediscountable at the CBN. 
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11 Bankers Unit Fund (BUF):- This instrument is indirectly linked to the Federal 
Government Stocks. Its introduction was expected to serve the desire of the 
financial institutions to invest a portion of their surplus in an asset linked to the 
Federal Government Stock. BUF is issued in multiples of 10,000 naira. The money 
collected from BUF sales are further invested in government securities of varying 
maturities by the CBN. Investment in BUF counts as part of a bank's liquid assets. 
Money invested in BUF is repayable on demand, as long as calls are made in 
multiples of 10,000 naira. 
111 Eligible Development Stock:- This instrument consists of Government 
development stocks of not more than three years maturity, held by the commercial 
banks. Eligible development stock held also accounts as part of total liquid assets in 
calculating statutory liquidity ratios of banks, (CBN Annual Report and Statement 
of Account, 1975). 
The Nigerian money market has grown tremendously SInce these three new 
instruments. Table 1.3 shows that the total value of outstanding instruments went up 
from 926,200 naira in 1975 to 24 million by 1985, and to 33.7 million by 1987. This is 
an increase of more than 3000 percent between 1975 to 1987. 
Table 1.3 
Money Market Instruments Outstanding 
(in 000' s of naira) 
Instruments 1975 1980 1985 1987 
Treasury Bills 616.0 2,119.0 16,976.0 25,226.0 
Treasury Certs. 228.0 3,027.6 6,644.0 6,664.1 
Bankers Unit Fund 40.0 28.3 20.3 8.6 
Eligible Dev. Stocks 7.3 3l.7 26.2 26.3 
Cert. of Deposits 2.5 120.9 21l.7 1,349.4 
Comm. Papers 32.4 48.1 218.2 496.4 
Total Outstanding 926.2 5,375.6 24,096.4 33,771.8 
Sources: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts; Various Issues 
1.5 The Capital Market 
A capital market or a stock exchange is defined as an organised market that provides 
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facilities for dealing in stocks and shares; and through which new capital could be raised 
by offering securities to the public, (Arowolo, 1971). In Nigeria, an organised capital 
market first came into existence in 1961, when the Lagos Stock Exchange was opened for 
business. The Lagos Stock Exchange (later named the Nigerian Stock Exchange) with 
headquarters in Lagos and branches in two other cities is fairly developed by developing 
country standards. 
Table 1.4 
Volume and Value of Transactions in the Nig. Cap. Mkt. 
(For Some Selected Years) 
Year Volume of Transactions Value of Transactions 
(in millions of naira) 
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT TOTAL INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT 
1975 694 501 193 63.73 0.903 62.83 
1980 7,138 6,918 220 388.80 7.90 380.90 
1985 2,3546 23,232 314 318.50 23.20 295.30 
1986 27,718 27,448 270 495.60 20.0 475.60 
1987 20,648 20,410 238 380.50 42.30 338.20 
1988 21,562 21,466 96 249.60 32.50 217.10 
1989 33,447 33,273 174 672.4 62.90 609.50 
Sources: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Account; CBN Economic and Financial Review 
(Various Issues). 
The Volume and Value of transactions in the Nigerian Stock Exchange grew very 
rapidly since its establishment. By the end of 1961 (six months after it was opened for 
business), 334 transactions valued at 760,100 Nigerian pounds had gone through the 
market. Of the total number of transactions in 1961, 91 were related to government 
securities and 242 for industrial securities. The total volume of transactions in 1965 was 
1,018, with a value of 7.9 million Nigerian pounds. Since 1975, there has been a 
remarkable increase in the volume and value of transactions carried out in the Nigerian 
capital market, (see Table 1.4). The dramatic increase in transactions in the mid-1970's 
was due to the Nigerian indigenisation promotion decree, which required that a 
controlling interest in all companies should be held by Nigerians. This decree has been 
amended in 1989 to allow for up to 100 percent acquisition of any Nigerian company, 
excluding Petroleum related companies, Banks, Insurance companies and other financial 
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institutions, by foreigners. The decline in the vol ume of transactions in the later part of 
the 1980s was due to the general decline in economic activities in the country, brought 
about by the substantial decline in the petroleum sector. Although there are more 
industrial securities bought and sold than government securities in any given year, the 
value of the government securities traded is always more than double that of industrial 
ones. 
An interesting innovation in the Nigerian capital market was the introduction of the 
"Second Tier Securities Market" (SSM). The SSM was established in 1985 with the aim 
of assisting small and medium size indigenous companies to have access to the resources 
of the Capital Market. It is also expected to increase the number and the varieties of 
securities available for trading in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The SSM is a capital 
market within the Nigerian Stock exchange. The requirements for enlisting in the SSM 
are less stringent than in the main stock exchange. Some of the requirements are as 
follows: 
1 Three years trading records, as opposed to five years, are required to enlist in the 
SSM. 
11 Companies are required to submit only audited half-year and annual statements in 
the SSM, while in the regular market quarterly statements are required to be 
submitted as well. 
111 Companies are required to make at least 10 percent or 50,000 naira worth of their 
total equity capital available for public subscription. In the regular market, the 
requirement is either 25 percent of the company's share, or 125,000 naira worth of 
equity. 
IV Companies are required to have no less than 100 shareholders to enlist in the SSM, 
which is about one fifth of what is required for the regular market. 
v Companies are to make a flat annual subscription of 2,000 naira to the stock 
exchange, instead of graduated annual quotation fees based on the companies' share 
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capital. 
VI Companies who enlist in the SSM are allowed to raise a maXImum sum of 5.0 
million naira, while there is no limit to the amount raised in the first-tier market. 
VB Companies would have to be registered as a limited liability company under the 
companies Act of 1968 before they can enlist in the SSM. 
As of Dec. 1985, only one company was registered in the SSM. By the end of 1987 
6 companies have registered in the SSM. 
The only other organised capital market in the rest of the ECOW AS sub-region is in 
the Cote d'Ivoire. Although trading is actively taking place in both new and second 
securities, the market is still at a rudimentary stage of development, compared to the one 
in Nigeria. 
1.6 The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Control 
The origin of exchange control in Nigeria was the exchange control act of 1962. 
The Act made it illegal for Nigerian residents to undertake any foreign exchange 
transaction without the approval of the exchange control authorities. At the same time, 
all foreign exchange receipts from exports or any other sources must be surrendered to 
the Central Bank. 
The exchange control measures provided by the 1962 Act, only started being 
applied effectively in 1967. Since then there has been alternating periods of tight and 
relaxed controls. 
Prior to 1967, although imports of some commodities were prohibited for health or 
security reasons, most imports were carried out under an open general licence. The 
foreign exchange for that purpose was guaranteed automatically. Exports of most locally 
produced goods were made freely under open general licence, except for exports to some 
Southern African countries. As Nigeria was a member of the sterling area, export 
proceeds from other sterling area countries were free of exchange control and were 
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allowed to be kept; however, proceeds from non-sterling area countries were to be 
converted to local currency within three months of the day of shipment. All payments for 
invisibles to the sterling area countries were made freely without any controls, but 
payments to non-sterling area countries required approval from the authorities. Residents 
of Nigeria travelling to other sterling area countries were allowed to take out an 
unlimited amount of foreign exchange, but those travelling to non-sterling areas were 
allowed to take out up to the equivalent of 250 Nigerian pounds in foreign exchange. 
The exchange control required that receipts from invisibles in currencies other than that 
of the sterling area countries must be sold to authorised dealers and to be surrendered to 
the Central Bank. 
Movement of capital to and from sterling area countries were free of controls and 
restrictions. Investments from non-sterling area countries required simple screening to 
eliminate speCUlative ventures. Once an investment has been approved, repatriation of 
the original capital and remittances of profits were allowed freely after local expenses 
and taxes had been met. 
The period between 1967 to 1971, characterised by the Nigerian Civil War, 
witnessed the coming into effect of new control measures, and a strengthening of existing 
ones. More goods were placed under the category of goods whose importation was 
prohibited, while all goods whose importation was not completely prohibited were placed 
under specific import licences. A national reconstruction surcharge, and import 
surcharge of 7.5 percent and 10 percent of the c.i.f values of all goods imported were 
introduced. The countries of the sterling area are now subject to the same set of 
exchange controls. 
With regard to import payments, a foreign exchange budget, where allocation of 
foreign exchange was made on priority basis, was also introduced for the first time. The 
CBN now sells foreign exchange in respect of imports, to the authorised banks, who in 
turn supply the importers, but only against letters of request supported by approved 
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exchange control forms and certified bills of entry and invoices. Further, a system of 
mandatory deferred payments for imports now operates. Under this system, payments 
can only be made, at the earliest, 90 days after arrival of the goods imported into Nigeria. 
All other kinds of payments were drastically reduced or were placed under a strict 
authorisation. The basic travelling allowance for the purpose of travelling to countries 
outside Africa was first reduced to 100 Nigerian pounds and later to 75. Allowances for 
the purpose of travelling to African countries were completely suspended. The amount 
foreign nationals working in Nigeria could remit was first reduced to 50 percent and later 
to 25 percent of their gross taxable earnings. 
Individual export licences were required for the export of the malO agricultural 
commodities (cocoa, cotton, palm products, groundnuts), that were under the respective 
marketing boards. Exports of petroleum products were subject to special arrangements. 
Most other remaining products were exported under an open general licence. All 
exporters were required to submit an exchange control declaration at the time of 
shipment, and all export proceeds were required to be repatriated and surrendered to the 
CBN within 3 months of shipment. The same conditions applied to proceeds from 
invisibles. 
All capital related transactions required approval from the Ministry of Finance. 
This includes residents of Nigeria borrowing abroad, buying and selling of foreign 
securities, and the repatriation of foreign capital. Non-residents intending to invest in 
Nigeria were advised to apply for an "approved status", the granting of which meant that 
sympathetic considerations were given to future requests to repatriate the invested 
capital. 
Between 1971 and 1975 Nigeria experienced a tremendous improvement in its 
international accounting positions brought about by expanded oil exports and revenues. 
Further, the civil war came to an end. As a result of these favourable events, exchange 
controls were generally relaxed. Most controls over imports and import payments were 
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relaxed. The mandatory deferred payments and the national reconstruction surcharge 
were abolished. Approval for most payments were easily granted by the authorised 
dealers. Allowances for travelling outside Africa were increased to 200 naira2 and within 
Africa restored to 50 naira per-year per-person. The amount remittable by foreign 
nationals working in Nigeria was increased to 50 percent of their gross taxable earnings. 
However, controls with respect to exports and export proceeds, and those relating to 
capital movement remained unchanged. 
1976 to 1979 was another period of tight controls. During these years more laws 
governing importations were introduced. Most of the new laws were, however, meant to 
correct certain mal-practices like over-loading of invoices for the purpose of transferring 
funds abroad, under-invoicing of imports in order to pay less duties, and general 
falsification of documents, etc. 
In 1980 the Nigerian current account surplus went up by more than 50 percent, from 
the 1979 value of 1,009.5 million naira to 1,593 million; due mostly to the increase in the 
price of crude oil. As a result, 1980 and parts of 1981 saw another relaxation of controls. 
By the end of 1981 the situation started to deteriorate. The current account had gone 
from the 1980 surplus to a deficit of 3,419.4 million naira. The Merchandise account was 
in deficit for the first time since 1978. The deficit was mainly due to the decline in the 
volume and value of oil exports, owing to the oil market glut. Oil shipments from 
Nigeria fell from 701.3 million barrels in 1980 to 458.2 million barrels in 1981. At the 
same time, the average selling price of Nigerian crude oil fell from 39.76 to 35.78 US. 
dollars per barrel between 1980 to 1981. The total value of Nigeria's oil exports fell by 
24 percent during this period. The decline in the volume and value of oil exports and 
therefore Nigeria's adverse economic condition continued throughout the 1980s. 
2 Nigeria changed its currency from pounds to naira in 1973. The valu.e of the new currency 
was fixed at one half of the old currency. 
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The period between 1981 to 1986 (the introduction of the Second Tier Foreign 
Exchange Market)3 witnessed the coming into effect of the most stringent set of controls 
Nigeria has ever experienced. 
Imports to Nigeria within this period were classified into prohibited, and those 
subject to specific import licences. Open general import licences were abolished in 1984. 
Prohibited imports were further divided into those that were absolutely prohibited and 
those that may be imported only as personal effects. The former category contained 
about 20 items, while the later one was made up of about 68 items. Included in the latter 
category were goods like vegetables and fresh fruits, textile fabrics, beer, fresh milk, 
tooth paste, passenger cars with a c.i.f value in excess of 15,000 naira, or an engine 
capacity exceeding 2,500 cc. Issuance of import licences for the category of goods 
whose importations were not prohibited was made subject to a foreign exchange budget, 
and according to domestic demand and supply conditions of the commodity. In addition, 
a priority list which emphasises raw materials, spare parts, machinery, and certain major 
food items was followed. Applications for import licences by manufacturing firms were 
evaluated against the following criteria: 1) the extent to which the manufacturing firm 
concerned used local raw materials 2) foreign exchange earnings generated by the firm's 
output 2) the linkage effect of the final product of the firm (how easily a firm's output can 
be used as an input to another firm) 4) the amount of capital invested in the firm, together 
with its turnover. and 5) The geographical location of the firm. 
An application for a foreign exchange form (known as an "M" form) was required to 
be completed for all imports into Nigeria, irrespective of value. An approved M-form 
acts as a foreign exchange release order. The processing, registration, and the initial 
approval of M-forms were carried out by the authorised dealers, on behalf of the CBN. 
However, the final approval continued to depend upon confirmation by the CBN. 
3 See next section of this chapter for a discussion on the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market 
(SFEM) 
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Completed M-forms were submitted in septuplecate; accompanied by the import licence 
for the goods to be imported, a tax clearance certificate (showing settlement of all tax 
liabilities) covering the previous three years, a pro forma invoice for the imports, 
showing the price split into f.o.b and freight, with all other charges, such as commission 
and interest charges shown separately. It is only after an M-form has been processed and 
registered that an importer can confirm his order to the seller. In the absence of a 
registered M-form, a letter of credit may not be opened, nor may any form of payments 
for imports be effected. 
Payments for any import were only made after the submission to the CBN of a full 
set of documents, evidencing the receipt of the goods in the country. If the CBN finds all 
the documents issued to be satisfactory, the office of exchange control issued a foreign 
exchange release order (an accepted M-form) to the foreign exchange operation 
department of the CBN, who released to the authorised dealers the required foreign 
exchange to effect payment for the imports. 
All imports valued at more than 1,000 naira were made subject to a pre-shipment 
inspection. The inspection was to ensure that all imports into Nigeria were of the correct 
quality and quantity according to the contracts, and that only the normal price of that 
commodity in the country of supply was paid. Only after a "clean report of findings" on 
goods to be imported has been issued, was the foreign exchange settlement for imports 
made. 
An "A-form", subject to a similar processing procedure as the M-form, was used to 
apply for foreign exchange to effect any payments for invisibles. However, approval for 
most kind of invisibles were granted by the authorised dealers. All insurance for which 
facilities existed, were required to be taken out with a company in Nigeria. The basic 
travelling allowance was reduced to the equivalent of 100 naira per adult person per-year. 
The business travel allowance, as well as the allowance for travel within Africa, were 
suspended. The remittances by foreign nationals working in the country were reduced to 
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25 percent of their net earnings. 
Nigeria's export policy in this period was geared towards assisting local producers, 
and towards attaining self sufficiency in food production. As a result, all exports were 
either prohibited or subject to licensing requirements. Exportation of 11 items, which 
included beans maize, rice, milk, groundnuts oil, and all imported food products was 
completely prohibited. Exportation of about 36 products required export licences. 
Export of cotton, cocoa, groundnuts and palm kernels were carried out only by the 
respective Marketing Boards. 
The Boards had the sole responsibility of purchasing these products from the 
farmers. The Marketing Boards were set up with the aim of stabilising the price farmers 
received for their products. In a season of bumper harvest, the Boards kept the surplus 
and sold what was necessary to maintain a certain price level. If the harvest for any 
given year was small, and the price was going to go up as a result, the Boards sold their 
stored surplus to keep the price down to the required level. Likewise, when the 
international price of these commodities went up, the Boards still paid the farmers the 
same price and kept the excess to supplement periods when international prices went 
below what the farmers were supposed to receive. However, as time went on, the Boards 
became more of a hindrance than a help to the farmers. Low prices were passed on to the 
farmers, but when prices went up the excess was kept. 
Exports of petroleum products were handled by the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation. Export proceeds were required to be surrendered to the CBN through an 
authorised dealer within three months of shipment. Proceeds from invisibles in foreign 
currencies were also required to be sold to the authorised dealers for surrender to the 
CBN. It was also necessary for all exporters to submit an exchange control declaration at 
the time of shipment. 
Restrictions regarding the movement of capital remained virtually the same. 
Permission of the Ministry of Finance was required for any individual, firm, company, or 
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branch, resident in Nigeria to borrow from abroad. Official agencies, and state controlled 
corporations also required an approval of the Ministry of Finance to borrow from abroad. 
Residents of Nigeria were not allowed to deal in foreign currency securities, buy 
from or sell to non-residents of Nigeria any security payable in naira without the 
permission of the Ministry of Finance. Non-residents intending to make a direct 
investment in Nigeria were to apply for an "approved status", otherwise, future requests 
to repatriate the invested capital and related profits would not receive a sympathetic 
hearing from the authorities. Generally, repatriation of foreign capital requires approval 
from the Ministry. 
Since October, 1986, with the commg into effect of the Second Tier Foreign 
Exchange Market (SFEM), most controls (especially exchange controls) have been 
removed. Some of the changes that took place since 1986 were as follows: To start with, 
import licencing and the 30 percent import surcharge4 were abolished. By 1988, the list 
of prohibited imports had been cut from the 1985 level of 72 items to 16 items. Among 
the prohibited list in 1988 were cigarettes, poultry (except day-old chicks), vegetables, 
fresh fruits, potatoes, eggs, textile fabrics, beer, fresh milk, rice and rice products, maize 
and maize products, wheat and wheat products, mineral water, and all sparkling wine. 
Payments for imports since 1986 are made by an overseas representative of the 
authorised dealers, upon presentation of confirmed letters of credit by an importer. Such 
payments are made with the understanding that the goods paid for will arrive in Nigeria 
and that all shipping documents relating to the imported goods are lodged by importers 
with the authorised foreign exchange dealer, as an agent of the Nigerian Government, 
within 21 days of negotiation of these documents. Further, a bill of entry must be 
submitted to the authorised exchange dealer within 90 days of negotiation and payment 
by an overseas representative bank. All imports valued at US$5,000 (c & f), or more, 
4 This surcharge was introduced on January 1 st. 1986. as a part of the national budget that 
year. to be imposed on all imports. in addition to existing duties. 
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except those specifically exempted by the government, are subject to pre-shipment 
inspection for reasons stated earlier. Foreign exchange for the settlement of the imports 
is effected only if the result of the inspection is satisfactory. 
With regard to payments of invisibles, although basic allowances are provided for 
most payments, applications for amounts in excess are automatically approved, if it can 
be proven that the intention of the applicant is not to transfer capital abroad. The basic 
allowance for tourist travel is now fixed at US$ 500 per adult person per year. The 
allowance for business travel was fixed at US$2,500 per trip per enterprise, subject to a 
maximum of two trips in any given year. The basic travelling allowance for international 
conferences and seminars is US$l ,500 per trip per person, with a maximum of two trips 
in a year. The amount an expatriate working in Nigeria can remit abroad was also 
increased to 75 percent of the net salary after tax. 
The changes made with regard to exports are as follows: all export licensing 
requirements, export bans and export duties were eliminated. To encourage the 
production and export of non-oil agricultural products, and thus reduce the country's 
dependence on oil for its foreign exchange, all marketing boards were eliminated. 
Henceforth, farmers exported their products themselves. With effect from September, 
1986, all surrender requirements were eliminated. Exporters of non-oil products were 
allowed to retain the proceeds of their exports, subject to repatriating it and keeping it in 
a Domiciliary Account, or to selling it freely in the foreign exchange market (FEM). A 
Domiciliary Account is a foreign currency account residents of Nigeria can operate inside 
the country since Oct. 1985. The operation of a Domiciliary Account is free of exchange 
control formalities and it is tax exempt. Interest is paid in foreign currency, at a rate 
comparable to the ruling interest rates for the currency of deposit. Account owners could 
use their deposit for any purpose, including import transactions, but were prohibited from 
selling funds in their accounts for use outside the banking system. Controls on 
movement of capital into and out of the country remained the same. 
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The very strict exchange regime described above is characteristic of the member 
countries of ECOW AS, with the exception of the members of W AMU. The W AMU 
countries have a very liberal exchange regime with respect to dealings with all countries 
that have an operation account with the French Treasury. However dealings with all 
other countries including the non-W AMU countries of ECOW AS are strictly controlled. 
As pointed out earlier, the strict exchange regime that exists in the sub-region, especially 
with regard to member countries, may have been partly responsible for the small level of 
trade among the member countries of ECOWAS. 
1.6.1 The Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) 
SFEM is an arrangement designed to introduce some elements of market forces in 
the determination of the exchange rate of the Nigerian currency. It was introduced in 
September 1986 as a part of the general structural adjustment programme adopted in the 
country. 
The exchange rate for the naira in the SFEM is detemlined through auctions carried 
out either weekly or fortnightly. The CBN (the supplier of the foreign currency) offers a 
certain amount of foreign currency in every auctioning session to be bid for by the 
authorised foreign exchange dealers. The dealers include commercial banks and 
merchant banks, that have operated in the country for at least three years. For the first 
few weeks, auctioning took place weekly. The going exchange rate for naira was 
determined using the "Marginal Pricing" system. Under this system, the foreign 
exchange dealers each bid for a certain amount of foreign exchange at a certain price. 
Each bidder's price and the amount it bid for were displayed, with the highest bidder, 
price wise, at the top of the list and the lowest bidder at the bottom. The dealer that bids 
the highest would be allocated the amount he bid for, then the next highest bidder, until 
the amount of foreign exchange supplied to the market is exhausted. The bid price by the 
last successful bidder which clears the market is the Marginal Price, and that will be the 
exchange rate of naira until the next bidding session. All successful dealers paid the 
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marginal rate for the amount they succeed in getting. The dealers then sell the foreign 
exchange to their customers at the margin price, plus a percentage detennined by the 
CBN. On the first auction session, the value of naira fell by 66 percent to 4.6124 naira to 
one US dollar. 
The marginal pricing system encouraged dealers to bid unreasonably high prices. 
This is the case because those whose bid prices are the highest are assured of the amount 
they bid for, yet they pay the marginal price, which is always lower or equal to any 
successful bidder's bid price. As a result the naira continuously depreciated. In April 
1987, the "Dutch Auction System" was adopted. The new system required that bidders 
pay the price they bid at, while the market clearing price is the one that detennines the 
going exchange rate. This system is supposed to discourage bidding very high prices, 
since the price dealers bid is what they paid, while selling can only take place at the 
market clearing rate plus a fixed margin. 
All transactions, except government debt settlements, contributions to international 
organisations, and transfers to Nigerian missions abroad were channeled through the 
SFEM. The exchange rate in the First Tier Market was fixed by the government. 
However, as planned the two markets were merged in July 1987, and was renamed the 
Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). Since then, all foreign exchange transactions are 
carried out at the market determined rate. Apart from Nigeria, another member country 
of ECOW AS, Ghana, has also adopted this procedure of determining a realistic exchange 
rate. Attaining a realistic exchange rate through the SFEM, although not undertaken with 
that purpose in mind, moves Nigeria towards fulfilling the initial requirement for the 
ECOW AS monetary cooperation programme. 
1.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The principal institution in the Nigerian financial system is the Central Bank. 
Established in 1959, the Central Bank of Nigeria performs the traditional functions of 
organising and executing the monetary policy of the country. Although it is within its 
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power to use all the traditional tools of monetary policy, the Central Bank has 
concentrated on just a few. It has never used open market operations and its use of the 
liquidity ratio to contract credit has not been effective. The liquidity ratio has been 
changed only twice since its inception in the early 1960s, even then the actual ratio has 
always remained above the prescribed one. Two of the tools utilised quite often with 
varying degree of success are the discount rate and direct credit controls. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria has changed the discount rate, as well as other interest rates many times 
since 1962. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria has also been an agent of government deficit financing. 
It raises funds for the Government not only by printing and selling securities to the 
public, but also purchases a substantial part of any issue. The loss of this particular 
function, in the event of the ECOW AS monetary unification, is likely to cause the most 
concern to the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
Nigeria also has a number of commercial banks, both foreign and domestic owned 
ones. As at the end of 1987, there were 33 commercial banks with 1,483 branches in 
Nigeria. Besides being the main agent through which monetary policy is effected, the 
commercial banks in Nigeria play a vital part in financing the government deficit. A 
sizeable percentage of government securities are purchased by the commercial banks. At 
present, the Nigerian commercial banks do not have branches in the other ECOW AS 
countries. This is partly because of the fact that regulations about establishing and 
operating banks differ a great deal between the member countries of ECOWAS. 
However, the ECOW AS monetary unification is expected to solve this problem and thus 
enhance the possibility for the Nigerian commercial banks to expand to other member 
countries of ECOW AS. In addition to the commercial banks, Nigeria has a number of 
merchant banks and development banks. 
One of the two stock exchanges that exist in the sub-region is in Nigeria. The other 
is in Cote d 'I voire. The Nigerian stock exchange has been operating since 1961 and a 
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sizeable amount of both private and government stock and other securities have passed 
through the Nigerian stock exchange. Since the "oil boom" of the early 70s, trading in 
the Nigerian stock exchange has expanded considerably, both in volume and value. The 
ECOW AS monetary integration is likely to expand the activities of the Nigerian stock 
exchange. In fact, it is possible for this stock exchange to be an important centre for 
financial activities of the sub-region. 
Chapter 2 
The Stability/Pr~cjictability of the Money Multiplier and the 
Controllability of the Monetary Base in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
43 
The theory of money supply encountered in most standard textbooks is that of the 
money multiplier model of money stock determination. According to this theory the 
money stock at any given point in time is a multiple of the monetary base, where the 
multiplying factor is known as the money multiplier. 
The money multiplier is often expressed as an identity derived from a combination 
of the currency to deposit and the reserve to deposit ratios. 1 These ratios are behavioural 
variables determined by the non-bank publics' preference for currency over deposit and 
the banks' preparedness to give out loans, thus reducing their reserves and increasing 
their deposits. The monetary base, on the other hand, is commonly defined to be the sum 
of currency with the non-bank public and the reserves of the deposit money banks.2 
Altering the money stock for monetary policy purposes, within the framework of the 
money multiplier model of money stock determination and given a stable money 
multiplier, requires a change in the monetary base. If the money multiplier is variable 
(presumably as a result of variations in the two ratios), the change in the monetary base 
would have to be such that the variations in the money multiplier are also offset. 
The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the ease with which the Nigerian 
monetary authorities could change the money stock for monetary policy purposes, and so 
1 Cagan (1965) and Friedman & Schwartz (1963) express the currency ratio in terms of 
currency to money rather than currency to deposit. 
2 Comprising commercial banks and other banks that have large demand deposits. 
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effectively test their ability to carry out monetary policy within the framework of the 
money multiplier model. To achieve this, the stability of the Nigerian money multiplier 
since 1960, and the accuracy with which its values can be predicted is investigated. Also 
the ease with which the monetary authorities can alter the monetary base is examined. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section (2.2) discusses the 
theoretical background to the money multiplier approach to money stock determination. 
Section (2.3) looks at the issue of the stability of the money multiplier and its 
determinants. In section (2.4) models of the money multiplier and its determinants, with a 
view to estimating it using Nigerian data, are presented and discussed. The econometrics 
modelling procedure employed for the purpose of estimating the models of section (2.4) 
is presented in section (2.5). The findings of estimating the money multiplier and the 
determinants are presented and discussed in section (2.6). Section (2.7) takes up the 
issue of controllability of the monetary base in Nigeria. Finally the summary and 
conclusion to the chapter are presented in section (2.8). 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
The issue of the ability of a country's monetary authority to control the money 
stock, in the context of the money multiplier model, is centered around the specification 
and the predictability of the relationship between the money stock and the monetary base. 
According to this model of money stock determination, the money stock at a given point 
in time is a multiple of the monetary base, the multiplying factor being the money 
multiplier. In other words, a given change in the monetary base would have multiple 
effects on the money stock. 
The money multiplier model is an extension of the bank deposit multiplier approach 
to deposit creation, (Pierce and Tysome, 1985). According to this approach to deposit 
creation, the total deposits of an economy is equal to a multiple of the banks' free/excess 
reserves. For example, if a commercial bank receives a certain amount of cash from a 
customer for deposit, its total reserves will go lip by that amount (M). Since cash does 
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not earn any interest, profit maximisation principles require that the new reserves are put 
into money making ventures. A commercial bank can either lend to customers, or 
purchase some interest earning short-term assets, such as government securities, etc. 
However, a certain percentage of the increase in reserves would have to be kept either in 
cash or in some near cash assets to meet any eventual desire to withdraw by the 
depositors. To maintain public confidence in the banking industry and to prevent panics 
and the collapse of the financial system of a country, the minimum percentage of the total 
deposits to be held for that purpose, is often imposed by law. This fraction is commonly 
known as the required reserve ratio. 
The one shot increase in the commercial bank's cash deposit is going to lead to a 
multiple expansion of deposits. From the initial cash deposit, the commercial bank can 
loan out the amount (M (I-r)) which is the excess reserves, where (r) is the required 
reserve ratio. This is the first round of the deposits expansion process. If the amount lent 
out were to be deposited with the bank, or for that matter, another bank, a second round 
of the deposits creation process will set in. If the required reserve ratio remains at (r), an 
amount (M (l-r)2) of excess reserve will now be made available to be lent out, and so 
on. The total amount of deposit created by the one shot increase in cash deposit can be 
represented by a geometric progression expressed by equation (2.1) below. 
MJ = M + M (I-r) + M (I-r)2 + ..... + M (l-rt (2.1) 
(l-r)Lill = M (I-r) + M (l-r)2 + ...... + M (l-rt+1 (2.2) 
MJ= 
M -M(l-rt+1 (2.3) 
r 
1 
MJ = -(M) (2.4) 
r 
1 
D = -(R) (2.5) 
r 
Multiplying both sides of equation (2.1) by (l-r) gives equation (2.2). Equation (2.3) is 
arrived at after subtracting (2.2) from (2.1) and solving for Lill. As "n" approaches 
infinity, equation (2.3) can be written as (2.4). According to this equation, the total 
amount of deposit created at the end of the day (Lill), as a result of the one shot cash 
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deposit (M), is a multiple (l/r) of the initial cash deposit. Since the required reserve 
ratio (r) is less than one, (tJ)) is necessarily greater than (M). In general, the amount of 
deposits in the economy at any given point in time, is given by equation (2.5). The total 
deposits in the economy are a multiple (l/r) of the total reserves. The multiplication 
factor O/r) is known as the deposit multiplier. 
2.2.1 The Money Stock Equation 
The derivation of the money stock equation in the context of the money multiplier 
model, in its simplest form, is presented below.3 
M==D+Cp 
H == R + C p; R = rD, 
M==D(1+c) 
H ==D (r + c) 
C -cD p-







Equation (2.6) states that the money stock is identically equal to the sum of deposits in 
the banking system and the currency held by the non-bank public. This can either be the 
narrow definition or the broad definition of money. If (M) is narrow money, (D) is 
demand deposits. In Nigeria, this amounts to the demand deposits with the banking 
system net of federal government's demand deposits. The narrow definition of money 
stems from its function as a medium of exchange for goods and services. Both demand 
deposits and currency held by the non bank public qualify as money because they are 
held for the purpose of making payments for goods and services only. In other words, 
assuming that demand deposits do not pay interest, the only reason why an economic 
agent would hold them is to carry out transactions. However, there are other functions 
of money besides being a medium of exchange for goods and services. Specifically, 
money also performs the important function of being a store of value. Economic agents 
3 This method of deriving the money stock equation is mainly due to Courchene. 1969. 
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therefore, in addition to the need to carry out transactions, would want to hold money as a 
means of storing their wealth. Accordingly, money can be broadly defined to include 
other assets like savings and time deposits that can be used for storing wealth. If (M) is 
to represent a broad definition of money, (D) would be demand deposits as defined above 
plus the sum of savings and time time deposits with the commercial banks (quasi 
money). 
Equation (2.7) defines the high powered money or the monetary base (H) as 
identically equal to the sum of the commercial banks' reserves (R) and the currency with 
the non-bank public (Cp )' The reserves of the commercial banks are normally defined to 
be the sum of vault cash and the deposits with the central bank. However in some 
countries, certain highly liquid assets besides vault cash and deposits with the central 
bank are reserve eligible. For example, in Nigeria, the treasury bills held by the deposit 
money banks count as part of their required reserves. According to the definition of the 
monetary base given in Courchene (1969) (all monetary assets capable of being used as 
bank reserves), the treasury bills held by the deposit money banks in Nigeria should be 
counted as part of the banks' reserves. Ajayi (1971) and Ojo (1976) agreed with the idea 
of treating treasury bills held by the Nigerian commercial banks as a component of the 
monetary base. 
This definition of the monetary base (banks' reserves and the currency held by the 
non-bank public) constitutes the uses of the monetary base. Alternatively, the monetary 
base can be defined in terms of its sources; which amounts to the sum of all items on the 
assets side of the central bank's balance sheet, minus the items on the liability side except 
currency and the deposits of the deposit money banks. 
From equation (2.5), the bank reserves (R) can be expressed as the ratio of reserves 
to deposits (r) multiplied by total deposits. Similarly, the amount of cash with the non-
bank public can be expressed as the currency to deposits ratio (c) multiplied by the total 
deposits. Utilising these expressions, equations (2.6) and (2.7) can be written as (2.8) 
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and (2.9). Dividing equation (2.8) by (2.9) and solving for the money stock (M) gives 
equation (2.10). Equation (2.10) is the money multiplier specification of the money stock 
equation. 
The money stock is identically equal to the monetary base multiplied by the money 
multiplier. The money multiplier is a function of the publics' desired currency to deposit 
ratio and the commercial banks' reserve to deposit ratio. According to the definition of 
the money multiplier given in equation (2.10), an increase in either of these ratios has 
the effect of reducing the value of the money multiplier. For a given increase in the high 
powered money, the resultant expansion in the money stock will be smaller, the higher 
the values of the two ratios. A higher currency to deposit ratio implies that the public is 
increasingly holding more cash than bank deposits. Looking at the deposit creation 
activity of the banks described earlier, for a given required reserve ratio, the smaller the 
amount of cash deposited, the smaller would be the total amount of deposits created at 
the end of the exercise. Similarly, a high reserve to deposit ratio implies that the 
commercial banks hold back more resources from entering the deposit creation process, 
and as such, less deposits are created. 
The money stock equation (2.10) and the resultant money multiplier are not unique. 
Different specifications abound in the literature, (see for example Ojo 1976, Beenstock 
1989, Cagan 1965, Friedman et al 1963, to mention a few). The differences are basically 
that of the specification of the determinants of the money multiplier. For example, in 
Cagan (1965), the denominator of the currency ratio is the money stock and not deposits. 
while in many other cases, instead of lumping all deposits together for the purpose of 
currency to deposit and reserve to deposit ratios, the deposits are separated into demand, 
savings, and time deposits. However for the purpose at hand, the specification given in 
(2.1 0) is quite sufficient, since in Nigeria, the required percentage to be held as a reserve 
by the banks is the same for all types of deposits. 
A change in the money stock, according to this model, arises as a result of a change 
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In the determinants of the money multiplier (currency to deposit and the reserve to 
deposit ratio) or a change in the monetary base. Variations in the ratios and therefore, the 
multiplier are regarded as endogenous. They are detennined by factors which alter the 
public's behaviour towards currency vis-a-vis deposits and the banks' behaviour towards 
holding more reserves. The monetary base, on the other hand, is assumed to be 
exogenously determined by the central bank. Since it is its liability, the central bank can 
change it at will. 
Monetary policy (change in the money stock), within the money multiplier 
framework, amounts to changing the monetary base in the desired direction for a given, 
stable money multiplier. However, if the money multiplier moves around constantly, 
presumably as a result of changes in the two determining ratios, the monetary authorities 
would have to be able to forecast the values of these ratios and then offset the variations 
suitably using the monetary base. If, for example, the desire was to increase the money 
stock by a certain amount next year, the monetary authorities can forecast the money 
multiplier, and buy the appropriate amount of short-term assets from the commercial 
banks and the public. This will increase the banks' free reserves, enabling them to 
expand deposits through the deposit expansion process described above. However, this 
analysis overlooks some vital issues. Can the monetary authorities persuade the 
commercial banks and the public to sell their assets, or in the case where a reduction in 
the money stock is required, to persuade them to buy more assets? This introduces the 
question of endogeneity of the monetary base and the money stock. A detailed discussion 
of this issue, together with a critique of the money multiplier approach to money stock 
determination will be taken up in the next chapter. 
Generally, the issue of the ability of a country's monetary authorities to control the 
domestic money stock, in the context of the money multiplier model, depends on the 
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%~ in the Money Multipliers and the Determinants 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
YEAR %~MULTI %~MULT2 %~CRI %~CR2 %~RRI %~RR2 
1960-61 -2.41 2.77 -1.20 -11.04 21.65 9.54 
1961-62 5.79 7.66 -10.19 -10.42 -20.97 -21.18 
1962-63 4.27 6.61 -1.77 -5.32 -27.15 -29.78 
1963-64 -2.21 -1.51 -2.37 -2.95 27.84 27.07 
1964-65 0.42 5.94 -4.08 -11.74 4.59 -3.76 
1965-66 -3.00 -1.19 -2.06 -4.51 25.31 22.18 
1966-67 -6.73 -10.00 15.13 17.02 26.37 28.45 
1967-68 -30.46 -23.60 -33.84 -35.59 214.68 206.37 
1968-69 6.73 2.35 10.46 14.59 -11.48 -8.17 
1969-70 2.51 5.49 -12.88 -13.34 -5.76 -6.27 
1970-71 40.32 43.19 -0.81 -3.60 -58.83 -59.98 
1971-72 -8.92 -5.61 -5.63 -9.03 37.41 32.46 
1972-73 14.87 16.07 -16.34 -13.48 -27.16 -24.67 
1973-74 -11.65 -15.71 -46.03 -35.12 58.19 90.19 
1974-75 -13.93 -11.18 36.40 24.19 25.46 14.22 
1975-76 17.10 10.43 -17.93 -8.23 -22.69 -13.56 
1976-77 18.99 10.62 -0.18 9.91 -28.51 -21.29 
1977-78 -10.38 -6.00 36.53 21.65 14.02 1.59 
1978-79 -1.26 7.30 -15.47 -22.03 8.00 -0.37 
1979-80 8.87 5.97 -14.84 -9.31 -11.84 -6.11 
1980-81 8.20 8.49 24.47 19.37 -23.96 -27.07 
1981-82 -25.40 -20.75 10.42 -0.24 87.24 69.16 
1982-83 -11.04 -9.66 3.75 0.77 24.24 20.68 
1983-84 -16.71 -14.06 -11.28 -12.51 34.78 32.90 
1984-85 3.65 4.23 -11.52 -9.85 -6.09 -4.32 
1985-86 43.47 52.78 17.18 4.41 -47.32 -53.06 
1986-87 -17.30 -14.00 5.79 -0.80 3.76 34.80 
1987-88 17.20 8.27 6.91 16.48 -27.77 -21.30 
1988-89 21.70 11.94 5.45 16.49 -41.63 -35.52 
MULTl=Ml/Base Money; MULT2=M2/Base Money; CRl= CpIDD; CR2 = Cp/(DD+TD); 
RRl= Reserve/(DD); RR2= Reserve/(DD+TD); 
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Table 2.2 
%~ in the Components of Currency and Reserve Ratios 
(1960 to 1989) 
YEAR % ~ClJ %~DD %~TD % ~ TBLS %~RES % ~ RES 1 
1960-61 0.00 1.22 29.09 60.98 15.79 23.14 
1961-62 0.63 12.05 12.68 13.47 -18.18 -11.45 
1962-63 5.63 7.53 16.25 -64.69 -5.56 -21.67 
1963-64 17.16 20.00 21.51 350.84 11.76 53.41 
1964-65 1.52 5.83 24.78 20.32 5.26 10.70 
1965-66 7.96 10.24 15.60 73.97 15.00 38.13 
1966-67 -4.61 -17.14 -19.63 27.34 -17.39 4.71 
1967-68 -11.59 33.62 40.46 519.41 21.05 320.48 
1968-69 38.25 25.16 16.85 11.06 8.70 10.79 
1969-70 35.18 55.15 56.74 40.90 88.00 46.21 
1970-71 3.80 4.65 10.39 -63.31 -19.15 -56.91 
1971-72 8.45 14.92 22.85 73.65 15.79 57.91 
1972-73 13.25 35.36 27.35 -14.21 50.00 -1.41 
1973-74 30.73 142.24 67.18 231.68 401.52 283.22 
1974-75 80.88 32.60 61.56 4.40 160.42 66.36 
1975-76 31.04 59.66 25.89 -9.57 43.50 23.42 
1976-77 43.67 43.93 13.95 -31.94 16.25 2.89 
1977-78 11.13 -18.61 7.32 61.10 -22.53 -7.19 
1978-79 8.99 28.94 52.98 160.07 -17.15 39.27 
1979-80 35.52 59.14 39.47 21.30 68.15 40.30 
1980-81 21.22 -2.62 6.41 -40.98 -10.05 -25.95 
1981-82 9.35 -0.97 20.95 143.80 44.91 85.42 
1982-83 14.68 10.54 16.66 100.56 -36.48 37.33 
1983-84 0.85 13.66 16.60 72.57 -18.21 53.19 
1984-85 0.53 13.62 9.81 10.34 -21.60 6.70 
1985-86 5.46 -10.00 10.24 -64.96 82.77 -52.59 
1986-87 21.65 14.99 27.85 74.40 46.22 65.30 
1987-88 49.45 39.79 21.24 -1.42 6.95 0.97 
1988-89 23.95 17.54 -1.49 -52.09 16.39 -31.39 
C = Currency with the non-bank public; DD = Demand Deposits; TD = Time + Savings Depo-
sifs; TBLS = Treasury Bills outstanding with the Commercial and the Merchant Banks; RES = 
Vault Cash + Balances with the Central Bank; RES 1 = RES + TBLS; 
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1) Are the ratios (currency to deposit and reserve to deposit) stable enough, so that the 
monetary base can be changed to achieve the desired level of money stock? If the 
ratios and the multiplier are variable, can the monetary authorities forecast the 
values of these ratios and use the monetary base to offset any variations that might 
arise? 
2) Do the monetary authorities have enough control over the monetary base, to use it to 
offset variations in the ratios, as well as to change it to achieve a certain desired 
level of money stock? 
2.3 Stability of the Money Multiplier 
One way of investigating the stability of a country's money multiplier, is to observe 
its behaviour through time. If for example, the annual value changes quite considerably 
from one year to the next, then the money multiplier is likely to be unstable. 
Alternatively, the difference between the lowest and the highest value obtained within a 
given period of time can be examined, with a view to concluding that the money 
multiplier is unstable if the difference is found to be relatively large. Ajayi (1971) uses 
this method to conclude that the quarterly money multiplier for Nigeria between 1960 to 
1969 is not stable. The main weakness of this procedure is that, it does not make 
allowances for fluctuations due to either seasonality or random shocks and regime shifts 
whose effects are felt at that period only. 
A cursory observation of the graphs of annual values of broadly and narrowly 
defined4 money multipliers, currency ratios, and reserve ratios for Nigeria presented in 
Charts 2.1 to 2.3 reveals that these variables have experienced some large fluctuations 
between 1960 to 1989. Between 1967 to 1968, the narrow and broad money multipliers 
fell by about 30 and 23 percent respectively. Narrow and broad currency to deposit ratios 
4 Narrow money multiplier (MULTI) = MlIBase,' Broad multiplier (MULT2) = M2lBase; Nar-
row currency ratio (CR1) = CpIDD; Broad one (CR2) = Cpl(DD+TD+SD); Narrow reserve ratio 
(RR1) = Banks' reservelDD; Broad one (RR2) = Banks' reservel(DD+TD+SD). 
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both fell by about 35 percent, while both broadly and narrowly defined reserve to deposit 
ratios went up by over 200 percent. After about three years of relative stability, there was 
another major fluctuation from 1970 to 1971. Both narrow and broad multipliers went up 
this time, while both currency and reserve ratios fell; the reserve ratio more so than the 
currency ratio. Other periods of instability in the history of the Nigerian money 
multipliers are between 1973 to 1974, 1981 to 1982 and 1985 to 1986. See Table 2.1 for 
the degree and direction of change in the money multipliers and the determinants in these 
periods. However, as detailed below, each one of the above mentioned periods of major 
fluctuations is characterised by a regime shift or some kind of shock to the Nigerian 
economy. 
2.3.1 1967 - 1968 
This period is characterised by the Nigerian civil war which went on from July, 
1967 to January 1970. Two main events occurred in 1968, which made the year stand 
out as far as the fluctuation of the Nigerian money multiplier is concerned. 
First is the issuance in January 1968 of new bank notes of different design to replace 
the old ones. The main reason behind the change was to safeguard the international value 
of the Nigerian currency from being undermined by the rebels through illegal trafficking, 
(CBN Annual Report, 1968 p. 30). The exchange exercise was carried out from the 3rd 
to 22nd of January in 9 out of the 12 states of the federation. At the end of the exercise, 
all old notes ceased to be legal tender and thus ceased to be counted as part of the 
currency in circulation. The implication of this exercise was to reduce the currency in 
circulation, at least by the amount of old notes held in the war affected states where the 
exchange did not take place. As a result the country saw a 12 percent decline in the 
amount of currency with the non-bank public between 1967 to 1968. This was the largest 
year to year percentage decline in the currency held by the non-bank public in the history 
of Nigeria since independence. Demand deposits and time plus saving deposits, on the 
other hand, went up quite considerably by 33 and 40 percent respectively, (see Table 
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2.2). The large decline in the currency to deposit ratios (both broadly and narrowly 
defined), from 1967 to 1968, evident from Chart 2.2 as well as Table 2.1, was partly due 
to the decline in the currency component and partly due to the growth in the various 
deposits. 
Second is the amendment of the Treasury Bills Act in May, 1968, to enable the 
Government to finance the civil war. The new amendment increased the maximum 
permissible ceiling on treasury bills outstanding from 50 to 85 percent of the 
Government's estimated current revenue, (CBN Annual Report, 1968 p. 42). The effect 
of this amendment was to increase the treasury bills held by the commercial banks. 
From 1967 to 1968, the amount of treasury bills outstanding held by the commercial and 
the merchant banks went up by more than 500 percent. As a result the banks' reserves 
also went up by about 320 percent. The major part of the increase in the banks' reserves 
was due to the treasury bills, and is evident from the fact that its other component (vault 
cash plus deposits with the central banks) went up by 21 percent only for the same 
period. 
Since the demand deposits and savings plus time deposits both went up by less than 
the percentage increase in the banks' reserves, the large increase in the banks' reserve to 
deposit ratio (both broadly and narrowly defined) from 1967 to 1968 can be indirectly 
attributable to the increase in the treasury bills held by the banks. The fall in the value of 
the money multipliers in 1968 can be argued to be mainly due to the increase in the 
reserve to deposit ratio. The other determinant of the money multiplier (currency to 
deposit ratio), unlike the reserve to deposit ratios, declined between 1967 to 1968. The 
effect of a fall in the currency to deposit ratio is to increase and not to decrease the 
money multiplier. 
2.3.2 1970 - 1971 
As stated earlier, the Nigerian government borrowed extensively from the 
commercial banks and other sources, mainly through sales of treasury bills and other like 
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assets, to finance the civil war. The effect on the commercial banks was to increase their 
liquidity, since short-tenn assets like the treasury bills are counted as part of a bank's 
liquid assets in Nigeria. However, this increase in liquidity did not pose any immediate 
inflationary problems because the demand for credit was very low.5 As the civil war 
ended in January 1970, the economy and the demand for credit started to pick up. 
Consequently, inflationary pressure started to build up. However the critical moment for 
the rise in banks' liquidity and the inflationary pressure came when importers in Nigeria 
deposited a large sum of local currency equivalent to the value of their imports, for which 
foreign exchange was not allocated. By the end of June 1971, these deposits amounted to 
about 400 million naira (Nwankwo, 1980). To bring this inflationary pressure under 
control, the central bank sought to reduce the liquidity of the commercial banks. For the 
first time ever, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) called for a non-reserve eligible 
special deposit to be made by the commercial banks. On the 10th June 1971, a directive 
was issued to all banks whose short-term external liabilities exceed 20 million naira to 
deposit the equivalent of the excess amount with the Central Bank of Nigeria on or 
before 30th of that month, (CBN Annual Report, 1971 p. 33). 
The year 1971 therefore, witnessed a decline of 63 percent in the treasury bills held 
by the banks, as the banks cashed them in to meet the special deposit requirement. The 
effect of this fall in the treasury bills held by the banks was to reduce the banks' reserves 
by 56 percent. The decline in total banks' reserves in 1971 was mainly due to the 
treasury bills component, since the other component (vault cash plus balances with the 
central bank) declined by less than 20 percent. Currency with the non-bank public, 
demand deposits, and time plus savings deposits all went up modestly between 1970 to 
1971, (see Table 2.2). The reserve to deposit ratios (narrowly and broadly defined) 
declined by almost 60 percent, while currency to deposit ratios narrowly and broadly 
5 The demand for credit was low because the civil war slowed down the economic activities in 
the country. 
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defined declined by one percent and three percent respectively, (see Table 2.1). The 
increase in the money multipliers between 1970 and 1971 of above 40 percent, shown in 
Table 2.1, was therefore mainly due to the effect of a decline in the reserves to deposit 
ratios. This is also quite evident from the graphs where the fluctuation in the reserves to 
deposit ratios are more pronounced than those of the currency to deposit ratios,(see 
relevant charts). 
2.3.3 1973 - 1974 
The period covering late 1973 through 1974 was the beginning of the "oil boom" era 
in Nigeria. The price of a barrel of Nigerian crude oil went up by about 250 percent 
within a period of about four months (from 4.287 $US in October 1973 to 14.691 $US by 
January 1974). This increase in the oil price and the resultant increase in revenue 
affected all the determinants of the money multiplier and therefore the money multiplier 
itself, although unequally. Currency with the non-bank public went up by 30 percent, 
while demand deposits and savings plus time deposits went up by 142 and 67 percent 
respectively. The increase in these variables reflects the monetisation of the oil revenue. 
The currency to deposit ratio, narrowly and broadly defined, declined by 46 and 36 
percent respectively from 1973 to 1974. The total banks' reserves went up by 283 
percent. The treasury bills component went up by about 230 percent, while the other 
component (vault cash plus balances with the central bank) went up by about 400 
percent. 
The 'oil boom' was only indirectly responsible for the large increase in the 'vault 
cash plus balances with the central bank component of the banks' reserves. The direct 
cause was the abolition of the call money scheme on July 1 1974. The call money 
scheme, set up in July 1967, was designed to provide an investment outlet for 
temporarily idle funds of the commercial banks and also to provide a means to absorb 
any immediate shock of liquidity pressure on the money market. Under the scheme, 
commercial banks and other participating financial institutions kept, temporarily, their 
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surplus cash with the Central Bank. The Central Bank then invested these funds in short-
tenn money market instruments, usually treasury bills. It, in turn, paid the commercial 
banks interest at a certain percentage below the prevailing treasury bills issue rate. 
Abolition of the scheme was due mainly to the following reasons: 1) The Federal 
Government, the main user of the call money resources, did not desire extra funds since it 
had enough from the oil revenues. 2) Upsurge in the commercial banks' liquidity 
increased the demand for the facility, which the scheme could no longer provide. 
The reserve to deposit ratio, narrowly and broadly defined, went up by about 60 and 
90 percent respectively. That coupled with the decline in the currency to deposit ratio, 
gave the modest decline in the narrowly and broadly defined money multiplier of 12 and 
16 percent respectively from 1973 to 1974. 
2.3.4 1981 -1982 
The oil glut which started in late 1981/1982 resulted in a decline in prices and 
output of Nigerian crude oil. Total shipments fell from 701.3 billion barrels in 1981 to 
394.7 billion barrels in 1982, while the average price which stood at $39.76 US in 1981 
fell to $35.248 US by the end of 1982. The downward swing in the narrowly and broadly 
defined money multipliers of 25 and 20 percent between 1981 to 1982 shown by Chart 
2.1 and Table 2.1, was partly due to the decline in government revenue brought about by 
the oil market collapse. In the face of the decline in its revenue, the Federal Government, 
once again, resorted to borrowing through sales of treasury bills. Between 1981 to 1982, 
the total treasury bills outstanding held by the commercial and the merchant banks went 
up by about 140 percent. This increase led to about an 85 percent increase in the banks' 
reserves. The reserve to deposit ratios, narrowly and broadly defined, therefore, went up 
by 87 and 69 percent respectively. However, this increase was also partly due to the 
decline in demand deposits of about one percent. The decline in the demand deposits 
largely represents a shift to income earning savings and time deposits following an 
increase in the deposit rate from 5.72 to 7.60 percent per annum. The time plus savings 
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deposits went up by about 20 percent within this period. 
The currency to deposit ratios, (especially the narrowly defined one) have also 
contributed to the decline in the money multipliers. The currency to deposit ratio, 
narrowly defined, went up by about 10 percent, while the broadly defined one declined by 
about 0.2 percent. The increase in the narrowly defined currency to deposit ratio was due 
to a modest increase in currency with the non-bank public of about 9 percent, coupled 
with the decline in demand deposits stated above. 
2.3.5 1985 -1986 
The major event that took place in Nigeria in 1986 that affected the whole economy 
was the adoption of the IMF supported structural adjustment programme SAP in July of 
that year. The main aim of (SAP) was to correct the distortions to the economy caused 
by the increase in oil prices in the 1970s. Specifically, SAP seeks to achieve the 
following objectives: 
i) To restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce 
the dependence on the oil sector and on imports. 
ii) To achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability. 
iii) To lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth. 
iv) To lessen the dominance of the unproductive investments In the public sector, 
Improve the sector's efficiency and intensify the growth potential of the private 
sector. 
One fundamental strategy for achieving these objectives was the adoption of a 
realistic exchange rate policy, coupled with the liberalisation of the external trade and 
payments system. This strategy led to the setting up of the Second Tier Foreign 
Exchange Market (SFEM), with the aim of bringing about a realistic and sustainable 
exchange rate for the Nigerian currency (naira), (CBN Annual Report 1986). The 
operational framework of SFEM is a periodic closed auction system, where the Central 
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Bank supplies a given amount of foreign exchange and calls for bids from the authorised 
dealers and thus determines the exchange rate for some periods. In the first bidding 
session held on the 29th September, 1986, the exchange rate of naira was depreciated by 
66 percent with immediate effect, (see chapter 1 for a discussion on the operational 
details of SFEM). 
Since the beginning of the structural adjustment programme, there was increased 
pressure on the commercial banks' resources for the following reason: 1) The 
announcement in July 1986 of the government's intention to introduce the SFEM led to a 
rush by bank customers to obtain credit for the settlement of their foreign obligations in 
anticipation of the expected substantial depreciation of the value of the naira. 2) As the 
depreciation took place, the naira price of imported inputs went up quite considerably and 
led to an increase in the working capital requirements of Nigerian businesses. This also 
led to an increase in the demand for credit. 3) In August and October 1986, the Central 
Bank called upon the commercial banks to deposit the naira counterpart of all external 
commitments with the Central Bank. Customers who could not provide the funds were 
compelled to seek bank loans. 4) The banks themselves required cash for the foreign 
exchange bidding sessions. The banks met this pressure for liquidity by discounting their 
treasury bill holdings. 
The value of treasury bills held by the banks (commercial and merchant banks) fell 
by 65 percent, from 9 billion naira in December 1985 to 3.2 billions by the end of 1986. 
This had the effect of reducing the banks' reserves by about 53 percent from 1985 to 
1986. The component of banks' reserves made up of vault cash plus balances with the 
Central Bank, however, went up by about 83 percent from 0.824 billion in 1985 to 1.51 
billion in 1986. The banks' reserve to deposit ratios, narrowly and broadly defined, 
declined by 47 and 53 percent respectively. Currency to deposit ratios narrowly and 
broadly defined, on the other hand, went up by 17 and 4 percent respectively. These 
increases are basically accounted for by a modest increase in the currency with the non-
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bank public of about 5 percent, coupled with a decline in demand deposits of 10 percent. 
Savings plus time deposits, however, went up by 10 percent, accounting for the lower 
percentage increase in the broadly defined currency to deposit ratios. Furthermore, it is 
the treasury bills component of the banks' reserves that is responsible for most of the 
fluctuations. 
The effect of an increase in the currency to deposit ratio is to reduce the money 
multipliers while that of a decrease in the reserve to deposit ratios is to have the opposite 
effect. The large change in the money multipliers (an increase in this case), as in almost 
all of the cases discussed above, was due to the change in the reserve to deposit ratios 
component rather than the currency to deposit ratios. 
The above analyses show that most of the noticeable fluctuations in the Nigerian 
money multipliers since 1960, are attributable to one fonn of shock or the other. It 
therefore, may not be appropriate to draw conclusions regarding the stability/instability 
of the multiplier based on the year to year fluctuations. 
2.4 Forecasting the Currency Ratio, Reserve Ratio, and the Money Multiplier 
The stability of the money multiplier, although important, is neither necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the ability of the monetary authorities to successfully control the 
money stock. What is necessary is for the monetary authorities to be able to predict the 
value a multiplier is likely to take in the future, and change the monetary base 
accordingly to achieve the desired level of money stock. To test whether the Nigerian 
money multipliers can be predicted, requires building a model of the multipliers and 
those of the determinants (currency and reserve ratios) and then testing for the models' 
ability to forecast the future. 
The forecasting accuracy test of the models is carried out in the following manner: 
Firstly parsimonious models for the ratios and the multiplier, employing part of the 
whole sample period (1960 to 1987), are found. Secondly, the left out observations are 
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then forecast using the estimated parsimonious models. A test statistic comparing the 
within sample and post sample residual variances asymptotically distributed as a 
X2 (N)/ N where N is the degrees of freedom is constructed. The null hypothesis tested is 
that the estimated parameters and the variances in the sample and the forecast period are 
the same (H 0: ~1 = ~2: aT = a~). The test statistic is standardised such that if its 
calculated value is greater than 2 it is taken to imply a poor ex-ante forecast. In addition 
to the X2 - test, a Chow - Test for parameter constancy between the sample and the 
forecast period can be constructed. 
The determinants of the money multiplier (currency and reserve ratios) are 
behavioural variables detennined by the non-bank public's and the banks' behaviour. 
The currency to deposit ratio and the banks' reserve to deposit ratio can be modelled as 
behavioural equations, each determined by a series of explanatory variables. Since the 
money multiplier is an identity derived from a combination of these two behavioural 
variables, as shown by equation (2.10) above, it is expressed as a function of the 
variables detennining the ratios. 
The models of currency ratio, the reserve ratio, and the money multiplier for Nigeria 
are presented below. 
C 
~ =/(GDP, CPI, BBRCH, SRT) 
D 
R - = g (LRT, DRT, TBR) 
D 
MULT=h [~ K] 
D'D 
Where the variables are defined as follows: 
MULT = Annual Values of the Money Multiplier. 
~ . R' = Currency to Deposl t atlO 
D 
RD'R . - = Banks' Reserve to eposH atlO 
D 




CPI = Consumer Price Index 
BBRCH = Bank Branches and Offices 
LRT = Commercial Banks Lending Rate 
SRT = Savings/Deposit Rate 
DRT = Discount Rate 
TBR = Treasury Bills Rate 
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Equation (2.11) is the non-bank public's currency to deposit ratio. It is postulated to 
be a function of the real gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of cost of living (CPI), 
number of bank branches and offices (BBRCH)6 and the savings or deposit rate (SRT). 
As income goes up, the demand for most goods and services are also expected to go up. 
Following the transactions motive for demanding money, the public's demand for 
currency to purchase these goods and services is expected to go up. This means that the 
expected relationship between the currency ratio and income is positive. However, 
Khatkhate et al (1980) have argued that the relationship will be negative, because 
individuals and corporations tend to become more efficient in their cash management as 
their income rises. 
The relationship between the currency to deposit ratio, (especially demand deposit) 
and the cost of living is expected to be positive. The implicit assumption here, as well as 
in the previous case, is that currency as well as demand deposits are held for transaction 
purposes only, since these assets do not bear interest. 7 When there is an increase in the 
price of goods and services, more money (currency and demand deposit) would be 
needed to maintain the same level of consumption. In Nigeria, one would expect the 
increase in the currency component to be greater than that of demand deposits. The 
situation may be different if a broader definition of deposits (savings plus time deposits) 
6 This variable is to cater for the development of banking habit and monetisation of the econo-
my. 
7 In reality in most countries, demand deposits bear some interest, although considerably less 
than on the other kinds of deposits. In Nigeria, in the latter part of 1990. it was made mandatory 
for commercial banks to pay interest on demand deposits. 
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is considered. Economic agents may want to increase their holdings of these deposits to 
hedge against inflation which erodes the value of wealth held in cash and demand 
deposits. This suggests a negative relationship between inflation and the currency to 
deposit ratio. 
The bank branches and offices, as a proxy for development of banking habit and 
monetisation in Nigeria, is expected to be negatively related to the currency to deposit 
ratio. As the banking habit develops people reduce their currency holdings and increase 
their deposit holdings. An increase in the interest rate paid for deposits is expected to 
reduce the amount of currency held, since the interest rate is an opportunity cost of 
holding currency or, in the Nigerian case, a demand deposit as well. 
The banks' reserve to deposit ratio is also postulated to be a function of the lending 
rate (LRT), the discount rate (DRT), and the treasury bills rate (TBR). 
A higher lending rate is expected to induce banks to reduce their reserves to take 
advantage of the more profitable lending, giving a negative relationship between lending 
rates and the reserve ratio. A higher treasury bills rate would encourage banks to switch 
from holding other assets to holding treasury bills. Since treasury bills held by the banks 
are part of the banks' reserves in Nigeria, the banks' reserve to deposit ratio will go up. 
The relationship between banks' reserve ratio and the treasury bills rate is therefore 
expected to be negative. A higher discount rate, on the other hand, induces banks to raise 
their reserve ratio to avoid using the discount window to make up for the legal 
requirement. 
The money multiplier, derived directly from the currency to deposit ratio and the 
reserve to deposit ratio, is indirectly affected by the variables determining the ratios. 
Any variable that increases the ratios is expected to have a negative effect on the money 
multiplier, while the opposite holds for the variables that lead to a decrease in the ratios. 
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2.5 The Econometric Modelling Technique 
The currency to deposit ratios, the reserve to deposit ratios and the ensuing money 
multipliers, for the purpose of estimation and forecasting future values are specified as 
dynamic models. Dynamic models involve non-contemporaneous relationships between 
the dependent and the independent variables. This means that the full effect of a change 
in an independent variable on the dependent variable is not realised instantaneously, but 
rather distributed through time. In comparison, in a static model, the dependent variable 
is taken to be a function of a set of explanatory variables observed at the same point in 
time with the dependent variable. This implies that the complete effect of any change in 
the independent variable on the dependent variable is realised within the periodicity of 
the data. 
The relevant estimation equations are formulated as autoregressive distributed 
lagged models (ADL). Assuming for simplicity that there are k explanatory variables in 
the model, the general form of the ADL model can be presented as equation (2.14) 
below, (see Harvey 1990 p. 265). 
k 
A (L)Yt = LBi(L)Xti + Et (2.14) 
i=l 
This formulation has the following advantages. To start with, if the error term (EI) 
In (2.14) is normally distributed, ordinary least square estimates are fully efficient. 
Secondly, it is easier to use Hendry's approach - a model selection procedure of moving 
from the general to specific, which is employed in this study. The general to specific 
procedure requires that a parsimonious model should not be adopted at the beginning of 
the exercise. Instead, the model should be deliberately overfitted with as many potential 
explanatory variables as possible, and then a specification search is conducted to arrive at 
the most suitable explanatory variables. The general to specific procedure becomes more 
relevant in situations (as in the case of this study) where the theory does not provide with 
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certainty the variables to be included in the estimating equation. Indeed, Harvey, (1990) 
has argued that the decision as to whether or not a particular explanatory variable should 
be included in a model can only be made if it is included in the model in the first place. 
There is one fundamental problem with equation (2.14). It is likely to suffer from 
multicollinearity, since variables and their lagged values are often highly correlated. One 
way of handling this problem is to reparameterise it into levels and changes, as in (2.15) 
below, thus ensuring orthogonality of the explanatory variables. 
r-1 s-l 
* * i1Yt = (u-l)Yt- 1 + Luj i1Yt- j + ~oL1Xt + ~Xt-1 + L~jL1Xt_j +€t (2.15) 
j=l j=l 
In addition, specifying a model in the form of equation (2.15) separates more clearly the 
short-run and the long-run effects of an independent variable on the dependent variable. 
The impact effect (the short-run effect) is represented by the coefficient of the change 
variable, while the long-run effect is given by the coefficients of the level variables 
divided by minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (u - 1). 
2.6 Discussion of the Estimation Results 
The general to specific modelling procedure, briefly outlined above, is used to 
estimate the narrowly and broadly defined currency to deposit ratio, reserve to deposit 
ratio, and the money multiplier. The starting point of the estimation process is to set the 
relevant equations (2.11 to 2.13) in the form of equation (2.15) above. The right hand 
side of each equation contained a one period lagged dependent variable in levels and in 
first differences, one period lagged level and non lagged first difference of each 
independent variable. A specification search is then conducted to arrive at parsimonious 
models. 
A number of models of the broadly and narrowly defined currency to deposit ratios 
are reported in Table 2.3 to 2.3.2 as (CR 1) and (CR2), depending on the specification of 
the dummy variables. The results with the lowest standard errors are those of Table 2.3 
which include step dummies. Both narrow and broad models of this table are free of both 
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first and second order serial correlation as shown by the Lagrange Multiplier Tests (LMI 
and LM2). Chi-squared tests for normality failed to reject the null hypotheses that the 
errors are nonnal. However, both models could not pass the first-order ARCH-test for 
heteroskedastic error tenns. The calculated chi-squared values are 6.58 and 6.65 
respectively, while the critical value at 5 percent is about 5.99. The reported t-values are 
however, derived from heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
All explanatory variables carry the expected signs except the savings rate (SRT). 
The savings rate both in the short-run and in the long-run has positive effects on the 
narrowly defined currency to deposit ratios. This seems to suggest that the savings rate 
does not represent the opportunity cost of holding money in Nigeria. This finding tends 
to confirm that of Ajayi (1973) that savings deposits in Nigeria are not held for the 
interest income but rather the other services they provide. The 1968, 1971, and 1986 
dummy variables have been dropped from the equations in Table 2.3 because of the low 
level of their significance in explaining the currency to deposit ratios. In fact, the 1981 
dummy is significant only at the 10 percent and above level. 
The most important test for the purpose of this study is the test for the ability of the 
models to forecast the future values of currency to deposit ratios. The calculated forecast 
Chi-squared value of 1.59 and the forecast period Chow-Test value of 0.44, coupled with 
the battery of diagnostic tests reported earlier, show that the model for narrowly defined 
currency to deposit ratio with step dummies has a good ability to forecast the future. It is 
stated in section 2.4 that if the calculated forecast chi-squared is larger than 2, then the 
model fails the forecast accuracy test. The calculated forecast chi-squared of 3 for the 
broad definition of the currency to deposit ratio indicates that the model gives poor ex-
ante forecasts of the future. However, a Chow-Test for the forecast period, and the 
results of the model specification tests dispel any possibility that this model is not stable. 
Table 2.3 
Currency to Deposit Ratios with Step Dummies 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
Variables 
Const. 
11 Log (CR 1)t-l 
Log (CR 1)t-l 
11 Log (CR 2)t-l 
Log (CR 2)t-l 
11 Log GDP 
Log (GDP)t-l 
11 Log BBRCH 
Log (BBRCH)t_l 
11 Log SRT 
Log (SRT)t-l 






LM -Test 1 st -Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test 2nd -Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH-Test 1st -Order Heteroskedasticity 
Nonnality Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables: ~ Log CRI and ~ Log CR2. 









































































t - Values in parenthesis are calculated from heteroskedasticity consistent error tenns. 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990), PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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Table 2.3.1 
Currency to Deposit Ratios with no Dummies 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
Variables 
Canst. 
.1 Log (CR 1)/-1 
Log (CR 1)/-1 
.1 Log(CR 2)/-1 
Log (CR 2)/-1 
.1 Log GDP 
Log (GDP)/_l 
.1 Log BBRCH 
Log (BBRCH)/_l 
.1 Log SRT 
Log (SRT)/_l 






LM-Test IS/-Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test 2nd-Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH-Test IS/-Order Heteroskedasticity 
Normality Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables:.1 Log CRI and .1 Log CR2. 









































































t - Values in parenthesis are calculated from heteroskedasticity consistent error terms. 




Currency to Deposit Ratios with Impulse Dummies 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
Variables CRI CR2 
Canst. 3.03 8.37 
(1.41) (3.32) 
11 Log (CR 1)/-1 -
Log (CR 1)/-1 -0.68 -
( -4.16) -
11 Log(CR 2)/-1 -
Log (CR 2)/-1 - -0.56 
- ( -3.26) 
11 Log GDP -0.54 -0.92 
(-2.27) (-3.81) 
Log (GDP)/-l 0.07 -0.40 
(0.34) (-2.02) 
11 Log BBRCH -0.52 -0.69 
(-1.32) (-1.78) 
Log (BBRCH)/_l -0.78 -1.03 
(-2.53) (-3.25) 
11 Log SRT 0.75 -
(2.93) -
Log (SRT)/-l 0.83 -
(3.88) -
11 Log cpr 0.21 0.60 
(0.79) (2.38) 
Log (CPI)I-l -0.11 0.60 
( -0.50) (2.99) 
I1D1973/74 -0.49 -0.24 
( -4.30) (-2.02) 
I1D1981/82 0.04 0.13 
(0.30) (1.18) 
R2 0.84 0.72 
Std. Err. 0.099 0.104 
LM -Test lSI-Order Serial Correlation F(1,16) 0.45 F(l,18) 0.05 
LM-Test 2nd-Order Serial Correlation F(2,15) 2.56 F(2,17) 0.03 
ARCH-Test lSI-Order Heteroskedasticity X
2(1) 0.01 X2(1) 0.007 
Nonnality Test X2(2) 0.43 X2(2) 1.00 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 1.53 X2(2)/2 6.48 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(2,15) 0.63 F(2,17) 2.57 
Dependent Variables: 11 Log CRI and ~ Log CR2. 
Where CRl= Cp/DD; and CR2= Cp/(DD+TD+SD) 
t - Values in parenthesis are calculated from heteroskedasticity consistent error tenns. 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990), PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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A number of models for the broadly and narrowly defined banks' reserve to deposit 
ratios are presented in Tables 2.4 to 2.4.2. The result of specifying the models with step 
dummies are in Table 2.4. Besides the dummy variables, only the treasury bills rate and 
the lending rate are found to be significant in explaining banks' reserves in Nigeria. Both 
variables carry expected signs. An increase in lending rate reduces the amount of 
reserves held. Presumably banks, rather than keeping their assets in reserve form, loan 
them out to take advantage of the increase in the lending rate. A rise in the treasury bills 
rate encourages banks to switch their funds from other forms of investment into treasury 
bills. Since the banks' reserves are defined to include treasury bills, any switch from 
non-reserves assets to treasury bills by the banks increases the banks' reserves. 
Furthermore, all variables in changes are found to be insignificant in explaining banks' 
reserves in Nigeria, suggesting that banks in Nigeria adjust to their equilibrium reserve 
level within a year after a change in either the lending rate or the treasury bills rate. 
The step dummy variables representing each of the periods of major disturbances 
discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter are all quite significant, confirming the analytical 
conclusions of the section. This, firstly, suggests that the shocks to the Nigerian 
economy did in fact, affect the reserve to deposit ratios, and secondly, that these effects 
can be successfully proxied (ex-post) by the use of the dummy variables in the modelling 
process.8 Unlike in the case of the currency to deposit ratios, the models in Table 2.4 pass 
all the regular specification tests including that of heteroskedasticity. The test for the 
forecasting ability of the models, carried out in a similar manner to the currency to 
deposit ratio case, indicates that the models can predict the future values of the reserve to 
deposit ratios satisfactorily. In fact, as indicated by the lower values for the calculated 
forecast Chi-squared, these models have a better forecasting ability than the ones for the 
currency to deposit ratios. The diagnostic tests as well as the forecast period Chow - Test 
8 It must be borne in mind that the dummy variables represent empirical hindsight, and that ex 
ante predictability in the face of external shocks may be difficult. 
Table 2.4 
Reserve to Deposit Ratios with Step Dummies 




llLog (RR 1)/-1 -
Log (RR 1)/-1 -0.93 
(-6.83) 
llLog(RR 2)/-1 -
Log (RR 2)/-1 -
-
II Log LRT -
Log (LRT)I_I -1.81 
(-2.70) 
II Log DRT -
Log (DRT)/_l -
II Log TBR -













Std. Err. 0.22 
LM -Test 1 s'-Order Serial Correlation F(1, 19) 1.77 
LM-Test 2nd-Order Serial Correlation F(2, 18) 1.62 
ARCH -Test 1 s'-Order Heteroskedastici ty X2(l) 1.04 
Normality-Test X2(2) 0.31 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 0.73 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(2, 18) 0.36 
Dependent Variables: II Log RRI and II Log RR2. 
Where RRl=Reserves/DD; and RR2=Reserves/(DD+TD+SD). 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 




































F(2, 18) 0.28 
Table 2.4.1 
Reserve to Deposit Ratios with no Dummies 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
Variables RRl 
Const. 0.69 
b. Log (RR 1)t-1 
(0.48) 
-
Log (RR 1)t-1 -0.31 
(-2.12) 
b.Log(RR 2)t-1 -
Log (RR 2)t-1 -
-
b. Log LRT -
Log (LRT)t-1 -0.64 
(-0.58) 
b. Log DRT -
Log (DRT)t-1 -
b. Log TBR -








Std. Err. 0.39 
LM -Test 1 st -Order Serial Correlation F(1,24) 0.17 
LM -Test 2nd -Order Serial Correlation F(2, 23) 0.34 
ARCH-Test 1st -Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 0.94 
Normality-Test X2(2) 1.01 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 6.06 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(2, 23) 1.76 
Dependent Variables: b. Log RR1 and b. Log RR2. 
Where RR1=Reserves/DD; and RR2=Reserves/(DD+TD+SD). 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 


























F(2, 23) 1.39 
Table 2.4.2 
Reserve to Deposit Ratios with Impulse Dummies 




/).Log (RR 1)/-1 -
Log (RR 1)/-1 -0.68 
(-0.73) 
Uog(RR 2)/-1 -
Log (RR 2)/-1 -
-
/). Log LRT -
Log (LRT)t_l -1.91 
(-2.61 ) 
/). Log DRT -
Log (DRT)t-l -
/). Log TBR -











Std. Err. 0.23 
LM -Test 1st -Order Serial Correlation F(1, 20) 0.24 
LM-Test 2nd-Order Serial Correlation F(2, 19) 2.06 
ARCH-Test 1 st -Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 2.44 
Norrnality-Test X2(2) 0.40 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 8.49 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(2, 19) 2.13 
Dependent Variables: /). Log RR 1 and /). Log RR2. 
Where RR 1 =Reserves/DD; and RR2=Rescrves/(DD+ TD+SD). 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 





























F(1, 20) 0.21 





DCW: Dummy variable to cater for the Nigerian Civil War. It takes the value of ones for the 
three years of the civil war and zeros all other times. 
Table 2.5 
Money Multipliers with Step Dummies 




I!:.Log (MULT 1)t-1 -0.31 
(-2.15) 
Log (MULT 1)t-1 -0.42 
(-2.41) 




I!:. Log GDP 0.70 
(2.84) 






I!:. LogTBR 0.28 
(1.97) 













Std. Err. 0.078 
LM-Test 1 st Order Serial Correlation F(l, 14) 0.30 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Correlation F(2, 13) 1.18 
ARCH-Test Ft Order Hetcroskcdasticity X2(2) 2.58 
Normality-Test X2(2) 0.647 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 0.76 
Chow-Test for Forecast period F(2, 13) 0.58 
Dependent Variables I!:. Log MULTI and I!:. Log MUL T2. 
Where MULT1=Ml/BASE, and MULT2=M2/BASE. 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 





































F(}, 14) 0.98 




F(2, 13) 0.82 
Table 2.5.1 
Money Multipliers with no Dummies 













tl Log GDP -0.05 
(-0.12) 
Log (GDP)t-l 0.13 
(0.95) 




tl Log TBR 0.001 
(0.02) 








Std. Err. 0.16 
LM-Test 1 st Order Serial Correlation F(l, 19) 0.14 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Correlation F(2, 18) 0.16 
ARCH-Test 1st Order Heteroskedasticity X2(2) 1.38 
Nonnality-Test X2(2) 1.44 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)!2 3.80 
Chow-Test for Forecast period F(2, 18) 2.07 
Dependent Variables tl Log MULTI and tl Log MUL T2. 
Where MULT1=M1/BASE, and MULT2=M2/BASE. 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 



























F(l, 19) 0.00 




F(2, 18) 1.69 
Table 2.5.2 
Money Multipliers with Impulse Dummies 




I:!.Log (MULT 1)t-1 -0.25 
(-1.31) 
Log (MULT 1)t-1 0.46 





I:!. Log GDP 0.81 
(2.28) 
Log (GDP)t-1 -0.02 
( -0.19) 




I:!. Log TBR 0.10 
(0.53) 






I:!.D 1981/82 -0.42 
(-2.88) 
I:!.D 1985/86 0.42 
(2.99) 
R2 (0.72) 
Std. Err. 0.115 
LM-Test 1st Order Serial Correlation F(1, 15) 0.08 
LM-Test 2M Order Serial Correlation F(2, 14) 9.78 
ARCH-Test 1st Order Heteroskedasticity X2(2) 0.60 
Nonnality-Test X2(2) 0.55 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(2)/2 8.79 
Chow-Test for Forecast period F(2, 14) 4.24 
Dependent Variables I:!. Log MULTI and I:!. Log MULT2. 
Where MULTl=MI/BASE, and MULT2=M2/BASE. 
t-Values are in parenthesis. 



































F(1, 15) 0.06 




F(2, 14) 1.14 
DCW: Dummy variable to cater for the Nigerian Civil War. It takes the value of ones for the 
three years of the civil war and zeros all other times. 
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also confirm that fairly stable models can be found for the broad and narrow definitions 
of the reserves to deposit ratios. 
Models for the narrow and the broad definition of the money multipliers, using step 
dummies, impulse dummies and without any dummy, are presented in Tables 2.5 to 
2.5.2. Only four out of the seven explanatory variables given by equations (2.11 and 
2.12) are found to be significant in explaining the money multipliers when step dummies 
are used (Table 2.5). Relevant explanatory variables are the real GDP, the lending rates 
(LRT) , the treasury bills rate (TBR) and the Cpr. All the dummy variables are also 
statistically significant, again confirming the conclusions of section 2.3. The models in 
Table 2.5 (both narrowly and broadly defined) have passed the regular specification tests 
as well. With regard to their forecasting ability, the calculated forecast chi-squared show 
that only the narrowly defined money multiplier can be predicted in Nigeria. This is 
quite consistent with the results from the determinants of the money multiplier (currency 
and reserve ratios), where the model for broadly defined currency to deposit ratio, when 
step dummies were used, is found to have a poor ex-ante forecasting ability. Although a 
different method is used, the above finding agrees with that of Ojo (1976), that the 
narrowly defined money multiplier is better for the purpose of money supply control in 
Nigeria. As in the cases of the models for currency and reserve ratios, a Chow-Test 
rejects the hypothesis that the forecast period and the other periods cannot be represented 
by the same model. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the outcome of estimating the models 
with step dummies. It may be important to examine the degree to which these results 
depend on the presence of these dummy variables. Furthermore, it may also be 
interesting to investigate what difference the use of impulse dummies as opposed to step 
dummies may make to the results. 9 
9 A step dummy assumes that the effect of the shock is permanent, while in the case of an im-
pulse dummy, the effect is temporary. Impulse dummies are obtained by taking the first difference 
of the step dummies. Initially, the effect of the Nigerian Civil War which went on for three years 
(1967 to 1970) was represented by two different dummy variables (zeros until 1967 and then ones 
81 
The result of estimating the currency to deposit ratio models with out any dummy 
variable is presented in Table 2.3.1, while that of using impulse dummies is presented in 
Table 2.3.2. In both cases there is no dramatic difference with the results from Table 2.3. 
The models have passed the regular diagnostic tests, with the narrow currency to deposit 
ratio having a satisfactory ex-ante forecast and the broad one relatively poor ex-ante 
forecast ability. One difference between the models in Tables 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and the ones in 
2.3 is the fact that explanatory variables in the former are relatively weaker. 
The result of estimating the reserve to deposit ratios without dummies and one with 
impulse dummies are presented in Tables 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Again the models have passed 
the regular diagnostic tests. Here also the coefficient estimates are weaker than when 
step dummies were used. The fundamental difference is that, in the former cases the 
models have quite poor ex-ante forecast abilities. However, in all cases the Chow-test for 
the forecast period rejects any possibility that the parameter estimates are different 
between the forecast and the rest of the period. 
With regard to the money multiplier, the models without dummy variables are 
presented in Table 2.5.1 while those using impulse dummies are presented in Table 2.5.2. 
Although, in both cases the regular specification and validation requirements have been 
satisfied, all the coefficient estimates with the exception of those on the dummy variables 
are very weak. Furthermore, the narrow and the broad definition of the money multiplier 
models, in both cases, show a poor ex-ante forecast. 
The robustness of the estimated models of the Nigerian money multiplier and the 
apparent conclusion that the Nigerian money multiplier is relatively stable and can be 
forecast with a reasonable degree of accuracy should be treated with a degree of caution, 
in view of the key role played by the step dummy variables. 
and zeros until 1970 and then ones). lIere, one variable - onesfor the three years of the civil war 
and zeros for all other period - is used. 
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2.7 Controlling the Monetary Base 
Earlier in this chapter (section 2.2.1), it was stated that the ability of a monetary 
authority to control the level of money stock, in the context of the money multiplier 
model, has two main dimensions. The stability and predictability of the money 
multiplier and the controllability of the monetary base. So far, only the first part of the 
issue has been addressed. This section partially addresses the second part, before taking 
the debate further in the next chapter. 
The appropriate starting point for this analysis is a proper definition of the monetary 
base. According to Balbach & Burger (1976), the monetary base is simply a set of assets 
that constrains the growth of money stock. In a system where the money stock consists 
of the sum of banks' liabilities (in the form of deposits) and government's liabilities (in 
the form of currency), the monetary base is made up of the following: 1) those assets 
which the consolidated banking sector uses to settle inter-bank debts, and 2) those items, 
aside from bank liabilities, which are used as money. In most monetary systems, these 
items take the form of commercial banks' deposits with the central bank and the 
currency in circulation (both items appear on the liability side of the central banks' 
balance sheet). This is the 'uses' definition of the monetary base. For the purpose of 
analysing the controllability of the monetary base, it is necessary also to look at the 
'sources'definition. The source of the base money is the algebraic sum of all other assets 
and liabilities in the central bank balance sheet. 
Table 2.6 is the balance sheet of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as at the end of 
1988. According to the above definition, the sources of the monetary base in Nigeria are 
the sum of all the items in the assets side, minus all the items in the liability side with the 
exception of currency in circulation and the commercial banks' deposits. As discussed 
earlier, the treasury bills held by the commercial banks in Nigeria are reserve eligible 
assets. In this case the amount of treasury bills held by the relevant institutions is to be 
added to the source definition given above, (Balback and Burger, 1976 p. 6). The sources 
83 
of the Nigerian monetary base can be written as equation (2.16) below. 
(2.16) 
TB stands for the amount of treasury bills outstanding held by the banks: other variables 
are defined in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 
Central Bank of Nigeria Balance Sheet II 
as at 31st Dec. 1988 (millions of naira) 
ASSETS I LIABILITIES I 
FOREIGN ASSETS (FA) 
Gold 19.80 Paid-up Capital (CP) 334.00 
T. Bills $ Bank Balances 3,222.40 Currency in circulations (CL) 10,210.50 
Foreign Govt Securities 30.50 Commercial Banks' Deposits (CD) 1,5301.10 
TOTAL 3,272.70 Federal Govt's Deposits (GD) 6,302.60 
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES (GS) State Govts' Deposits (SD) 85.60 
Treasury Bills 22,350.90 Foreign Deposits (FD) 751.3 
Treasury Certs. 3,801.10 Other Deposits (OD) 2,065.00 
Others 1,450.50 Other Liabilities (OL) 40,243.30 
TOTAL 27,602.50 
LOANS AND REDISCOUNTS (LD) 
Treasury Bills 474.40 
Treasury Certs. 9.60 
Commercial Bills 79.20 
Advances -
TOTAL 563.20 
Other Assets (OA) 3,584 
61,552.40 61,552.40 
Sources: CBN Economic And Financial Review March, 1990. 
The ability of the Central Bank of Nigeria to control the monetary base amounts to 
its ability to control the variables in equation (2.16). The foreign assets component of the 
Nigerian monetary base (FA), is mainly the foreign currency deposits in foreign central 
banks. It is basically determined by the price and export of crude oil, which constitutes 
over 90 percent of the country's exports. For example, between 1973 and 1974 the CBN 
saw its foreign assets go up by over 800 percent from 389 to 3,454 million Nigerian 
naira, while from 1980 to 1983 it declined by 600 percent. The increase in 1973 to 1974 
was due to the first oil price increase, and the decrease in the early 1980s was entirely due 




extent detennined by market forces, and to a lesser extent by the decisions of the OPEC 
cartel, of which Nigeria is a member, the CBN carmot change the foreign assets at will 
for the purpose of changing the monetary base. 
The amount of government securities held by the CBN (GS), depends on the 
budgetary operations of the Federal Government of Nigeria. In principle the CBN is free 
to alter its government security holdings for monetary policy purposes, but not in 
practice. Quite often, contrary to its better judgement, the CBN has been a vehicle for 
financing the federal government deficits both directly and indirectly. 
Indirectly, the CBN is often pressured by the Federal Government to maintain a 
cheap money policy to keep the cost of deficit financing down. In 1964, the Central 
Bank's attempt to raise the treasury bills issue rate, in the interest of currency stability, 
was abandoned because of the Government's opposition to any increase in the cost of its 
borrowing. Since then, until the dramatic increase in the government's revenue due to 
crude oil exports in the 1970s, the Federal Government financed most of its expenditures 
through internal borrowing. After the oil price collapse, against the Central Banks' 
advice, the Government resorted back to heavy deficit financing for its operations. 
Directly, the Central Bank has to accept all government securities issued but not 
subscribed for by the commercial banks and other non-bank institutions. As a result, in 
most years the Central Bank subscribes for over 50 percent of the treasury bills issued. 
For example, in 1988 and 1989, over 80 percent of the issues were subscribed for by the 
Central Bank. 
Although the Central Bank has the power to use open market operations to change 
the amount of government securities it is holding, in practice, open market operations in 
the traditional sense of the tenn have never been used in Nigeria. The buying and selling 
of government securities by the Central Bank, which has been going on since its 
inception, was aimed at raising funds for the government rather than influencing the 
abilities of the Nigerian financial institutions to create money. 
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The amount of treasury bills held by the commercial banks can also be controlled in 
principle. To make the commercial banks hold more, the treasury bills rate would have 
to be increased. However, as mentioned earlier, the Central Bank does not have a free 
hand in adjusting the rates of return on government securities for monetary policy 
purposes. 
The loans and discounts (LD) component of the monetary base is within the 
complete control of the Central Bank of Nigeria. It has been using the minimum 
rediscount rate for monetary policy purposes since 1962. Except for the period between 
1968 to 1975, the minimum rediscount rate has been constantly changed throughout 
Nigeria's post independence history. Other assets (OA), which is mainly composed of 
fixed assets like buildings, vehicles, etc., cannot be altered for the purpose of changing 
the monetary base. 
Almost all of the variables on the liability side of the Central Bank's balance sheet, 
which appear in equation (2.16), are not within the control of the monetary authorities. It 
is inconceivable for the Central Bank to change its paid up capital (CP) for monetary 
policy purposes. The Federal Government's deposits (GD), the state governments' 
deposits (SD) are determined by the revenue the governments can generate in any given 
year. The Central Bank cannot for example, change the interest rates on these deposits or 
provide other incentives to entice the governments to deposit more. This statement 
equally applies to the foreign government deposits with the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(FD). Other deposits (OD), which includes deposits of government parastatals and other 
institutions, cannot be controlled by the Central Bank at will either. In sum, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria does not seem to have much control over the components of the 
monetary base. 
The analysis in this chapter so far, implicitly assumes that the monetary base is 
exogenous which may not be true. A group of economists known as the "Post-
Keynesians" believe that the monetary base and the money stock are both endogenously 
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detennined by the public's demand for it. The monetary authorities, therefore, cannot 
control either at will. A detailed analysis of this contention, plus the short-comings of 
the money multiplier approach to the money stock determination is taken up in the next 
chapter. 
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
According to the money multiplier model of money stock determination, the money 
stock at any given point in time is equal to the money multiplier times the monetary base. 
The money multiplier is an identity derived from the currency to deposit ratio and the 
reserve to deposit ratio, while the monetary base is basically the sum of currency held by 
the non-bank public and the reserves of the deposit money banks. 
A simple observation of the data and the graphs of the money multiplier, the 
currency to deposit ratios, and the reserve to deposit ratios for Nigeria shows that their 
yearly values have experienced some major fluctuations since 1960. It is therefore, 
tempting to conclude that the money multiplier and its detenninants are unstable and as 
such not predictable. However, closer observation reveals that most of the major 
fluctuations were due to unpredictable internal or external shocks. 
Stability of the money multiplier and its determinants is not an end in itself. What 
is of importance is the ability of the Nigerian monetary authorities to predict the future 
value of these variables. Using econometric models, where the shocks are taken into 
consideration through the use of dummy variables, it is found that the Nigerian monetary 
authorities may be able to forecast with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the values of the 
money multiplier and its determinants in the future. This conclusion was arrived at after 
step dummies were used to capture the shocks. Estimating without dummies, and with 
impulse dummies could not produce similar results. Therefore, the stability and 
predictability of the money multiplier is open to question. With regard to the monetary 
base, evidence does not seem to support that the Central Bank of Nigeria can control the 
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variables that make up the monetary base. This may be because the monetary base is 
endogenous. The detailed analysis of whether the monetary base is endogenous is taken 
up in the next chapter . 
• 
Chapter 3 
Critique .of the Money Multiplier Approach and the 
EndogeneltyIEx9QeneJ1'L of the Monetary base and the 
Money Stock in Nigeria 
3.1 Introduction 
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In the last chapter the ability of the Nigerian Central Bank to change the money 
stock for monetary policy purposes, was analysed in the context of the money multiplier 
approach. Specifically, the central issues of the approach - the stability and how easily 
the money multiplier can be predicted, plus the controllability of the monetary base were 
looked at. However, it is well known that the theory behind the analysis of chapter 2 (the 
money multiplier analysis of money supply determination) has been found to be 
deficient, (see for example Goodhart, (1984), (1989)). 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the deficiencies of this approach and 
present alternative methods of analysing the money stock determination. Furthermore, 
the issue of the endogeneity of the monetary base and the money stock, briefly touched 
on at the end of the last chapter, is more thoroughly analysed. The outline of the rest of 
the chapter is as follows: A brief review of the money multiplier theory of money supply 
determination is carried out in section (3.2). Section (3.3) presents some of the criticisms 
made against the money multiplier approach as a theory. Section (3.3.1) briefly outlines 
the portfolio balance model of money supply determination believed to correct some of 
the deficiencies of the money multiplier approach. A discussion of the critical issue of 
appropriateness or otherwise of assuming the monetary base as exogenously fixed by the 
central bank is carried out in section (3.3.2). Section (3.4) looks at the issue of 
endogeneity/exogeneity of the monetary base and the money stock, paying close attention 
to the debate between the Monetarists and the Post-Keynesians. In section (3.4.1), a 
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possible way of empirically testing the issue of exogeneity/endogeneity of the monetary 
base and the money stock is explored. Section (3.4.2) looks at the Granger-Sims 
causality test, while section (3.4.3) discusses the outcome of applying the Granger-Sims 
causality test to Nigerian data. Finally, the summary and conclusion to the chapter is 
presented in section (3.5). 
3.2 The Money Multiplier Approach 
The money stock, at a given point in time, is usually defined as the sum of currency 
with the non-bank public and the deposits with the commercial banks. In Nigeria, the 
relevant deposits for the purpose of defining money supply is net of the Federal 
Government deposits. Depending on whether a narrow or a broad definition of money is 
of interest, deposits with the commercial banks may be just demand deposits, or may 
include savings and time deposits. Whatever definition is used, the money supply 
process mainly involves three parties; namely the commercial banks, the non-bank 
public and the monetary authorities. 1 
All deposits are liabilities of the commercial banks, and assets to the non-bank 
public, while the currency component of the money stock is the liability of the monetary 
authorities. Although in less financially developed economies, currency could be a major 
proportion of the total money stock, it is seldom, if ever, used for the purpose of 
changing the money stock. This does not mean that the role of the monetary authorities 
in the money supply process is less important, because the monetary authorities act 
through the deposit component as well. 
The commercial banks play the most important role in the money supply process 
through the deposit creation activity described at the beginning of the last chapter. The 
role of the non-bank public is to trigger this deposit creation activity by making the initial 
deposit and also enable the process to continue by borrowing from the commercial banks. 
1 The terms "monetary authorities" and "the cenlral bank" are used inlerchangeably 
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The monetary authorities' role is an indirect one. By using different kinds of measures, 
including a direct control, it can speed up or delay the credit creation process. 
In the previous chapter, the Nigerian money supply process was examined using the 
money-multiplier formulation of money supply determination. The money stock 
equation utilised is restated below as equation (3.1) 
(3.1) 
This equation is derived from an algebraic manipulation of two identities. Namely, the 
money stock is equal to the currency with the non-bank public plus the deposit liabilities 
of the commercial banks (M == Cp + D), and the monetary base is equal to the currency 
with the non-bank public plus the banks' reserves (H == Cp + R). The money stock 
equation (3.1) has two components - the money multiplier and the monetary base. The 
money multiplier is made up of the non-bank public's currency to deposit ratio (Cp I D) 
and the banks' reserve to deposit ratio (RID). The behaviour of the banks and the non-
bank public are superficially incorporated into the money supply process through the 
money multiplier. The behaviour of the other agent, the monetary authorities, is 
incorporated through the monetary base, which is basically made up of their net liability 
items. 
The total quantity of money in circulation is viewed as resulting from the joint 
decisions of the public, the banks and the monetary authorities. The money stock varies 
directly with the monetary base and inversely with the (CpID) chosen by the public and 
(RID) chosen by the banks. 
A change in the money supply for monetary policy purposes within the money 
multiplier framework requires, for a given stable currency and reserve ratios (and 
therefore, a stable money multiplier), a change in the monetary base in the desired 
direction by the desired amount. If, on the other hand, the ratios are not stable, the 
authorities are required to counter the effect of such variability by changing the monetary 
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base over and above what is required to achieve the desired level of money stock if the 
ratios and the multiplier were stable. This approach to money supply determination 
assumes that the monetary base is exogenously controlled by the monetary authorities 
and by implication the money stock is also exogenously determined. 
3.3 Deficiencies of the Money Multiplier Approach 
The use of the money supply equation, in the context of the money multiplier 
approach, as a theory of money supply determination has been criticised on many 
grounds. Some economists (exemplified by Goodhart, 1984) argue that the money stock 
equation (3.1) is not an adequate specification of a theory of money supply determination 
because it is an identity. It simply describes the movement in the money stock without 
providing much behavioural theory of its determination. As such, its use will tend to 
obscure the proper role of the main agents (banks and the non-bank public) in the money 
stock determination process. The following quotation from (Goodhart, 1984 p. 188) 
explains this point: 
" ..... it causes a complete failure to comprehend the proper role of the banks 
and the public in the dynamics of the money supply process. The portfolio 
adjustments of the banks apparently play no role in the process except in so far 
as they may seek to alter their reserve ratios. The public's asset preferences 
are seemingly irrelevant to the determination of the money stock, except in so 
far as they seek to alter their cash/deposit ratio" 
This particular shortcoming of the money multiplier approach culminates in ignoring the 
very important role played by the relative price of assets (yields) movements in the 
adjustment process that leads to the final desired level of the money stock, after a change 
in the monetary base. For example, if there is a desire to increase the money stock, the 
monetary authorities can buy government securities in the open market. This will 
provide the non-bank public with excess cash, which they deposit with the banks. The 
banks, from their sales of securities, together with the deposit they receive from the non-
bank public, would experience an increase in their free reserves. According to the 
deposit multiplier analysis, this will trigger off the deposit/credit creation activity. There 
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is however an intermediate step which has not been made explicit. When the monetary 
authorities start buying up securities, for a given supply, the price of securities will go up 
relative to other assets. An increase in the price of securities is equivalent to a reduction 
in their yield. Therefore, the non-bank public will substitute away from securities into 
bank deposits, while banks substitute away from securities into loans. The ultimate end 
is to increase the money stock - defined as the sum of currency and bank deposits. 
3.3.1 The Portfolio Balance Approach 
One solution to the above mentioned shortcoming of the money multiplier approach 
is to use a model which explicitly takes into account the portfolio adjustments of the 
main agents (the banks, the non-bank public, and the monetary authorities) as the relative 
prices of assets are altered. The portfolio model suggested by Goodhart 1984 is outlined 
below: 
W=D +CP +DBP +FB-L 
XiIW=J(rD, r DB , r FB , r L , W, Z) 
Dt +K =R +DBb +L 
rD =J(rL, r DB , RID, RR) 
rL = J (rDB , RID, RR) 







Equations (3.2) and (3.3) represent the behaviour of the non-bank public. The non-
bank public is assumed to hold its wealth (W) in the form of the following assets: Bank 
deposits (D), Currency (CP), Domestic bonds (DBP), Foreign bonds (FB), and a liability 
in the form of loans from the banks (L). The proportion of the non-bank public's total 
wealth held in anyone of the assets and the liability listed above is given by equation 
(3.3). This proportion (XiIW) depends on a vector of own and other assets' rates of 
return, the wealth variable, and a vector of other independent variables (Z). The assets 
are assumed to be gross substitutes and, therefore, each asset is positively related to its 
own rate of return, but negatively related to the other assets' rate of return. Generally, 
the non-bank public is assumed to allocate its stock of wealth in response to changes in 
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the interest rate which it takes as given. 
The behaviour of the banks are represented by equations (3.4) to (3.7). Unlike the 
non-bank public, the banks act both as price setters and price takers. The banks set the 
the rate on the loan they give and accommodate any demand that arises. Similarly, they 
set the rate on the deposits and accept all money placed with them at that rate. The banks 
however, would have to act as price takers in deciding their desired holdings of reserve 
assets and bonds. Equation (3.4) is the banks' balance sheet constraint, where the total 
liability (made up of deposits (D) plus non-deposit liabilities (K)), is equal to the total 
assets (composed of their reserve assets (R), their domestic bonds holding (DB b) and of 
course the loans they advance to other parties (L)). Equation (3.5) states that banks, in 
setting the rate they are ready to pay on deposits, will take into account the rate they will 
earn when the money taken as a deposit is invested in bonds, loans, etc. The other 
determinant is the degree of liquidity of their assets, represented by the total reserve to 
deposit ratio (RID) and the reserve requirement (RR). The higher the rate on loans and 
on domestic bonds, the higher will be the rates banks will be prepared to pay for the 
deposits. A high reserve to deposit ratio means that the banks are not pressured for funds 
and therefore they will be prepared to pay less to attract deposits. However, the converse 
will be true if the required reserve ratio (RR) were to go up. An increase in (RR) will 
reduce the liquidity of the banks. To attract more funds the banks would have to raise the 
deposit rate. 
The lending rate fixing activities of the banks is represented by equation (3.6). The 
rate charged on loans they advanced to the public is assumed to depend on the rates of 
return on alternative assets, and the liquidity of the banks' portfolios. For example, if the 
rate of interest on domestic bonds goes up, banks will demand an equally high rate for 
the advances they make. Otherwise, they can make more by investing in bonds. The 
more idle funds the banks have (higher RID and lower RR), the more they will want to 
give out in loans. This can only be achieved with a lower lending rate. 
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Equation (3.7) describes the behaviour of the banks with regard to reserve assets 
holdings. The amount of reserve assets held by the banks is assumed to depend on the 
domestic bonds rate relative to the rate of return on reserve assets (fixed at zero), the 
required reserves and the total liquid assets available to the banks. A high bonds rate will 
discourage banks from keeping reserves over and above what is required by law, since 
reserve assets do not earn any rate of return. The total demand for reserves is expected to 
go up when the minimum reserve ratio is increased. Similarly, all other things held 
constant, a high level of liquid assets may encourage banks to hold more reserve assets. 
In such a model, an increase in the relative yield of bonds as a result of open market 
activities of the monetary authorities will have the following effects: First of all, it will 
encourage the public to substitute away from bank deposits into bonds, and thus put 
pressure on bank reserves. However, the degree to which this substitution takes place 
(shifting away from deposits into domestic bonds) is conditional on the mobility of 
capital into and out of the country. If capital is reasonably mobile, it is possible for 
residents to substitute away from foreign bonds into domestic bonds, rather than from 
their deposits. In this case, the effect of the open market operation will fall on the 
international capital flows, and the foreign exchange reserves rather than on the domestic 
money stock. Secondly, even if the monetary authorities succeed in encouraging the 
public to substitute away from deposits, the banks can counter that by raising the deposit 
rate and by bidding for more deposits. For the banks to maintain their profit margin, they 
will equally raise the lending rate. An increase in the lending rate could reduce the 
demand for loans and thus reduce the money supply as intended by the monetary 
authorities. However, if the interest elasticity of demand for loans is small (inelastic 
demand for loans), the banks can successfully bid for more funds and continue to expand 
their loan advances, and thereby undermine any efforts to reduce the money stock. 
Although the portfolio balance model outlined above which explicitly takes account 
of the behaviour of the major agents is an improvement over the multiplier approach, its 
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applicability to the developing economies like that of Nigeria is very limited. In Nigeria, 
and in many other developing countries, the financial market is limited in scope, (see 
chapter 1 for a discussion). Moreover, yields on the limited financial assets are quite 
often not determined by the interaction of demand and supply, but rather artificially fixed 
by the authorities. 
3.3.2 Exogeneity of the Monetary Base 
Another major deficiency of the multiplier approach is the fact that it takes the 
monetary base as given (assumed to be exogenously fixed by the monetary authorities). 
By taking the monetary base as given, it is implicitly assumed that the authorities have 
been controlling this aggregate or are intending to do that in the future. Yet they may 
have been in fact using the interest rate as a monetary policy target. It has been discussed 
in chapter 2 that the Nigerian Monetary Authorities have been using the interest rate as a 
target. It is therefore necessary to empirically investigate whether monetary authorities 
have actually used the monetary base as a policy target rather than to assume it a priori. 
Even if it has been shown that a given authority uses the monetary base as the policy 
target, it is wrong to take a policy target as exogenous. 
Exogenous variables are those whose values are determined outside the system, 
while policy targets are control variables whose value the authorities, at the very center 
of the system, attempt to set. To treat a policy target as an exogenous variable implies 
that the authorities do not alter their control variable in response to developments in the 
macro-economy, (Goodhart, 1984). Policy targets generally are not independent of past 
occurrences and developments in the economic system. Policy variables or targets are 
changed mainly to steer the economy either away from the past direction into a new 
direction, or to keep to the same course. 
The monetary base, either used as a policy target or not, always changes in reaction 
to or to serve a certain purpose. The most appropriate line of analysis is to investigate 
the factors which determine it rather than to take it as given, as the multiplier analysis 
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does. The appropriate starting point, according to Goodhart, 1984, P 189, is to look at 
how government deficits are financed. This line of enquiry is most relevant to Nigeria 
where, as stated in chapter 2, that the Central Bank is a major source of the Federal 
Government deficit financing. Generally, a government deficit is financed either by sales 
of government debt to the non-bank public, sales of foreign exchange reserves, or by 
borrowing from the banking system including the central bank. This last action has the 
effect of directly increasing the monetary base, (Pierce and Tysome, 1985). The 
government financing constraint can be written as equation (3.8) below: 
DEF + MAT = MGD + NMGD + FE + M-/ (3.8) 
According to this equation, the total financing requirement of the government (made up 
of the government deficit at period t (DEF) plus the additional finance required to repay 
maturing debt (MAT» should have to be met by one or all of the following: sales of 
marketable government debt (MGD), sales of non-marketable government debt (NMGD), 
sales of foreign exchange reserve (FE) and the monetary base expansion (M-/). Equation 
(3.8) can be rearranged to arrive at (3.9). 
M/ = (DEF + MAT) - (MGD +NMGD) -FE (3.9) 
Equation (3.9) is an alternative definition of the source of the monetary base to the one 
analysed in the last chapter. In the former case, the central banks' balance sheet was used 
as a starting point, while in this case the starting point is the government deficit financing 
constraint. 
The ability of a monetary authority to change the monetary base (M/) can be 
analysed in a similar manner to section (2.7) of the last chapter, by investigating the 
degree to which each element on the right hand side of equation (3.9) can be altered at 
will. As discussed in the last chapter, the Central Bank of Nigeria cannot change the 
foreign element (FE) at will. Changes in this variable depend on the current and capital 
account balances of the balance of payments. Neither can the Nigerian Central Bank 
control the level of the government deficit (DEF), and the additional finance required to 
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pay maturing debts (MAT). However, the Central bank of Nigeria can alter the levels of 
marketable and non-marketable government deficits (MGD and NMGDF). 
Although it is important to know whether the monetary authorities can control the 
elements that make up the monetary base, what is of interest for the present analysis is to 
realise that the authorities do not change the monetary base directly. Instead, they alter 
the conditions in the government debt market by intervening quantitatively or price-wise. 
These interventions change the relative prices of assets and bring about portfolio 
readjustments in the manner described earlier in this chapter. It is portfolio 
readjustments that bring about changes in the monetary base, (Goodhart, 1984, p. 193). 
The above analysis seems to suggest that the Nigerian monetary authorities may be 
able to change the monetary base. However, this change arises as a byproduct of the 
Federal Governments fiscal activities and not as a result of a deliberate act to achieve a 
certain level of money stock. Moreover, even if the monetary authorities do want to 
change the monetary base for monetary policy purposes, in a credit money economy 
which most modern economies are, there is an asymmetry in their ability to change the 
monetary base and thus the money stock. The authorities can increase but not decrease 
the monetary base, (Moore, 1988). In a country where a secondary security market 
exists, and there is a desire to increase the monetary base and the money stock, the 
central bank can purchase securities in the open market. The public who receive the 
proceeds of the sales will deposit it with the commercial banks. Since the required 
reserve ratio is always less than 100 percent, the level of free reserves in the commercial 
banks will go up. Given that banks are profit maximisers, these free reserves will be 
given out in loans, rather than being kept in the form of non-earning assets - reserves, and 
in the process increase the money stock. 
When the central bank sells securities, with the intention of decreasing the level of 
the monetary base and thus the money supply, it will drive non-borrowed reserves below 
the level of required reserves. However, this may not lead to a reduction in the amount 
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of loans given by the commercial banks. Firstly, some loan arrangements are such that 
the banks undertake to provide a customer with a line of credit which does not have to be 
used at once. In such a case, the undisbursed amount of the total commitment would 
have to be supplied even though the banks' reserves may have fallen. Secondly, if the 
demand for loans is rising when open market purchases of securities are undertaken (this 
is often the case since if the demand for loans is falling, there will be less reason to try 
and reduce the money stock), the banks will find alternative sources of funds to satisfy 
this demand. The banks, for example, can turn to the discount window of the central 
bank. The central bank being a lender of last resort cannot reject the demand for funds 
by the banks, otherwise it could lead the economy into financial crises. However, the 
central bank has one tool which it can use, that is, it can increase the discount rate, but 
this will in turn increase the interest rate at which the banks make advances. The end 
result of the central bank's sales of securities is to increase the interest rate and not to 
reduce the amount of loans being made, and therefore, the money supply. 
The central bank may also face some difficulties in changing the monetary base in 
the long-run, if the country is a small open one characterised by a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Changes in the domestic component of the monetary base are likely to be met by 
an equal but opposite change in the foreign component, such that the monetary base 
remains unchanged. 
By using the central bank's balance sheet, the monetary base has been shown in the 
last chapter to be equal to the sum of the net foreign assets and the net domestic assets of 
the central bank (NFA + NDA). The net foreign assets are mainly the foreign exchange 
reserves of the central bank, while the net domestic assets are made up of the amount of 
government securities, plus other assets like bills discounted, held by the central bank. If 
the central bank sells its holding of government securities with the intention of reducing 
the monetary base and the money stock, the immediate effect is a fall in the level of the 
domestic component of the monetary base. However. for the sales of the securities to go 
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through, the price would have to come down and thus the interest rate go up. A high 
interest rate will discourage investment, reduce income and imports of goods and 
services. For a given amount of exports, this will improve the current account balance of 
the country. The increase in the domestic interest rates, for a given level of foreign 
interest rates, attracts foreign capital and thus improves the capital account balance. The 
high level of the domestic interest rate will therefore end up improving the balance of 
payments of the country. In a fixed exchange rate regime, this will translate into an 
increase in the foreign currency reserves of the central bank - the foreign component of 
the monetary base. 
Under certain assumptions (no sterilisation of balance of payments deficits and 
surpluses, etc.), the balance of payments will keep on improving and the foreign 
component of the monetary base will keep on increasing until the initial decrease in the 
domestic component of the monetary base is completely offset. According to the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, the offset to the domestic 
component of the monetary base by the foreign component is complete, implying that 
any effort by the central bank to increase the monetary base will be futile. Whether in 
actual fact this offset is complete or not is an empirical matter, and chapters (5) and (6) 
will investigate the degree to which this offset occurs in Nigeria. 
3.4 Endogeneity/Exogeneity of the Money Stock 
The analysis in this chapter so far, does not dismiss outright the money multiplier 
approach and its main assumption that the monetary authorities can, to some extent, 
control the monetary base and thus the money stock. Instead, the multiplier approach is 
seen to have some non-fatal flaws that can be corrected. Goodhart, 1975, p. 103 states 
that 
" .... My objection to the multiplier analysis is that, while it is correct, indeed it 
is true by definition, it lacks the behavioural content of the portfolio approach" 
The main conclusion of the money multiplier as well as the portfolio approach to money 
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supply determination (the monetary authorities can to a certain extent determine the 
money supply through the monetary base), is completely rejected by a group of 
economists classified as the "Post-Keynesians".2 
The central contention of the Post-Keynesian theory of money supply3 is that there 
is a distinction between the money supply in a commodity money economy and that in a 
credit money economy. In a commodity money economy, money may, for example, 
consist of precious metals like gold and silver, paper money convertible to such precious 
metals or paper money backed by fiat. In all these cases, the quantity of money has an 
independent supply function since there are distinct costs associated with its production. 
Money supply in a commodity or fiat money economy, therefore, can be increased 
independently of the demand. For example, new gold discoveries or a balance of 
payments surplus will automatically increase the money stock in a gold standard type 
economy. The approaches to money supply determination where the money stock is 
assumed to be exogenous and, at least in principle, can be controlled by the central bank 
are appropriate to this kind of economy, (see Kaldor 1980, Kaldor 1970, Moore 1988, 
chapter 1, Moore 1986, for instance). 
The situation may be quite different when looking at a credit money economy, 
which describes most modern economies. Credit money mainly consists of LO.Us of the 
commercial banks (deposits). This type of money, according to Moore, 1989, has no 
supply function in the production sense since its cost of production is insignificant. It 
comes into existence as a result of bank lending and is extinguished through repayments 
of bank loans. In other words, credit money is created as a by-product of new loans 
granted by the deposit money banks. Bank loans and the ensuing deposits they create are 
increased by the initiatives of the borrowers. Banks are basically in a business of selling 
2 The most prominent among this group are Nicholas Kaldor, Basil Moore, Sydney Weintraub, 
Paul Davidson, to mention but afew 
3 The term theory here is not used ill the strict sense of the word. differences abound among the 
Post-Keynesians, (see for example. a survey by Jao. /989). 
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credit, and like any other business how much of the product they sell depends on the 
demand for the product. The demand for bank loans is mostly from business firms. 
Firms typically have to pay their factors of production - especially labour before they 
realise the proceeds from the sales of the final goods. They often turn to bank loans to 
satisfy this need for funds, (Moore 1988). The proceeds of the loan are used to pay the 
factors of production, who then deposit it with the banks. The bank loan will therefore, 
reappear as deposits on the liability side of the banks' balance sheets. Money supply in a 
credit money economy, therefore, varies in direct response to changes in the public 
demand for bank loans. 
An increase in the monetary base, defined as the sum of currency in circulation plus 
commercial banks' reserves, follows directly from an increase in the commercial banks' 
deposits brought about by an increase in the demand for credit. In most countries, a 
certain percentage of all deposits would have to be kept as reserves by law. An increase 
in the commercial banks' deposits, therefore, increases the total commercial banks' 
reserves and thus the monetary base. This means that the monetary base is also 
endogenous, indirectly determined by the credit demand. 
Unlike the commodity or fiat money economy, the monetary base and the money 
stock in a credit money economy are always endogenous, responding only to a change in 
demand for credit. The central bank can neither change the monetary base nor the money 
stock at will, as believed by the proponents of the multiplier approach. In fact, when the 
commercial banks get into a liquidity squeeze as a result of an increase in credit demand 
from their customers, and they have lent out in excess of their free reserves, they turn to 
the central bank for funds to make up their reserves requirements. The central bank in its 
role as the lender of last resort and the guardian of the banking system of a country has 
no choice but to accommodate the commercial banks' demands. This also indicates that 
the reserves of the commercial banks (and thus the monetary base) and the total credit 
supply (indirectly the money stock) change passively in response to credit demand and 
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not to the desires of the central bank. 
The only likely tool of monetary base and money stock control open to the central 
bank is the price of credit. It can increase its discount rate which indirectly affects the 
demand for reserve money and the interest rates charged by the commercial banks on 
loans they give to the public. 
The central bank, together with the commercial banks, set the interest rate and at 
that rate they supply all the amount of credit demanded. The money supply curve is, 
therefore, believed to be horizontal in the money and interest space. This gives the Post-
Keynesians their other name - "The Horizontalists". Furthermore, it is argued that the 
power of the central bank to change the money stock, using the interest rate, is very 
limited. The interest elasticity of money demand is believed to be very small, and 
therefore, if the central bank desires to reduce the money stock through a reduction in the 
money demand, it would have to raise the interest rate by a considerable amount, which 
will end up disrupting the financial markets, (Lavoie, 1984). 
Other Post-Keynesians (for example, Davidson and Weintraub, 1973) take a middle 
ground between the assertion that the monetary base and the money stock are completely 
exogenous and can be controlled by the authorities at will, and the assertion by the other 
Post-Keynesians that these variables are completely endogenous. To them, a change in 
the money stock for example, can have both exogenous and endogenous components. 
The most important endogenous cause of an increase in the money stock is the increase 
in money wages, determined through collective bargaining. An upward change in money 
wages will increase the cost of production and with it the demand for money by firms. 
The central bank will have to accommodate such demands. With the increase in money 
wages, unless productivity increases, there will be a decline in employment (increase in 
unemployment). Unemployment is often socially unacceptable, and therefore the central 
bank (not immune to political pressure) would expand the money supply by an amount 
more than necessary to cover the increase in demand due to the initial wages increase. 
103 
The extra money supply to cover unemployment is therefore the exogenous component 
of the money stock, (Davison and Weintraub, 1973, Weintraub, 1980). 
3.4.1 An Empirical Test 
The monetarist's position on the exogeneity/endogeneity of money is that, the 
nominal money stock is always exogenous. Appealing to the quantity theory of money, 
they argue that changes in the nominal income and prices almost always arise as a result 
of changes in the nominal supply of money, (see for example, Friedman, 1971). 
Furthermore, the money supply process is believed to be explained by equation (3.1) 
above. According to this equation, the money stock (M) is basically determined by the 
monetary base (H). The implication of this, coupled with the statement that changes in 
nominal income are brought about by changes in the nominal money, is that causality 
runs from the monetary base to the money stock (M) and then to nominal income (Y) 
[H=>M=>Y]. 
The Post-Keynesians' views, briefly outlined earlier, is that the converse is the case. 
In other words, they believe that causation runs from income to money, and then from 
money to monetary base [Y => M => H]. Any variable that leads to an increase in credit 
demand4 will also lead to an increase in credit money, as banks automatically try to 
accommodate such a demand. And as explained above, this will lead to an increase in 
the monetary base as well. Although not explicitly stated, Lavoie (1984) is of the view 
that the Post-Keynesians envisage an equation of the following nature: H = (1/u) M, 
where H, u, and M are as defined earlier, while the term (l/u) is the credit divisor. 
An empirical test of endogeneity/exogeneity of the money stock is based on what 
actually obtained in the past and it takes one or all of the following forms: (see Jao 1989 
4 An increase in money wages or in the price of raw malerials will cause business borrowers to 
demand more short-term credit for working capital purposes. Expectations of rising financial as-
set prices will lead to credit demand for speculalive purposes, with a view to reaping anticipated 
capital gains, (Moore 1988, chapt. 7). An increase in income will increase credit or money 
demandfor transaction purposes. 
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for a survey) 
i) Testing causality between money and income. The essence here is either to affirm 
the monetarists contention that money, which they assume to be exogenous, causes 
income, or to deny this contention. In which case money is endogenous. This is the 
most widely used empirical test for the endogeneity of the money supply. 
ii) Testing causality between money and money wages. Causality running from money 
wages to money supports the Post -Keynesians' view. that an increase in money 
wages increases demand for credit, which leads to an increase in the supply of credit 
and therefore, money. 
iii) Testing money - monetary base causality. As briefly outlined above, the 
monetarists believe that the monetary base causes money while the Post-Keynesians 
believe that the causation runs from money to monetary base. Causality running 
from money to monetary base may imply that the central bank did not change the 
monetary base exogenously to achieve a certain desired level of money stock, but 
rather played a passive accommodating role of supplying bank reserves as often as 
required. 
A money - monetary base causality test is the most relevant when the aim is to 
examine the ability of a central bank to change the money stock using the monetary base. 
In this section of the chapter, the Granger-causality test is utilised to determine whether 
the Central Bank of Nigeria has in the past actively used the monetary base to change the 
money stock, or has been passively accommodating the demand for reserves by banks. 
In other words, to find out if the monetary base in Nigeria is endogenous or exogenously 
determined by the monetary authorities. 
3.4.2 Granger-Sims Causality Test 
The most popular statistical test for the direction of causality between a set of time 
series is the Granger-Sims test. According to Granger (1969) a series XI Granger-causes 
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another series Yt if taking account of past values of X t leads to improved prediction for Yt 
than not. In practice, this test requires estimating equations with autoregressive and 
distributed lagged components, similar to (3.10) and (3.11) below. 
m n 
Xt = L fj Xt- j + L gi Yt - i + £t (3.10) 
j=l i=O 
m n 
Yt = L hj Yt - j + L ki Xt - i + V t (3.11) 
j=l i=O 
Testing the null hypothesis that Yt does not Granger-cause Xt requires constructing an F-
test for the joint significance of the Yis, or rather that the gis are all equal to zero. The 
null hypothesis is rejected if test statistic F is found to be greater than the appropriate 
critical F. Similarly, testing the null that Xt does not Granger-cause Yt requires 
constructing an F-test for the joint significance of the kis. In other words, testing to see 
whether Yt Granger-causes Xt requires running a regression of Xt on Xt- 1 , ••• ,Xt- m , 
Yt-o, ... ,Yt- n and testing the joint significance of the lagged Yts. 
The first step in applying the Granger causality test is to ensure that each series 
employed in the regression is stationary. Combining series that are not stationary is 
likely to produce residuals that are not white noise. In such a case, the usual significance 
tests are not valid because parameter estimates from autocorrelated residuals are 
consistent, but the estimates of the variances of these parameters are biased downwards. 
This will lead to exaggerated F-statistics, and therefore, accepting a causal relationship 
which in fact does not exist, (Pierce and Haugh, 1977). 
A non-stationary time series can be made stationary by differencing it a sufficient 
number of times (Granger and Newbold, 1977). The number of differencing required to 
achieve stationarity of a given series can be determined by using a test procedure known 
as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-test. 5 Assuming a time series (Xt ), the ADF test 
requires estimating the following autoregressive process. 
5 This test is a large sample test. Results from a small sample should be interpreted with cau-
tion. 
p 




P is selected such that et is as close to white noise as possible. The null hypothesis being 
tested is that b=O against the alternative that b <0. The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
"-
t-value on the estimated b is larger than a critical t-value. The regular t-table is not 
appropriate in this case. An applicable t-table is provided in Fuller (976). Rejecting the 
null at this stage means that the series X t is stationary and therefore, does not require any 
differencing. In the terminology of time-series analysis, X t is said to be integrated of 
order zero (l(0». However, if the null hypothesis were accepted, it implies that Xt is not 
stationary in levels, but tentatively stationary in first differences. In other words, the 
series is not 1(0), but tentatively 10). To confirm that Xl is I(l), the ADF - test, equation 
(3.12) would have to repeated. This time, the second difference of Xl (L\Mt) is regressed 
on one period lagged first difference of Xl ((L\X)1-1) and p lagged dependent variables. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected this time, then the series is confirmed as I( 1) and need to 
be differenced once to achieve stationarity. Otherwise, the test procedure is repeated 
until the null is finally rejected. If the series Xl is found to be integrated of order n (l(n», 
it would have to be differenced n-times to achieve stationarity. 
One of the following set of outcomes will arise from applying the Granger-causality 
test: 
i) A unidirectional causality running from Yt to Xl' This arises when an F-test accepts 
the joint significance of the gis in equation (3.10), but rejects those of the kjs in 
(3.11). 
ii) A unidirectional causality running from Xl to YI' This occurs if an F-test rejects the 
joint significance of the giS, but accepts those of the kjs. 
iii) Feedback or bidirectional causality between Xl and Yt exists if an F-test shows that 
the joint significance of both the gis and the kis cannot be rejected. 
Results from the Granger-causality test should be interpreted with caution because 
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the test does not measure causality in the intuitive sense of the word. According to 
Maddala (1988), the Granger-causality test is simply a measure of whether YI precedes 
Xt, Xl precedes Yt or they move together. The fact that one variable is found to precede 
(Granger-cause) another does not mean that the former causes the later. 
The Sims causality test requires prefiltered logarithms of Xl to be regressed on the 
past, the present and future values of prefiltered logarithms of Yt. If the coefficients of 
the future values of Yt are found to be jointly equal to zero, causality is said to run from 
Yt to Xt. According to Sims "when (X, Y) has an autoregressive representation, Xl can 
be expressed as a distributed lagged function of current and past values of YI with 
residuals which are not correlated with any values of Yt , past or future, if and only if, Xt 
does not cause Yt in the Granger sense" (Harvey 1990, p. 306) 
3.4.3 Outcome of the Granger-Causality Test for Endogeneity of the Money Stock 
and the Monetary Base 
In what follows, the Granger-approach is used to test for the following hypotheses 
using Nigerian data.6 
(1) Monetary base Granger causes money stock (M 1 and M2) 
(2) Money stock (M! and M2) Granger causes monetary base 
(3) Domestic credit Granger causes money stock (M! and M2) 
(4) Money stock (M! and M2) Granger cause domestic credit 
For each of the cases above, the autoregressive part (regression of Xt on 
X X Or Yt on Yt -1, ... ,Yt - n which are the restricted equations) is first t-l, .. " l-n 
estimated and parameterised so that the errors are white noise, before adding the lagged 
6 Hypotheses (3) and (4) test the Post-Keynesians' contention that the money which causes the 
monetary base is itself caused by the domestic credit. 
6 The Sims-test is not used in this study, firstly because of lack of degrees of freedom and 
secondly, since some of the observations are negative values, it is impossible to take the loga-
rithms as required by the Sims methodology. 
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distributed parts (Yt- O, ••• ,Yt- m ) and (Xt-O, ... ,Xt- n ). It has been argued that unless m 
in equations (3.10) and (3.11) is chosen such that the error terms of the restricted 
equations are white noise, it is possible for the coefficients of the lagged Yt in (3.10) and 
X t in (3.11) to be inflated, leading to an acceptance of causality which in fact does not 
exist (Harvey 1990, p. 306). Furthermore, a set of dummy variables are used in each of 
the restricted equations to control for the shocks to the Nigerian economy discussed in 
chapter 2 (results excluding the dummies are also considered, see below). 
Prior to estimating the restricted equations, a stationarity test is carried out using the 
(ADF) test briefly outlined earlier, with the intention of determining the number of times 
each variable should be differenced to achieve stationarity. All of the variables of 
interest (Monetary base, domestic credit, and the money stock) are found to be 1(2). In 
other words, they need to be differenced twice before achieving stationarity. The 
necessary regressions are carried out using variables in second difference. When the 
level of the variables and the first difference were used, despite the presence of enough 
lagged dependent variables, the resultant regressions were found to be characterised by 
serially correlated error-terms. 
The result of testing for proposition (1) above is presented in Table (3.1). All 
equations are free of both first and second order serial correlation, as shown by the 
relevant Lagrange multiplier tests. The normality test also shows that the error terms are 
normal. Columns 2 & 4 of the table are the restricted equations, while columns 3 & 5 
are the unrestricted ones (the ones with the lagged distributed components). p* gives 
the F-test for the validity of the restrictions that the coefficients of the lagged distributed 
components are jointly equal to zero. F(3, 13) - value of 0.78 indicates that the 
restriction between columns 2 & 3 of the table is valid. This means that the null 
hypothesis that the monetary base (H) does not Granger-cause the narrow money (M!) in 
Nigeria could not be rejected at 5 percent significance level. In Nigeria therefore, at least 
in the past, the monetary authorities did not use the monetary base to control the narrow 
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money (MI). The calculated F-value for the restriction between columns 5 & 6 of the 
table is 3.38. This seems to reject the null hypothesis that the combined effect of the 
lagged distributed component of the equation is equal to zero, at the 10 percent level. 
This implies that the monetary base does Granger cause the broad or quasi money (M2) 
in Nigeria. 
The result of testing the hypothesis that money (M! and M2) does not cause the 
monetary base is reported in Table (3.2). The restricted equation (column 2) and the 
unrestricted ones (columns 3 & 4) have errors that are free of both first and second order 
serial correlation, and non-normality, as required. The F-test for the validity of the 
restriction rejected the hypothesis that the lagged distributed components of the money 
stock are jointly equal to zero, (see table for calculated F-values). 
The results of Tables (3.1) and (3.2) imply that in Nigeria there is a unidirectional 
causality running from the narrow money (M1) to the monetary base (H), while the 
relationship between monetary base and the broad money (M2) is that of feedback. In 
other words, M2 and the monetary base Granger-cause each other. Despite the 
differences in the structures of the economies of Nigeria and of the US, Moore (1988), 
arrived at a similar conclusion using US data. 
The statistical evidence therefore, seems to suggest that the monetary base in 
Nigeria is Granger-caused by rather than being the cause of the money stock. At worst, 
the monetary base and the broad money (M2) Granger-cause each other. 
The result of testing for causality between domestic credit and money are reported 
in Tables (3.3) and (3.4). In Table (3.3), the calculated F-value indicates that the null 
hypothesis that money (narrow and broad) does not Granger-cause domestic credit (DC) 
cannot be rejected even at the 10 percent level. However, the null hypothesis that 
domestic credit does not cause money is rejected at the 5 percent level in the case of 
Narrow money, and at the 10 percent level in the case of broad money (M2), (see Table 
(3.4)). In other words, in Nigeria, there is a unidirectional Granger-causality running 
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Table 3.1 
Granger Causality Test - with Step Dummies 
(Monetary Base Causes Money) 
Canst. 
(H causes M 1) (H causes M2) 
3131.44 2783.87 
(7.63) (3.11) 
(M 1)t-l -0.59 -0.48 
( -4.87) (-2.00) 
(M l)t-2 -1.33 -1.34 
(-7.91) ( -3.98) 
(M 1)t-3 -0.62 -0.59 
( -2.90) ( -2.(3) 
(M l)t-4 -0.79 -0.64 





DUM 1973/74 -615.81 -522.93 
( -1.89) (-1.41) 
DUM 1981/82 1142.25 973.15 
(3.22) (2.11) 








R2 0.88 0.90 
LM-Test Ft Order Serial Carr. F(1, 15) 0.01 F(1, 12) 1.11 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Carr. F(2, 14) 1.49 F(2, 11) 2.17 
Normality X2(2) 4.81 5.93 
RSS 6104678.61 5176476.64 
F*(3, 13) 0.78 
Dependent Variables: Ml(Narrow Money), M2(Broad Money) 
























F(1, 15) 0.57 F(1,12)4.17 
F(2, 14) 0.32 F(2, 11) 1.99 
1.63 5.10 
11875651. 70 6673136.85 
3.38 
F* :- Calculated F-value under the null of monetary base (H) does not cause money (Ml and 
M2). 
Critical F(3, 13): 2.50(10%) 3.41(5%), 5.74(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
Table 3.2 
Granger Causality Test - with Step Dummies 











DUM 1979/80 -2142.00 
(-3.50) 
DUM 1981/82 2559.14 
(4.06) 











LM-Test Ft Order Serial Corr. F(1, 15) 1.62 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Corr. F(2, 14) 0.76 
Nonnality X2(2) 1.35 
RSS 5104754.37 
F*(4, 12) 
Dependent Variable: Monetary Base (H) 
t-Values are in Parenthesis 


























F(1, 11) 3.49 































F(1, 11) 2.47 




F*:- Calculated F-Value under the null of Money (Ml and M2) do not cause Monetary Base (H) 
Critical F(4, 12): 2.48(10%) 3.26(5%) 5.41 (1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
Table 3.3 
Granger Causality Test - with Step Dummies 











DUM 1973/74 -2399.04 
(-1.77) 









LM -Test 1st Order Serial Corr. F(1, 16) 1.41 
LM -Test 2M Order Serial Corr. F(2, 15) 1.36 
Normality X2(2) 0.49 
RSS 142594549.26 
F*(3, 14) 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit (DC) 
t-Values are in Parenthesis 






















F(1, l3) 2.74 



























F(1, 13) 1.39 




F*:- Calculated F-value under the null hypothesis that Money (M 1 and M2) does not cause 
Domestic Credit (DC) 
Critical F(3, 14): 2.52(10%) 3.34(5%) 5.56(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (9190) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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Table 3.4 
Granger Causality Test - with Step Dummies 
(Domestic Credit Causes Money) 
DC causes Ml DC cause M2 
Canst. 4100.32 2500.64 4404.13 
(7.63) (6.56) (7.19) 
(M 1)'-1 -0.59 -0.66 
( -4.87) (-5.68) 
(M 1)'-2 -1.33 -1.73 
(-7.91) (-6.43) 
(M 1),-3 -0.62 -1.00 
(-2.90) (-4.24) 
(M 1),-4 -0.92 -1.21 









DUM1973n4 -615.18 -654.28 -1044.37 
( -1.89) (-2.40) (-2.30) 
DUM 1981/82 1142.25 1265.14 1230.60 
(3.22) (4.27) (2.53) 
DUM 1985/86 -3607.90 -3045.71 -4500.09 







R2 0.88 0.93 0.89 
LM -Test F' Order Serial Carr. F(1, 15) 0.01 F(1, 12) 4.89 F(1, 15) 0.57 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Carr. F(2, 14) 1.49 F(2, 11) 3.09 F(2, 14) 0.32 
Nonnality X2 (2) 4.81 31.52 1.63 
RSS 6104678.61 3378067.91 11875651.70 
F*(3, 13) 3.50 
Dependent Variables: Narrow Money (Ml) and Broad Money (M2). 
























F(1, 12) 4.51 




F*:- Calculated F-value under the null hypothesis that Domestic Credit (DC) does not cause Mo-
ney (Ml and M2) 
Critical F(3, 13): 2.50(10%) 3.41(5%) 5.74(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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from domestic credit to money. 
The above conclusions regarding the direction of Granger-causality between money 
stock/monetary base and the money stock/domestic credit rely on step dummy variables 
to capture some of the major shocks to the Nigerian economy (The Nigerian civil war, 
the first and second oil price shocks, the oil price collapse, and the 1985/86 economic 
liberalisation and the devaluation of the currency, see chapter 2 for full detail) were used. 
The year the civil war began, the foreign assets of the Central Bank fell by about 50 
percent, however, its domestic assets went up quite considerably as the Government 
borrowed from the Central Bank to finance the war. As a result, the monetary base 
declined only slightly. The end of the civil war saw an increase in the monetary base of 
nearly 100 percent as both foreign and the domestic components went up considerably. 
The begining of the civil war did not affect the total domestic credit very drastically. 
Although borrowing by the Government went up, private credit fell as the economic 
activities, especially in the war affected areas declined. The end of the war, on the other 
hand, lead to about SO percent increase in the domestic credit as private sector credit 
demand started picking up and the Government continued to expand borrowing to finance 
the reconstruction. The money stock also experienced a slight decline at the begining of 
the war, but the end of the war brought about a 30 percent increase in the narrowly 
defined money (M1). 
Between 1973 and 1974, as a result of the increase in the oil price, there was a 
sudden increase in the monetary base by over 60 percent. This increase was mainly due 
to the increase in the foreign component, since the domestic component fell for the same 
period. The net foreign assets of the Central Bank went up by nearly 800 percent, while 
the net domestic assets fell by over 1000 percent as the Government retired its 
obligations to the Central Bank. Domestic credit in that period delined while the money 
stock M 1 went up by about 90 percent. The effect of the oil price increase on the money 
stock was an indirect one. It mainly arose because of the huge increase in the country's 
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real income. 
The second oil price increase of 1979 had a similar effect to the 1973n4 increases. 
The monetary base went up by about 100 percent, while the money stock went up by over 
50 percent. The 1981/82 oil price collapse had a strong effect on the domestic credit; as 
the Federal Government again resorted to borrowing to finance its expenditures; in view 
of the decline in its revenue from oil. The monetary base and the money stock were only 
slightly affected because the negative effect of the decline in the foreign component of 
the monetary base was countered by an increase in the domestic component. 
In 1986, as discussed in section 2.3.5 of chapter 2, Nigeria undertook to liberalise 
and restructure its economy. As a part of the programme it devalued the currency by 
about 60 percent. The end result of this was an increase in the net foreign assets of the 
Central Bank, denominated in local currency, by over 100 percent. The monetary base 
and the money stock also went up. The domestic credit on the other hand, rather than 
declining went up by about 20 percent. This was partly due to the increase in private 
demand for credit. The devaluation led to an increase in the local price of imported 
imputs, and with it an increase in the demand for credit to meet the increased working 
capital requirement. 
Different sets of dummy variables appear ll1 the different equations because the 
dummy variables that were found to be highly insignificant were dropped. For the 
purpose of making comparison, as in the last chapter, all the equations are re-estimated 
without any dummy variables and with impulse dummies. The result of testing the 
hypothesis that monetary base does not cause money stock (M1 and M2) when no 
dummies are used is presented in Table 3.1.1. The F-values 11.69 and 1l.64 for M1 and 
M2 seem to suggest that the hypothesis would have to be rejected. However, Lagrange 
multiplier tests show that the errors of the equations are highly correlated, implying that 
the estimation results from these equations cannot be relied upon. 
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The result of testing the proposition that the money stock (M 1 and M2) does not 
cause the monetary base are presented in Table 3.2.1. The proposition is very strongly 
rejected, implying that money does cause the monetary base. Lagrange multiplier tests in 
this case show that the hypothesis that the residuals from these equations are free of serial 
correlation can be accepted at the 10 percent level. The Granger-causality tests carried 
out without the step dummies, give no conclusive answer to the question of wether the 
monetary base Granger-causes the money stock or not, but the money stock is shown to 
very strongly Granger-cause the monetary base. Therefore, it can be cautiously said that 
even when no dummy variables are used, the monetary base is highly likely to be caused 
by the money stock, again implying that the monetary base is likely to be endogenous. 
The result of testing the proposition that the money stock (M 1 and M2) does not 
cause domestic credit is presented in Table 3.3.1. The equations have passed both first 
and second order serial correlation tests, and the test for the normality of the errors. This 
proposition is accepted both for narrow and broad money, implying that money does not 
Granger-cause domestic credit. The result of testing the proposition that domestic credit 
does not Granger-cause money stock (M1 and M2) is presented in Table 3.4.1. F- tests 
show that the proposition is rejected for M1 but accepted for M2. In fact, the equation 
for broad money (M2) seems to suffer from a high level of second order serial 
correlation, placing in doubt any results given by that equation. When looked at in 
conjunction with the result of Table 3.3.1, the conclusion that can be drawn is that there 
is a clear one way Granger causality running from domestic credit to narrow money (Ml) 
but not broad money (M2). 
The results from estimating the equations with impulse dummies are similar to 
those without the dummy variables. All the impulse dummies were very insignificant 
(results not reported here). 
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Table 3.1.1 
Granger Causality Test with no Dummies 
(Monetary Base Causes Money) 
(H causes M 1) (H causes M2) 
Const. 356.62 62.88 
( 1.36) (0.38) 
(M 1)t-1 -0.21 -0.77 
( -0.96) ( -2.88) 
(M 1)t-2 -1.10 -0.81 
( -3.34) ( -2.35) 
(M l)t-3 -0.34 -0.23 
( -0.83) ( -0.82) 
(M l)t-4 -0.57 -0.14 














R2 0.44 0.83 
LM-Test lSI Order Selial Corr. F(1, 18) 4.03 F(1, 15) 9.82 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Corr. F(2, 17) 10.99 F(2, 14) 4.66 
Normality X2(2) 2.16 4.31 
RSS 28807535 9027282 
F*(3, 16) 11.69 
Dependent Valiables: M1(Narrow Money), M2(Broad Money) 








(-1.28) ( -1.25) 
-0.59 -0.21 








F(1, 18) 3.34 F(1, 15) 8.51 




F* :- Calculated F-value under the null of monetary base (H) does not cause money (Ml and 
M2). 
Clitical F(3, 16): 3.24(5%), 5.29(1 %) 
Econometlic Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
Table 3.2.1 
Granger Causality Test - with no Dummies 
























LM-Test ]St Order Serial COIT. F(1, 18) 0.00 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Corr. F(2, 17) 0.01 
NOI1l1ality X2(2) 5.44 
RSS 19987999 
F*(4, 15) 
Dependent Variable: Monetary Base (H) 
t-Values are in Parenthesis 




















F(1, 14) 5.50 

























F(l, 14) 0.00 




F*:- Calculated F-Value under the null of Money (M1 and M2) do not cause Monetary Base (H) 
Critical F(4, 15): 3.68(5%) 6.36(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
Table 3.3.1 
Granger Causality Test - with no Dummies 




















LM-Test Ft Order Serial Carr. F(1, 18) 2.89 
LM -Test 2nd Order Serial Carr. F(2, 17) 1.78 
Nonnality X2(2) 1.24 
RSS 250748545 
F*(3, 16) 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Credit (DC) 
t-Values are in Parenthesis 


















F(1, 15) 0.22 























F(1, 15) 0.03 




F*:- Calculated F-value under the null hypothesis that Money (Ml and M2) does not cause 
Domestic Credit (DC) 
Critical F(3, 16): 3.24(5%) 5.29(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (9190) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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Table 3.4.1 
Granger Causality Test - with no Dummies 
(Domestic Credit Causes Money) 
DC causes M1 DC cause M2 
Canst. 356.62 282.17 629.20 
(M 1)/-1 
(1.36) (1.28) (1.81) 
-0.21 -0.55 
(-0.96) ( -2.38) 
(M 1)/-2 -1.10 -2.16 
(-3.34) ( -4.49) 
(M 1)/-3 -0.34 -1.19 
(-0.84) ( -2.75) 
(M 1)/-4 -0.57 -1.54 


















R2 0.44 0.68 0.54 
LM -Test 1 sl Order Serial Carr. F(l, 18) 4.03 F(l, 15) 5.90 F(l, 18) 3.34 
LM-Test 2nd Order Serial Carr. F(2, 17) 10.99 F(2, 14) 2.86 F(2, 17) 8.29 
Nonnality X2(2) 2.16 1.46 4.81 
RSS 28807535 16824745 47212165 
F*(3, 16) 3.80 
Dependent Variables: Narrow Money (M1) and Broad Money (M2). 


















F(l, 15) 2.19 




F*:- Calculated F-value under the null hypothesis that Domestic Credit (DC) does not cause Mo-
ney (M 1 and M2) 
Critical F(3, 16): 3.24(5%) 5.29(1 %) 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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The findings of this empirical analysis that the monetary base in Nigeria is being 
Granger-caused by rather than causing money may mean one or both of the following: 1) 
the monetary base can be changed by the Central Bank of Nigeria, but in practice the 
central bank did not in the past use it for monetary policy purposes. 2) the Central Bank 
behaves in the manner suggested by the Post-Keynesians; supplying reserves to the 
commercial banks as often as required, and when necessary using interest rates (discount 
rate) to effect changes in the money market. 
Observation of the actual behaviour of the Central Bank of Nigeria discussed in 
earlier chapters reveals elements of both possibilities. The Central bank has the power to 
buy and sell government securities for monetary policy purposes (change the monetary 
base), although it has never done so in the past. Its holdings of government securities 
went up as and when desired by the Federal Government for the purposes of deficit 
financing. This indicates some elements of the first point. The fact that the Central Bank 
of Nigeria has in its portfolio of assets, loans and discounts it extends to the commercial 
banks and other institutions, probably to supply them with reserves, plus the fact that it 
has, as discussed in section (2.7), used the discount rate quite extensively since 1962 
tends to support scenario number (2) above more so than number (1). Another possible 
explanation for the Granger-causality test showing that the monetary base is likely to be 
endogenous than not may be the fact that the Nigerian exchange rate has been basically 
fixed for the major part of the period covered by this study. A detailed analysis of this 
point is taken up in chapters 5 and 6. 
The above findings seem to suggest that the monetary base and the money stock in 
Nigeria are likely to be endogenously demand determined. The only source of influence 
the Central bank of Nigeria may have on the money stock is through the factors that 
determine the money demand, for example, interest rates. The degree to which it 
succeeds in attaining the desired money stock, using the determinants of the money 
demand, depends on the elasticities of these determinants with respect to the money 
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demand, and the stability of the money demand function itself. This issue is taken up in 
detail in chapter 4. 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The money supply equation often seen in the standard economIC textbooks is 
derived in the context of the monetary base/money multiplier approach to money stock 
determination. According to this equation, the money stock is always identically equal to 
the product of the money multiplier and the monetary base. This theory assumes that the 
money multiplier is stable and central banks can change the money stock in the desired 
direction, by changing the monetary base, which is completely under their control. 
The money multiplier approach as a theory of money supply determination has 
many deficiencies. To start with, the equation underlying this theory is derived from two 
identities and therefore, itself an identity. As an indentity, it lacks the necessary 
behavioural content to be a credible theory of money supply determination. As a result, 
the role played by banks and the non-bank public in the money supply process is 
undermined. An alternative specification which corrects this particular problem of the 
money multiplier approach is a general equilibrium model that takes explicit account of 
portfolio adjustments by banks and the non-bank public. The successful implementation 
of an elaborate model of this nature requires a relatively developed financial system, 
unlike that which obtains in a developing country like Nigeria. 
Secondly, it is wrong to take the monetary base as exogenously given as the money 
nultiplier approach does. Instead, domestic and foreign factors that bring about changes 
n this variable should be closely investigated. 
The money multiplier analysis assumes that the monetary base is exogenous and can 
)e changed at will, and therefore, it follows that the money stock is also exogenous and 
:an be changed by the central bank as well. In reality, this conclusion may only be true 
'or a commodity or fiat money economy where the money supply function is 
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independent. In a credit money economy, which describes most modern economIes, 
including that of the developing countries, the monetary base and the money stock are 
both likely to be endogenously determined by the demand for money. These variables 
only change when conditions determining the demand for money change. The banks, 
including the central bank, playa passive accommodating role of supplying the amount 
of money demanded. When there is an increase in credit demand, commercial banks will 
automatically supply it. Since the proceeds of the loans are eventually deposited with the 
commercial banks, there will be an increase in the total deposits and thus the money 
stock. In most modern economies, a certain percentage of any increase in deposits would 
have to be held as reserves. Bank reserves are a component of the monetary base, so any 
change will be directly reflected on the monetary base. Therefore, contrary to the basic 
assumption of the money multiplier approach, changes in the money stock, presumably 
brought about by changes in demand for it, causes changes in the monetary base. 
An empirical test of this hypothesis, which is proposed by a group of economists 
known as the Post-Keynesians, requires testing for a causal relationship between 
domestic credit and the money stock on the one hand, and between the money stock and 
the monetary base on the other. Causation running from domestic credit to money and 
from money to monetary base supports the position of the Post-Keynesians. 
Applying the Granger-Sims causality test to the Nigerian data showed a UnI-
directional causality running from narrow money (M 1) to the monetary base, but a 
feedback between the broader money (M2) and the monetary base when the equations are 
specified to include a set of step dummies catering for some of the major shocks to the 
Nigerian economy. Without the step dummies the results show that the hypothesis that 
the money stock does not cause monetary base can be strongly rejected, but no 
conclusive statement can be made regarding whether monetary base causes money stock 
or not. A similar result is also found for the money-domestic credit causality test. The 
Granger-causality test utilised to arrive at the above conclusion has been criticised as 
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simply a measure of which variable precedes another temporally, rather than that of 
causality in the every day sense of the word. 
The weaknesses of the Granger-causality test notwithstanding, the result of the test 
seems to imply that the monetary base in Nigeria is endogenously determined by 
credit/money demand. The Central Bank of Nigeria cannot therefore use it to change the 
money stock for monetary policy purposes. The only possible channel of influence on 
the money stock, besides direct credit control, is through the money demand, via one of 
the determinants - interest rates. How successful the Central Bank is in changing the 
money stock in this manner depends a great deal on the stability and the interest elasticity 
of the money demand. The issue of the stability of the Nigerian money demand function 
is taken up in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Stability of the Money Demand Function in Nigeria 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter it was shown that the monetary base and the money stock in 
Nigeria are likely to be endogenous and demand determined. This implies that changing 
the money stock for monetary policy purposes can only be achieved through changing the 
demand for it. A successful conduct of monetary policy in this case will require a stable 
money demand function, which is significantly linked with the control variable (the 
interest rate). 
In this chapter, the stability of the Nigerian money demand function is examined by 
estimating three different specifications of the money demand function; namely, the 
standard partial adjustment specification, a specification with variables in levels and 
changes, and one in the form of error-correction and cointegration. There are two main 
objectives to this exercise. Firstly, it will allow a statement to be made regarding the 
abilities of the Nigerian Monetary Authorities to control the money stock. Secondly, it 
will provide a necessary background study to the next two chapters which investigate, 
using the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, the degree to which the 
domestic component of the monetary base is offset by the foreign component. 
The outline of the rest of the chapter is as follows: In section 4.2, the theory of 
money demand is reviewed. Section 4.3 discusses the partial adjustment specification of 
the short-run demand for money, while section 4.4 takes up the critique of this method of 
specifying the short-run money demand function. A discussion of the alternative 
dynamic specifications of the short-run demand for money is carried out in section 4.5. 
Section 4.6 takes up the issue of identification and simultaneity in relation to estimating 
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the money demand function. The result of estimating the different money demand 
functions and their discussions are presented in section 4.7. Finally, the summary and 
conclusion to the chapter is presented in section 4.8. 
4.2 The Theory of Money Demand 
It is almost universally accepted that the demand for real money balances should be 
specified as a function of a scale variable and an opportunity cost variable. The money 
demand function is often defined in terms of a constant elasticity function, represented by 
equation (4.1) below. 
* ~ =bOyb 1 Jb 2 
P 




Where ~ is the real quantity of money demanded, Y is some scale variable, and J is the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Using lower case letters to represent the logarithm of 
a variable, equation (4.1) can be linearised to give equation (4.2). The parameters (b 1) 
and (b 2 ) are the long-run elasticities of money demand with respect to the scale variable 
and the opportunity cost variable respectively. The quantity of real money [~'l can 
be narrow money (currency plus demand deposits - M1) or broad money (M1 plus 
savings/time deposits - M2). What constitutes an appropriate definition for the scale 
variable differs between the two main schools of thought. 
According to the Keynesian school, l there are three mam motives for holding 
money, namely, the transactions motive, precautionary motive, and the speculative 
motive. The transactions motive arises from the desire by agents to hold some money to 
make regular planned purchases of goods and services (for example weekly grocery 
shopping). The precautionary motive arises because of the desire by agents to hold some 
1 The discussion that follows is mainly due to Keynes (1936) 
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money for unplanned expenditures, as a result of an emergency or some similar 
circumstances. Both the precautionary and the transactions demand for money are 
positively related to the current real income. In fact, these two motives are often 
combined and referred to as the transactions motive. 
It is generally assumed that, in addition to money, agents hold their wealth in the 
form of other assets that carry a promise to pay the holder a certain income per annum, 
fixed in money terms. These assets are collectively referred to as bonds in the literature. 
There is an inverse relationship between the interest rate and the price of bonds. When 
the interest rate goes up, the price of bonds come down. This means that the value of 
bonds held is going to decline and those who held their wealth in bonds will experience a 
capital loss. The converse will be the case when the interest rate falls. 
One of the characteristics of money, which bonds do not possess, is that its value 
does not change with a change in the interest rate. Therefore, when the interest rate is 
expected to go up, which usually happens when the interest rate is below a certain 
perceived normal level, the agents will go out of bonds and go into money to avoid the 
pending capital loss. When the interest rate is higher than the perceived normal level, 
wealth holders will expect it to fall, and they will buy more bonds and in the process 
reduce the amount of money they hold. The demand for money for the purpose of trying 
to avoid a capital loss is the speCUlative demand for money. It increases when the 
interest rate is low and decreases when the interest rate is high. The wealth variable is 
important in that it determines the total amount of bonds held, and therefore, indirectly 
the speculative demand for money. However, since wealth does not change in the short-
run, the speculative demand for money can be defined as a function of the interest rate 
only. The total money demand (speculative and transactions), according to the 
Keynesian analysis, is determined by the current real income and the interest rate only. 
The appropriate scale variable is the real current income. 
The monetarist school epitomised by Friedman (1956) holds the VIew that the 
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demand for money should be analysed in the same manner as the demand for any other 
durable goods. According to consumer theory, the demand for any good is a function of 
a constraint variable, normally some kind of income, own price, the price of other goods, 
and tastes and preferences. The individual consumer purchases more than one type of 
good at any given point in time. The maximum he can purchase of any good is 
constrained by his total income. When his income goes up he buys more of all goods as 
long as they are normal goods. Similarly, money is not the only asset an agent can hold. 
Other interest earning financial assets like bonds or real assets like property, equities, etc. 
are also held. All the assets held would have to add up to the agent's total wealth. The 
maximum amount of money that can be held, or any of the other assets in the portfolio, 
must be less than or equal to the total wealth. An agent's total wealth defines the 
constrained on money holding like income defines the constrained on the purchases of a 
given good and services. This implies that the appropriate scale variable in the money 
demand function should be the total wealth and not the current real income as suggested 
by the Keynesian analysis. 
Others2 have argued that the appropriate scale variable should be a measure of 
consumer expenditure. According to the Keynesian analysis of the demand for money, 
briefly outlined above, the transactions component of the money demand should depend 
on the real income (GNP or GDP). While all components of GNP generate transactions, 
consumers' transactions generates the most money demand. Federal Government 
transactions generate less money demand because the federal Government accounts are 
not included in measured M 1 or M2. Business transactions generate less money demand 
because businesses are more sophisticated at financial management than households, 
(Mankiw and Summers, 1986 p. 416). The best scale variable to explain the transactions 
demand for money should therefore, be consumer expenditures. Also, if it is accepted 
that the appropriate scale variable is permanent income, the best proxy for it should be 
2 see/or example Mankiw and Summers, (1986) 
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consumption, since it is postulated to be proportional to permanent income. Irrespective 
of whether the transactions or the portfolio theory of money demand is being looked at, 
the appropriate scale variable, according to the above argument should be the consumers' 
expenditure. 
The opportunity cost of holding money can be defined in terms of the services the 
other assets render to the holder. Interest earning assets, for example, provide the holder 
with income (interest income and capital gains/losses). Although different assets have 
different rates of return, because of the ease with which one asset can be substituted for 
the other, it is believed that these rates of return generally move together, so one 
representative rate of return can be used in the demand for money analysis. The other 
component of the income provided by the interest earning assets is the capital gainlloss 
that arises with any change in the interest rate. This variable is proxied by the percentage 
rate of change of the interest rate. Since expected increases in the interest rate lead to a 
capital loss, this variable, according to the monetarists, should enter the money demand 
function with a negative sign, or preferably it should be deducted from the interest 
earnings. 
The services money provides are in real terms, so the demand for money is the 
demand for real balances. 3 Changes in the price level affect the real value of the money 
held. An increase in the price level reduces the value of the services money renders, and 
thus reduces its rate of return. The opposite holds if prices go down. The percentage rate 
of change of the price level should enter the money demand function to represent own 
rate of return on money holding. According to the monetarist specification of the money 
demand, the total wealth, the nominal interest rate, the rate of change of the interest rate 
and the rate of change of the price level should enter the money demand function. 
3 This proposition can in fact be tested through estimating the demand for nominal rather than 
real money, where the price level appears as one of the explanatory variables. An estimated 
coefficient value of unity on the price variable confirms the proposition. 1I0wever,for the purpose 
of deriving the monetarists specification of the money demand function, it is sufficient to assume 
that the proposition holds. 
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The variable (lor i) in the long-run money demand function represents the 
opportunity cost of holding money. The purpose of holding money includes its use as a 
medium of exchange for goods and services, and its use as a means of storing value 
(wealth). Money alone, among all assets, can perfonn the function of a medium of 
exchange for goods and services, but there are other assets that can be used for the store 
of value purpose. Both schools of thought agree that, in addition to money, wealth can 
be held in the form of other financial assets (bonds, etc.) and non-financial assets like 
equities, houses, gold, etc. The opportunity cost of holding money arises because there 
are returns to holding wealth in a spectrum of other assets which cannot be realised by 
holding money. In the developed countries where there are a variety of financial assets 
available to a wealth holder (some closer to money than others), the degree of 
substitution between money and the non-financial assets are assumed to be negligible. 
The opportunity cost of holding money is defined in tenns of the rate of return on the 
financial assets only, (one or more interest rates). 
The situation in the developing countries is slightly different. Unlike the developed 
countries, there are few alternative domestic and foreign financial assets available to a 
wealth holder. This is partly due to the paucity of the domestic financial markets and 
partly due to the presence of capital control measures. Moreover, the observable interest 
rates do not, in general reflect money market conditions, because in most cases they are 
institutionally pegged. The following quote from Fry (1988) explains the developing 
countries' financial markets 
" .... in most developing countries, neither corporate nor government bonds are 
traded in the open markets. Indeed, corporate bonds simply do not exist in 
many developing countries. !ypically, the commerci~l banks. ar~ . capti~e 
buyers of low yielding domestzc government bonds by vzrtue of lzquzdzty ralLO 
requirements" 
The asset choice of most wealth holders in the developing countries is limited to money 
or physical assets (land, houses, consumer durables, etc.) This means that money 
holdings in these countries will be sensitive to the yields on real and not financial assets. 
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In the literature, this is approximated by the rate of depreciation in the real value of 
money (rate of change of the general price level or the inflation rate).4 When the inflation 
rate is expected to go up and thus depreciate the value of money held, agents will 
substitute away from money and in the process reduce their demand for money. Since 
money as an asset has desired qualities which real assets do not possess (liquidity), an 
expected decline in the inflation rate will lead to an increase in the demand for it. 
4.3 Partial Adjustment and the Short-run Money Demand Function 
The money demand equations (4.1) and (4.2) represent the long-run equilibrium 
quantity of money demanded.S In the real world, the actual quantity of money held often 
differs from the desired or the long-run quantity. An agent may not be able to return to 
his equilibrium level of money holding within a given period (e.g one quarter or one 
year) after a disturbance. One likely reason for such an inertia is that adjusting a portfolio 
to eliminate the disequilibrium may be costly. However, it is also costly for the agent to 
maintain the disequilibrium. These two costs are usually presented as quadratic loss 
functions in the form of equations (4.3) and (4.4) below. 
* )2 C 1 = a(mt - mt 
C 2 = P (mt-mt _l)2 
TC = a(m; - mt )2 + p(mt - mt_l)2 
mt=mt-l +y(m; -mt-l) where y=a/(a+p) 






The cost of being away from the desired or target money holdings is represented by 
equation (4.3). It is assumed to depend upon the gap between an agent's desired money 
holding (m;) and the amount he actually holds emt). If the amount he currently holds is 
greater than the desired, he suffers the cost of foregone interest income, income which 
would have been earned if the excess money were in an interest earning asset. If the 
current amount of money held is below the desired level, he suffers risks and 
4 Seefor example, Adekunle (1967), Wong (1977), and Darrat (1985). 
5 This quantity is some times referred to as the desired or the target quantity. 
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inconveniences. For example, if the agent's cash balances fall short of what is required 
for a certain transaction, he either has to postpone the transaction until later or undertake 
it on credit and incur an explicit interest cost. 
The cost of portfolio adjustment is represented by equation (4.4). In movmg 
towards the desired money holding, agents must increase or decrease the actual amount 
of money they hold. This can only be achieved through sales or purchases of other assets 
in their portfolios. These transactions entail brokerage cost. Even if an agent were not 
faced with an explicit brokerage fee, the time spent carrying out the transaction, which 
could have been utilised elsewhere more productively, constitutes a cost. 
As the agent moves to eliminate the disequilibrium, the cost of being out of 
equilibrium decreases but the cost of his portfolio adjustment increases. The agent's 
problem is therefore, to choose that amount of money which minimises the total cost (the 
sum of the two costs), represented by equation (4.5). Differentiating (4.5) with respect to 
(mt), setting the result equal to zero and rearranging gives equation (4.6). According to 
this equation, agents adjust the discrepancy between their desired and actual money 
holding slowly. The parameter (y) is the adjustment coefficient. Its value is usually 
postulated to be between zero and one. When (y) takes on the value of one (possible only 
when ~ = 0 and therefore, there is no cost to adjusting portfolios) the actual money 
balances will always be equal to the desired money balances, implying that adjustment is 
instantaneous. If (y) takes on a value of zero (possible only when a = 0 and therefore, 
there is no cost to being out of equilibrium) the actual money holding will be equal to last 
period's money holding. This implies that agents will never bother adjusting their money 
holding towards the equilibrium level. Generally, the closer the adjustment coefficient to 
one, the faster will the agent adjust his money holding towards the desired level. 
Substituting the long-run money demand function (4.2) into (4.6) and collecting like 
terms gives equation (4.7). This equation is the standard short-run demand for money 
function, almost universally estimated before the advent of the instability problem of the 
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early 1970s.6 Here a one period lagged dependent variable appears in the equation to 
cater for the dynamics of the system. The long-run coefficient of the money demand 
function can be recovered through dividing the short-run coefficients by the adjustment 
coefficient (one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable). 
4.4 Critique of the Partial Adjustment Specification of the Short-run Money 
Demand Function 
One of the main problems with the standard formulation of the short-run demand for 
money function (equation 4.7), is that of the dynamics of adjusting from actual to an 
equilibrium level of money holding. As discussed earlier, the likelihood that an agent 
may not be able to adjust to his desired or target money balances is handled by the 
inclusion of a one period lagged dependent variable into the equation. This formulation 
implies that the cost of adjusting money holdings is the same whether the initial 
disturbance is due to a change in the real income or interest rate. The following scenario 
outlined by Gordon (1984) suggests that adjustment costs are not only different for 
changes in real income and interest rates, but also depend on either an increase or 
decrease in the determinants that lead to the disruption of the initial equilibrium. 
Furthermore, even the degree to which these changes are anticipated may make some 
differences to the cost of adjustment. 
If there is an increase in income, paid either by cash or cheque, there will be no cost 
to the agent in increasing his real money holding, since these assets are money. The only 
relevant portfolio adjustment cost will be in trying to decrease the quantity of money held 
by reallocating it to other forms of assets. This portfolio adjustment cost will depend on 
whether the income increase is anticipated or not. If the increase were anticipated, the 
amount of money held can be temporarily lowered below the desired level just before 
receiving the payment and thereby, reducing any excess to be transformed into other 
6 see Judd and Scadding (1982), and Laidler (1980)jor a survey. 
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assets, and thus reducing the cost of portfolio adjustment. 
The situation is slightly different when there is a change in the interest rate. To 
begin with, a change in a market determined interest rate is seldom anticipated. Real 
money balances adjust slowly to changes in the interest rate because of the delay in 
adjusting expectations of the interest rate level and the adjustment costs. "Thus at the 
individual level gradual adjustment of real balances makes sense for interest rates but 
not for real income", (Gordon, 1984 p. 411). 
The imposition of a single adjustment parameter across all the independent 
variables can lead to a dynamic misspecification. Relevant lagged values of the 
independent variables could be wrongly excluded from the equation, thus leading to an 
erroneous conclusion that the speeds of adjustment are slow when in fact they are not. 
Furthermore, such a misspecification could lead to serially correlated error terms and 
biased estimates of the parameters. This problem may be responsible for estimates of 
this type of equation almost universally rendering serially correlated error terms and 
where the Cochrane-Ocutt correction procedure is almost uniformly used, (see for 
example Goldfeld 1973, 1976, etc.). 
4.4.1 Wealth as a Scale Variable 
The non-instantaneous adjustment of money balances is not the sole explanation for 
the existence of a lagged dependent variable in the money demand function. In fact, 
using wealth rather than current real income as the scale variable can lead to a similar 
equation to (4.7) above. In empirical studies, wealth is usually proxied by permanent 
income, defined as the discounted present values of expected future income (Laidler, 
1985). If a constant discount rate is assumed, permanent income can be represented by 
expected income. 
Supporters of the hypothesis that wealth is the appropriate scale variable, use 
adaptive expectations or the error learning process to approximate expected income. 
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According to this procedure, in each period, agents revise their expectation in proportion 
to the difference between what they expect their income to be and what it actually turned 
out to be. This expectation fonnation process can be written as equation (4.8) below. 
yf = yf-l + A(Yt - yf-l ) 
yf = AYt + (1 - A)yf-l 




Where yf stands for what the agents expect their income to be in the next period, yf-l for 
the last period's expectation about the income this period, and Yt his actual income this 
period. The variable A is the coefficient of expectations, whose value is postulated to be 
between zero and one (0 < A < 1). If A takes the value of one it means that agents have 
perfect foresight, and their expected income is exactly equal to their actual income 
(yf = Yt)· On the other hand, if A = 0, it implies that agents do not revise their 
expectations at all, and therefore, their expected income this period and last period is the 
same (yf = yf-l)' In this case, the agents are said to have a static expectation. 
Rearranging equation (4.8) gives (4.9). Substituting equation (4.9) into the monetarists' 
specification of the money demand (equation 4.2 where the scale variable y is replaced by 
expected or pennanent income) and using Koyck's transformation renders equation 
(4.10). This equation is slightly different from (4.7), in that, in addition to the other 
explanatory variables, one period lagged opportunity cost of holding money appears. 
Furthennore, equation (4.10) is a specification of the equilibrium or long-run money 
demand. It is possible to introduce the partial adjustment assumption to this 
specification. The final equation in this case, would contain one and two periods lagged 
dependent variables, (see for example, Laidler & Parkin, 1970, and Coghlan, 1978). 
Despite the differences between equations (4.7) and (4.10), the two equations are 
sufficiently similar "that if (4.10) was in fact the true model of the demand for money 
function, then anyone who fitted (4.7) would obtain rather good results and vice versa", 
(Laidler, 1985 p. 108). 
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4.5 Alternative Dynamic Specification 
In the last couple of sections it was pointed out that the short-run money demand 
specification (equation 4.7) is inadequate because an identical adjustment rate is assumed 
for all types of shocks and over all periods. As a result only one lagged variable (the 
lagged dependent variable) appears in the equation. One way of getting around this 
short-coming is to specify the function in the form of a general autoregressive distributed 
lagged (ADL) model discussed in section (2.5) of chapter 2 (see also Hendry and Mizon 
1978). When applied to the money demand function, it can be written as equation (4.11) 
below: 
n n n 
mt = a + L bjYt-j + L cjit_j + L djmt_j + El 
j=O j=O j=1 
mt=a+boYt+blYt-l +coi1 +Cl il-l +d 1mt-l +E1 
I1mt = a + b ol1Yt + col1it + (b o + b 1 )Yl-l 
+ (co + c1)it- 1 + (d 1 -l)mt-1 + Et 
!1mt = a + bofl.Yt + cofl.it + (d 1 - 1) [mt-1 - [
bO+b 1 ] 1 





Assuming (n = 1), equation (4.11) can be simplified and written as (4.12). Unlike (4.7), 
in addition to the lagged dependent variable, lagged values of each independent variable 
appear in this equation. Although an improvement over equation (4.7), equations (4.11) 
and (4.12) are not entirely satisfactory. The equilibrium condition embodied in them is a 
static one, (Harvey, 1990). This implies that there is only one equilibrium point which 
the system gets back to after any disturbance. In other words, there is no growth in the 
system, enabling the equilibrium point to change overtime. The equilibrium concept 
relevant to most economic variables is however, that of the steady state. A steady state 
relationship between variables is said to exist if, despite a growth in each variable, a 
certain specific long-run relationship is maintained. 
After adding and subtracting variables, and collecting like terms, (4.12) can be 
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written as (4.13). This equation, by specifying the variables in levels and changes, 
introduces some growth elements to the system and moves away from the restrictive 
assumption of static equilibrium embodied in (4.12).7 In addition, (4.13) has the 
following advantages: 1) As discussed in section (2.5) of chapter 2, specifying the 
equation in levels and changes is likely to reduce the multicollinearity problem inherent 
in equations specified in the form of (4.12). 2) It allows for a clean separation between 
the long-run and the short-run effects in a way that is not possible with equation (4.12). 
Specifically, the coefficients of the change variables give the respective short-run effects, 
while those of the level variables divided by that of the level of the dependent variable 
give the long-run effect. 
A further manipulation would allow equation (4.13) to be expressed as an error 
-correction model (4.14), where the term in the squared bracket represents the error-
correction term. Suppose there is a sudden increase in m[> such that the steady state 
relationship is disturbed, the error-correction term becomes positive. Assuming that 
(d 1 < 1; and therefore (d 1 - 1) < 0), the effect of the error-correction term is to reduce 
the excess growth of mt, pushing it back towards steady state, or the equilibrium growth 
level. An opposite scenario can be envisaged if there is a sudden increase in Yt supersede 
the steady state growth level. Defining the error-correction term as er. it can be written as 
equation (4.15) below 
( 4.15) 
This equation is in fact the long-run equilibrium money demand function (4.2) where the 
opportunity cost variable and the constant term are omitted and an error term et is added. 
Two observations can be made about equation (4.14). 1) the error-correction term is 
specified only in terms of one of the independent variables - the real income, or rather the 
7 For example, f..m which is the same as ~ LogM, is in fact approximately equal to the percen-
[
Mt-Mt-l] 
tage growth rate of Mt to first - order. 
M t - l 
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scale variable. Although this can be justified by arguing that the demand for money 
being analysed is basically that of transactions demand, which is not an unreasonable 
assumption in countries where there are limited alternative financial assets to money, and 
where the speculative demand for money may be small. Furthermore, in countries like 
Nigeria where the interest rate is virtually fixed by the authorities, and therefore, not 
allowed to fluctuate much, it is reasonable to specify the error-correction in terms of real 
income alone. It is nevertheless, possible for a disturbance to the steady state 
relationship to arise from the interest rate or the opportunity cost variable. This problem 
becomes more pronounced the more independent variables there are in the model. 2) To 
simplify the estimation of equation (4.14), it is often assumed that the long-run elasticity 
of money demand with respect to income ((b o + b 1 )/(1 - d 1)) is equal to unity. Hendry 
(1979), for example, makes this assumption to estimate the U.K money demand function. 
It is however, possible to test specifically for this assumption by adding an extra YI-l 
term to equation (4.14), or estimate equation (4.13) directly instead. 
4.5.1 Cointegration and Error-Correction 
Two or more series are said to be cointegrated if there is a defined long-run 
equilibrium relationship between them. More technically, assume that two series QI and 
XI are both integrated of order one (T(1) - stationary in first difference and not in levels)8 
it is possible for there to be a linear combination of the two variables defined by equation 
(4.16) below, which is stationary in levels (1(0)). 
( 4.16) 
If such a relationship exists the two series are said to be cointegrated, with e being the 
cointegration parameter (Carruth and Schnabel, 1988). In other words, there is a unique 
parameter e which defines the relationship between QI and Xt in the long-run. Although 
equation (4.16) is defined in terms of two variables only, it is nevertheless, possible to 
8 See chapter 3, section 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion about the order of integration of a series 
and how that can be measured using the ADF - Test. 
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extend it to a case of many variables with different cointegration parameters. 
When taken in the context of the money demand analysis, equation (4.16) is simply 
the error-correction term (4.15) defined earlier. The cointegration parameter e is the 
long-run elasticity of money demand with respect to the real income. It follows that if 
two or more series are cointegrated, it is always possible to construct a model with a 
valid error-correction term. In fact cointegration is a necessary condition for there to be a 
stable long-run linear equilibrium relationship between any given set of variables. The 
validity of specifying the money demand function in the form of equation (4.15) depends 
on Yt and mt being cointegrated. 
The following can be deduced from the above discussion about cointegration: 
1) Equation (4.16) is in fact a long-run equilibrium relationship without a constant 
term; where Qt is the dependent variable, Xl the independent variable, ZI the error 
term and e a parameter which can be defined as an elasticity if the variables are in 
logarithms. 
2) The error-correction term IS equal to the error-term of a long-run equilibrium 
equation. 
3) A slightly different strategy for formulating and estimating an error-correction 
model is suggested. Firstly to estimate a long-run equilibrium relationship 
suggested by a given theory, and then use the residuals from the regression as the 
error-correction term. This strategy has the advantage that the error-correction term 
can be specified in terms of more than one independent variable. In addition, the 
values of the long-run elasticities are estimated rather than imposed arbitrarily. 
Engle and Granger (1987) proposed the following procedure for constructing and 
estimating an error correction model using the cointegration ideas. The procedure is 
commonly known as the "Engle-Granger two-step approach". The starting point is to test 
the integratedness of each individual series (the number of times these series need to be 
differenced before achieving stationarity). Generally, it is required for the series to be 
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integrated of the same order. The two methods of testing most often utilised are the 
Durbin-Watson test (DW) and the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF).9 The DW test 
requires that a regression of the series Xl (AXt if testing for 1(1)) be run on a constant and 
test the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a random walk. In other words, for each 
series Xl or LiX, the null hypothesis is that the first order autocorrelation coefficient is 
equal to unity. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the series follows a random 
walk. 
If the different series are found to be integrated of the same order, the next step of 
the approach is to test for cointegration of these series. This is carried out by running a 
static regression of the level of the dependent variable on the levels of the independent 
variables (the cointegration regression) and testing the residuals of the regression for 
stationarity. If the variables are cointegrated, the residuals must be stationary in levels 
(I(O)). A formal test for cointegration of a set of series would require testing the residuals 
from the cointegration regression for stationarity, 1(0). The null-hypothesis is that the 
residuals from the cointegration regression contain a unit-root (the residuals are a non-
stationary random walk). Rejection of this hypothesis means that the variables are 
cointegrated and there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between them. The first 
kind of test is based on the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated from the cointegration 
regression. The test is not whether the value of the DW statistic is equal to, or nearly 
equal to 2 as in the conventional test for first order serial correlation, but rather that d is 
significantly positive or not. The null that the residual is a non-stationary random walk 
(has a unit-root), would be rejected if the value of DW is greater than a certain critical 
value. The appropriate critical values are provided in Sargan & Bhargava (1983). A 
second kind of test is based on the ADF test described earlier. The appropriate critical 
values in this case can be found in Engle and Yoo (1987). Either way, if the residuals of 
the cointegration regression can be shown to be 1(0), the null of non-cointegration would 
9 see chapter 3 for a discussion on ADF test. 
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be rejected for cointegration. 
The second step would be (after confirming that the residuals are 1(0) ) to include a 
one period lagged value of the residuals variable into an equation that regresses the first 
difference of the dependent variable on the first difference of the independent series. 
(here it is assumed that all series are 10)). The one period lagged residuals of the 
cointegration regression serves as the error-correction term. 
4.6 Identification and Simultaneity Problems 
The identification problem in the context of estimating the money demand function 
arises because the quantity of money demanded cannot be observed directly. Instead, 
what is observed is the quantity of money supplied or rather the quantity of money in 
circulation at a given point in time. A money market equilibrium condition is invoked to 
be able to define the observed stock of money as the quantity demanded. A least squares 
line fitted through a series of observations of the equilibrium quantity of money across 
time may represent the money demand function, the money supply function, or neither. 
If the unobserved demand function were reasonably stable, and the observations are as a 
result of shifts in the supply function, then a least squares line could be a money demand 
function. If on the other hand, the money supply function were stable, but the money 
demand function shifts around, the least squares line will represent the money supply 
function. If both functions shift around, the least squares line is neither a money demand 
function, nor a money supply function. Only in the first scenario is the money demand 
function identified. 
The money demand function can therefore be identified if there is one variable 
which makes the money supply function shift independently of the money demand 
function. "Suppose that we believe the demand/or nominal balances depend on the level 
of real income, the price level, and a representative interest rate and the supply to 
depend on that same interest rate and stock money base available in the economy. Then, 
if fluctuations in the stock of money base are independent of fluctuations in real income 
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and prices or any of the other variables, including the random factors that might cause 
the demandfor money to vary, the parameters 0/ the demand/unction will be identified", 
(Laidler, 1985 p. 101). The above statement implicitly assumes that the monetary base is 
exogenous. However, as discussed in the earlier chapters, the monetary base and the 
money stock may in fact be endogenous. If the endogeneity is such that the money 
supply function is horizontal in the money interest rate space, and interest rate targeting 
is practiced, then the money demand function is identifiable. Changes in the interest rate 
will lead to shifts in the horizontal money supply function, and generating points that lie 
on the money demand function. Furthermore, if real rather than the nominal observed 
quantity of money is used as the dependent variable, and the price level is endogenous, so 
that it does not appear in the money demand function as an explanatory variable, then the 
identification problem discussed above will not arise. Unless the monetary authorities 
can change the price level directly, there will not be a separate supply function for real 
money balances. 
Assuming the money demand function is identified, it is often specified in the 
context of a single equation model and estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The implicit assumption is that the explanatory variables - real income, and the interest 
rates, for example, are independent of the error term of the equation. Violation of this 
assumption will lead to simultaneity bias, where the parameter estimates obtained using 
the OLS technique will be biased and inconsistent. 
Following Thomas (1985), the simultaneity problem can be illustrated usmg a 
simple model of the money market defined by equations (4.17, 4.18 and 4.19) below. 
m d = bo + b lY + b 2 i + Ed 
m S = u + h where u = 10gU and h = 10gH 
mS=m d 
1 b lIEd 
i = -(u -bo)- -Y + -h +-





Equation (4.17) is basically the money demand equation (4.2) plus the error term Ed· 
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Equation (4.18) is a simple money supply equation where the money stock is defined to 
be identically equal to the money multiplier (U) times the monetary base (H), and 
equation (4.19) defines the money market equilibrium condition. 
Assume that real income (y) is exogenous. Further assume that the monetary 
authorities target money supply and use the monetary base (h) as the instrument. In this 
situation the interest rate adjusts to clear the market. Setting equation (4.17) equal to 
(4.18) and solving for the interest rate variable gives equation (4.20), which defines the 
interest rate in terms of the other variables. The error term (Ed) appears in this equation 
and is positively correlated with the interest rate variable. If the above assumptions hold, 
the interest rate variable in the money demand equation will be endogenous and 
estimating the money demand function using OLS will result in simultaneity bias. 
If the monetary authorities target the interest rate, it is the monetary base that 
adjusts endogenously to clear the market. In this case the interest rate variable is 
exogenous and will not be correlated with the error-term (Ed). Unbiased and consistent 
estimates of the money demand parameters can be obtained by applying the OLS 
estimation technique, (Thomas, 1985). It has been discussed in chapter 1 that the 
Nigerian Central Bank has never used open market operations or any other quantitative 
instruments suitable for targeting money supply. It has used the discount rate which is 
directly connected to the commercial bank lending and borrowing rates, as an instrument 
of monetary policy since 1963. This seems to suggest that monetary policy in Nigeria 
has been geared towards interest rate targeting rather than some monetary aggregate. In 
view of the above discussions, it is possible for the Nigerian money demand function to 
be identified. Furthermore, the interest rate variable in the money demand function is 
expected to be exogenous; implying that a single equation estimation technique can be 
used to obtain consistent and unbiased parameter estimates. 
The most often utilised solution to the simultaneity problem is to use the two stage 
least squares estimation technique. lO This technique requires regressing all the 
10 Alternatively. the money demand/unction can be set up as one 0/ many equations and a sys-
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endogenous explanatory variables on some variables that are actually exogenous to the 
system and then using the predicted values from this regression as the explanatory 
variables in the money demand equation. Empirical studies of the demand for money 
function often use both OLS and 2SLS to estimate the money demand function. If there 
is no discernible difference between the results, then the possibility of the simultaneity 
problem is discounted, (see for example Goldfeld, 1973). Cooley and Leroy (1981) 
argue that similar OLS and 2SLS results may not be an indication that the simultaneity 
problem is not important, but rather that the instruments used (the exogenous variables 
used in the first stage of the two stage least squares) are selected in such a way that the 
two methods are equally biased. 
Although the point presented by Cooley and Leroy (1981), is plausible, Laidler 
(1985), is inclined to think that it is unduly pessimistic. Furthermore, he argued that the 
"the extent to which a particular set of data might suffer from the kind of errors that lead 
to simultaneous equation bias can be related to the length of the time period it covers 
and to the time interval over which individual observations are averaged". This study, 
which uses annual data, is therefore less likely to suffer from simultaneity bias. 
4.7 Stability of the Money Demand Function 
According to Judd and Scadding (1982) a stable demand for money function should 
1) have few arguments which are linked in a significant way to the real sector 2) The 
estimated functions should have significant and theoretically consistent signs, and be able 
to make an out of sample forecast. According to Hendry (1979), a stable money demand 
function should be characterised by estimated parameters that are relatively constant 
over-time and should have good predictive accuracy. 
In this section, the stability of the Nigerian money demand function will be 
investigated by estimating the three different specifications of the money demand 
tems estimation technique like the full informations maximum likelihood (F1ML) can be used. 
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function. The traditional partial adjustment specification represented by equation (4.7), a 
specification in levels and changes represented by equation (4.13) and a specification in 
tenns of the error-correction and cointegration technique discussed earlier. In addition to 
investigating the stability issue, this will enable a comparison between the different 
specifications using the Nigerian data. 
The stability test utilised in this study is that suggested by Hendry (1979), based on 
the out of sample forecasting performance of the estimated models. This test involves 
estimating the money demand function using only part of the whole sample (leaving out 
some observations - 1984 to 1989 in this case) and then using the estimated model to 
forecast the omitted observations. A Chow-test for the forecast period can be used to test 
the hypothesis that the parameters of the equation are the same for the in-sample and the 
forecast period. As discussed in chapter 2, for the predictive accuracy of the model, a 
forecast Chi-squared test can be used to measure how closely the model succeeded in 
predicting the out of sample observations. In addition, a barrage of diagnostic tests are 
carried out to ensure that the estimated models have met the regular specification 
conditions (lack of serial correlation, homoskedasticity, and normality). 
The result of estimating the partial adjustment model, equation (4.7) for narrow and 
broad definition of money (M 1 and M2) is reported in Table 4.1. Diagnostic tests reject 
the hypothesis that the error-terms of the regression are serially correlated, 
heteroskedastic and non-normal. All the explanatory variables are significant and carry 
theory consistent signs except the opportunity cost of holding money which is not 
significant. 11 The adjustment coefficients (one minus the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variables) are (0.50) and (0.63) for M 1 and M2 respectively. This indicates 
that about 50 and 60 percent of any adjustment towards the desired or the equilibrium 
quantity of money holding is achieved one year after any disturbance. In other words, 
11 The treasury bills rate is used to represent the opportunity cost of holding money. Discount 
rate and savings/deposits rate (M2' s own rate of relurn) did nol yield any heller result. 
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ceteris paribus, it will take about two years for adjustment towards equilibrium to be 
completed. The short-run income elasticities of money demand are (0.88) for both MI 
and M2. Dividing that by the respective adjustment coefficients, renders long-run 
elasticities of (1.76) and (l.40) for Ml and M2 respectively.12 Casual observation of 
these elasticities indicate that they are greater than one and therefore, it may not be 
appropriate to estimate an error-correction model, specified in the form of equation 
(4.14), which assumes a priori that the long-run income elasticity of money demand is 
unity. However, given the analytical weakness of the partial adjustment specification 
discussed earlier, a further investigation is necessary. A forecast x2 (5) value of 4.25 and 
1.6 for Ml and M2 and a Chow-test for the forecast period value of (F(5, 18) = 0.63 for 
Ml and F(5, 16) = 0.30 for M2) indicate that the hypothesis that this empirical model is 
stable cannot be rejected. 
The above result is arrived at after a set of step dummy variables, to capture the 
effect of the shocks to the Nigerian economy, outlined in chapter 2 were used in the 
modelling process. However, in the context of the money demand, these dummies are 
hard to justify. For example, it is not clear, besides the income effect which is captured 
by the income variable, how the 1973n4 oil price shock affected the quantity of money 
demanded in Nigeria. It is therefore, necessary to re-estimate this and the other 
specifications of the money demand function without these dummy variables. The result 
of the partial adjustment specification without dummies is presented in Table 4.1.1. In 
fact, it is not very different from the one in Table 4.1. The models without dummies are 
quite stable as indicated by the outcome of the battery of diagnostic tests and the forecast 
ability tests. Furthermore, the adjustment coefficients of 0.61 and 0.66 are not 
12 It is unusual for the long-run income elasticity of narrow money to be greater than that of 
broader money. This result implies that narrow money is more of a luxury than a broad money. 
This may be due to the fact that in Nigeria, current accounts are more of a luxury than savings ac-
count. There are strickter requirement for openning a current account than a savings account. In 
fact, most lower level wage workers that are not paid in cash are paid through the banks via sav-
ings account. 
Table 4.1 
Money Demand Function with step Dummies 
(Partial Adjustment Specification) 
Variables Narrow Money 
Const. -7.48 
(-3.73) 
Log (M 1/ P)t-l 0.50 
(4.62) 















Std. Err. 0.10 
LM-Test for 1st Order Serial Correlation F(1, 22) 0.04 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation F(2, 21) 2.71 
ARCH-Test for 1st Order Heteroskedasticity F(1,21) 0.19 
ARCH-Test for 2nd Order Heteroskedasticity F(2, 19) 0.13 
Normality -Test X
2(2) 0.321 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2(5)/5 0.85 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(5, 18) 0.63 
Dependent Variables: Log(M1/P), and Log(M2/P). 
t-values are in parenthesis 
























F(2, 19) 1.90 
F(1, 19) 0.13 
F(2, 17) 0.04 
X2(2) 1.02 
X2(5)/5 0.32 
F(5, 16) 0.30 
Table 4.1.1 
Money Demand Function with no Dummies 
(Partial Adjustment Specification) 
Variables Narrow Money 
Canst. -4.40 
( -3.21) 
Log (M 1/ P)t-l 0.61 
(5.29) 











Std. Err. 0.126 
LM-Test for 1 st Order Serial Correlation F(1,24) 0.18 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation F(2, 23) 0.50 
ARCH-Test for 1st Order Heteroskedasticity X
2(1) 0.14 
Nonnality -Test X2(2) 0.47 
Forecast Accuracy Test X2 (5)/5 0.66 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period F(5, 20) 0.28 
Dependent Variables: Log(Ml/P), and Log(M2/P). 
t-values are in parenthesis 
















F(2, 23) 0.17 
X2(1) 0.09 
X2(2) 0.26 
X2 (5)15 0.27 
F(5, 20) 0.26 
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statistically different from those given by the models with dummy variables. The short-
run income elasticities of 0.56 and 0.52 for narrow and broad money are less than the 
0.88 obtained in the earlier models. Similarly, the long-run income elasticities of 1.44 
and 1.53 for narrow and broad money are less than those obtained when dummy variables 
were used. Also, in this model unlike in the earlier one, the income elasticity for broad 
money is higher than that for narrow money, although the difference may not be 
statistically significant. 
The result of estimating the money demand function, specified as a general 
autoregressive distributed lag model, reparameterised into levels and changes (equation 
4.13), is presented in Table 4.2. As discussed earlier, this model has the advantage that it 
does not impose the same cost of adjustment with respect to all the independent 
variables. As in the partial adjustment case, the empirical models pass the battery of 
standard diagnostic tests. The forecast chi-squared and the Chow-test for the forecast 
period also show that the functions are stable. It is most interesting to note that the 
short-run income elasticity of money demand of (1.00) and (1.05) (coefficient of the 
change variables) and long-run values of 0.74) and 0.37) (coefficients of the level 
variables divided by minus the coefficient of the lagged level of the dependent variable) 
for M1 and M2, are virtually the same as the values obtained using the partial adjustment 
specification. These results, firstly, seem to confirm the suspicion raised by the partial 
adjustment specification that the long-run income elasticity of money demand is likely to 
be greater than unity. Secondly, they seem to suggest that the partial adjustment 
specification may in fact be an adequate representation of money demand in Nigeria. The 
interest rate variable as in the partial adjustment specification, although of the expected 
sign, is not statistically significant. 
The result of estimating this equation without the dummy variables is presented in 
Table 4.2.1. Here as well, the hypothesis that the models are stable could not be rejected. 
Unlike the partial adjustment models, the coefficient estimates in this case are weaker as 
Table 4.2 
Money Demand Function 
(Variables in Levels and Changes) 
Variables 
Const. 
Log (M 1/ P)t-l 
Log (M2/ P)t-l 









LM-Test for 1st Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH-Test for 1 st Order Heteroskedasticity 
ARCH-Test for 2nd Order Heteroskedasticity 
Nonnality Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables: ~Log(Ml/P) and II Log(M2/P). 



























F(2, 18) 0.31 
X2(2) 0.S7 
X2(S)/S 0.84 
F(S, 17) 0.77 


























F(2, 19) I.S4 
F(1, 19) 0.38 
F(2, 17) 0.92 
X2(2) 0.29 
X2(S)/S 0.62 
F(S, 16) 0.48 
Table 4.2.1 
Money Demand Function with no Dummies 
(Variables in Levels and Changes) 
Variables 
Const. 











LM -Test for 1st Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH -Test for 1 st Order Heteroskedastici ty 
Nonnality Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables: ~Log(Ml/P) and ~ Log(M2/P). 
t-values are in parenthesis. 


















F(2, 22) 0.08 
X2(1) 1.06 
X2(2) 0.44 
X2 (5)/5 0.55 
F(5, 19) 0.53 
























F(5, 19) 0.32 
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shown by the low t-values. In fact all of the coefficients, with the exception of that 
representing the impact effect of the real income, are significant only at the 10 percent 
level. The impact elasticity of 0.89 for narrow and broad money are not statistically 
different from the values of 1.00 obtained when step dummies were used. The long-run 
income elasticities of 1.82 and 1.67 for narrow and broad money are also only slightly 
different from 1.74 and 1.37 obtained earlier. 
Unlike in the case where dummy varibles are used, the short-run income elasticities 
obtained from the partial adjustment and those obtained from the models in levels and 
changes are quite different, but the long-run elastities are still quite close, and in both 
cases they are greater than unity. 
Table 4.3 
Order of Integration of the Series 
VARIABLES ADF-TEST FOR 1(0) 
(LEVELS) 
COEFF t-VALUES 
Log(MI/P) -0.05 ( -1.08) 
Log(M2/P) -0.05 ( -1.30) 
LogGDP -0.06 ( -1.48) 
LogTBRT 0.02 (0.20) 
Log SRT 0.05 (0.99) 
LogDRT 0.11 (1.33) 
ADF-Test requires running the following: 
n 
!!.XI = a + bXI - 1 + I,!!.XI-i + el 
i==1 
ADF-TeSl 
ADF-TEST FOR 1(1) 
(FIRST DIFFERENCE) 
COEFF t-VALUES 




-0.61 ( -2.67) 
-0.75 (-2.82) 
Coeff. represents the estimates of b, with t-values in parenthesis. 










It has been discussed earlier that there are advantages to specifying the money 
demand function in an error-correction form. Evidence from estimating the other 
formulations shows that the long-run income elasticity of money demand is greater than 
unity. It is therefore, not appropriate to estimate equation (4.14) which uses such an 
assumption. Instead the Engle-Granger two-step procedure, which involves the idea of 
cointegration is adopted to formulate and estimate an error-correction model of Nigerian 
money demand. 
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One of the necessary conditions for a valid cointegration analyses is for for the 
variables to be integrated of the same order. The result of testing the integratedness of 
each series is reported in Table 4.3. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests showed that 
all the series are integrated of the same order (I(1) - achieve stationarity after differencing 
once). The next stage of the Engle - Granger approach is to test for cointegration across 
the series. In other words, to investigate whether a long-run relationship in fact exists 
between real money holdings, real income, and the nominal interest rate. For this 
purpose, a regression of the level of real money balances is run on the levels of the 
dependent variables (cointegration regression), and the result of that is reported in Table 
4.4. Cointegration Regression Dubin-Watson (CRDW) of (1.44) and (1.88) suggest that 
the null that the variables are cointegrated in a long-run relationship cannot be rejected. 
Furthermore, testing the residuals from the cointegration regression for stationarity using 
the ADF test gave t-values on the one-period lagged residuals as (-4.50) and (-5.0) for 
MI and M2 respectively, further re-enforcing the conclusion that the variables are 
coin tegrated. 
The result of estimating an error-correction model, where one period lagged 
residuals from the cointegration regressions are used as the error-correction terms is, 
presented in Table 4.6. Tests carried out in a similar manner to the earlier models show 
that these models also pass all the regular diagnostic and stability tests. The error-
correction terms are statistically significant for both MI and M2. Furthermore, the 
coefficient values of (-0.09) and (-0.08) on the error-correction terms indicate that the 
dynamics of the systems are stable. However, while the other two specifications gave a 
similar degree of adjustment for M 1 and M2, this specification seems to suggest an 
adjustment of M2 considerably faster than that of MI. 
The short-run or the impact income elasticity of money demand of (1.07) and (0.87) 
for M 1 and M2 are very close to the ones obtained from the two earlier models. The 
long-run elasticity of income which is to be read off straight from the cointegration 
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regression are (1.22) and (1.23) for Ml and M2. The value for M2 is quite close to the 
values obtained from the other models. For Ml, it is considerably smaller than (1.76) 
and (1.74) reported from the two earlier models. The Interest rate variable, although of 
the expected sign, is characteristically insignificant in this model as well. 
The result that the variables are cointegrated in a long-run equilibrium relationship 
was obtained only after inclusion of the set of step dummy variables mentioned earlier. 
Without the dummy variables, the (CRDW) values are 0.58 and 0.62, while the t-values 
on the one period lagged residuals, using ADF-test are (-2.60) and (-2.56) for Ml and M2 
respectively (see Tables 4.4.1 and 4.5.1). The critical (CRDW) at 5% is about 0.827, 
while that of the ADF-test with two explanatory variables is about -3.0. Without the 
dummy variables, the null hypothesis that the variables are cointegrated in a long-run 
relationship is rejected on both counts. Furthermore, the interest rate variable in the 
long-run cointegration regression without dummies are significant but of the wrong signs, 
which may imply a misspecification. 
The cointegration tests utilised above are large sample tests. Results from small 
samples may not be very relaible. According to Engle and Granger, 1987 if a valid 
error-correction term can be established, then the variables must be cointegrated in a 
long-run relationship. As a further test of the cointegratedness of the varibles, an error-
correction model can be estimated and the validity of the error-correction term checked. 
The result of estimating such a model without the dummy variables is presented in Table 
4.6.1. The standard tests show that the models are stable. Furthermore, the coefficients 
of the real income and the interest rate are of the expected sign, with the latter 
characteristically insignificant. The error-correction terms have the expected signs and 
have values of less than one in absolute value but are not significant. This seem to 
reinforce the conclusion from the ADF and CRDW tests that there is no cointegration 
between the variables. Modelling the Nigerian money demand using the Engle-Granger 
two steps approach, therefore, may not be valid. 
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Table 4.4 
Cointegration Regression Equations 
Variables Narrow Moncy Broad Money 
Const. -8.71 -8.20 
(-4.02) (-4.36) 
Log GDP 1.22 1.23 
(6.40) (7.43) 
LogTBR -0.08 -0.12 
(-1.04) ( -1.33) 
DUM 1967/68 - -0.21 
- ( -3.22) 
DUM 1970/71 0.27 0.28 
(1.89) (2.37) 
DUM 1973/74 -0.30 -0.22 
(-3.09) ( -2.77) 
DUM 1979/80 -0.29 -0.31 
(-3.00) ( -3.95) 
DUM 1981/82 - -0.19 
- ( -1.97) 
R2 0.97 0.99 
Std. Err. 0.12 0.097 
CRDW 1.42 l.88 
Dependent Variables: Log(M1/P) and Log(M2/P). 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
Table 4.4.1 
Cointegration Regression Equations with no Dummies 
Variables Narrow Money Broad Money 
Const. -10.73 -12.17 
(-12.40) (-14.36) 
LogGDP 1.35 1.50 
(16.51 ) (18.82) 
LogTBR 0.15 0.25 
(2.06) (3.49) 
R2 0.92 0.94 
Std. Err. 0.18 0.17 
CRDW 0.58 0.62 
Dependent Variables: Log(Ml/P) and Log(M2/P). 




Cointegration Regression Residuals for 1(0) 
Variables Narrow Money Broad Money 




(ECT 1)/-1 -0.98 -
(-4.50)** -
(MCT2)t-l - 0.36 
- (1.94) 
(ECT2)t-l - -1.27 
- (-5.00)** 
Dependent Variables: MCT 1, and MCT2, where ECf represents the residuals from the coni-
tegration regression. 
ECT: Residuals from the cointegration regressions (Table 4.4) 
** the relevant t-values for cointegration test. 
Table 4.5.1 
ADF-Test 
Co integration Regression Residuals for 1(0) 
Variables Narrow Money 
Const. -0.002 
(-0.072) 
(MCT 1)/-1 0.31 
(1.60) 

















Dependent Variables: MCT 1, and MCT2, where ECf represents the residuals from the coni-
tegration regression. 
ECT: Residuals from the cointegration regressions (Table 4.4.1) 
** the relevant t-values for cointegration test. 
Table 4.6 
Money Demand Function 













LM -Test for 1 sl Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH-Test for FI Order Heteroskedasticity 
ARCH-Test for 2nd Order Heteroskedasticity 
Normality - Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables: !1LogM liP, !1LogM 21 P. 
ECT - Residuals from the Cointegration Regressions. 
t-values are in parenthesis. 





















F(1, 21) 0.01 
F(2, 20) 0.36 
F(1, 20) D.12 
F(2, 18) 0.56 
X2(2) 1.39 
X2 (5)/5 2.14 
F(5, 17) 1.67 
























F(2, 19) 1.59 
F(1, 19) 0.14 
F(2, 17) 0.73 
X2(2) 0.078 
X2(5)!5 0.68 
F(5, 17) 0.52 
Table 4.6.1 
Money Demand Function with no Dummies 













LM-Test for JSI Order Serial Correlation 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial Correlation 
ARCH-Test for F' Order Heteroskedasticity 
Nonnality - Test 
Forecast Accuracy Test 
Chow-Test for Forecast Period 
Dependent Variables: tLogM liP, tLogM 21 P. 
ECT - Residuals from the Cointegration Regressions. 
t-values are in parenthesis. 














F(2, 23) 0.08 
F(1, 23) 0.49 
X2(2) 0.35 
X2(5)/5 0.55 
F(5, 20) 0.48 















F(1, 24) 0.66 
F(2, 23) 0.41 
F(1, 23) 0.26 
X2(2) 0.006 
X2(5)/5 0.39 
F(5, 20) 0.33 
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One of the reasons for investigating the stability of the Nigerian money demand 
relationship is to make a statement about the abilities of the Nigerian Monetary 
Authorities to control the quantity of money stock for monetary policy purposes. In view 
of the conclusion from the last chapter (the monetary base and the money stock in 
Nigeria are likely to be endogenously determined by the demand for money), the money 
stock can only be controlled through the money demand. Although all the different 
specifications showed that the Nigerian money demand function is stable, the interest rate 
variable, which is the only likely control variable in the money demand function, is not 
significant. In this study, the treasury bills rate is utilised. Two other interest rate 
variables (the discount rate and the deposits rate) rendered not only statistically 
insignificant coefficients, but signs which are inconsistent with the theory as well. Given 
that the interest rate variable is insignificant, it is not possible for the Nigerian Monetary 
Authorities to significantly change the quantity of money demanded and thus the quantity 
supplied, through the interest rate variable. This may seem to indicate that the monetary 
authorities cannot effectively change the money stock for monetary policy purposes and 
therefore cast some doubts upon its ability to conduct effective and independent 
monetary policy. 
However, in spite of the fact that the Central Bank of Nigeria has changed the 
interest rates for policy purposes, the year to year variation may in fact be very small. 
The insignificance of the interest rate variable in the money demand functions may 
therefore, be as a result of lack of variability. In the light of this possibility, as discussed 
earlier, alternative proxies for the opportunity cost of holding money can be used. One 
such alternative suggested is the expected inflation rate. There are two problems to 
using the expected inflation variable in this study. Firstly, as a result of the problems 
associated with defining expectations, it is difficult to construct this variable. Secondly, 
even if a suitable variable can be found to represent the expected inflation, it is not 
possible for a country's central bank to use it as a policy instrument for the purpose of 
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controlling money demand and thus the money supply, in an endogenous money 
economy. Its use in this study will serve no purpose. Another proxy suggested is the 
degree of credit restraint. Wong (1977) for example argues that the interest rate is 
relevant in the money demand function of developing countries. However, the relevant 
interest rates are not the ones charged by banks and other financial institutions which are 
pegged by the government, but rather the unobservable ones in the unorganised sector. 
A vailability of credit in the organised market affects the unobservable interest rate in the 
unorganised market. For example, if the amount of credit available through the 
commercial banks is reduced, those in need of credit will turn to the unorganised market 
and thus raise the demand for credit and the interest rate. In the face of the fact that most 
developing countries use credit control as a tool of monetary policy, a variable which 
reflects the degree of credit restraint can be a good proxy for the unobserved interest rate 
of the unorganised money markets. Proxies for the credit restraint variable suggested for 
example, includes the discount rate, the rate of domestic credit expansion, etc., (see 
Wong, 1977 p. 65). 
Although the idea of using credit restraint as a proxy for the interest variable in the 
money demand function of developing countries may be reasonable, its importance in 
this study is very limited because of the following: Firstly, the strong dichotomy of the 
financial sector of a country into organised and un-organised sectors may be true of some 
developing countries, but not all. Unlike most Asian countries, the unorganised market 
for loans - Landlords, etc, are not a prevalent feature of Nigerian society. There are of 
course other sources of credit besides the organised market, e.g relatives and friends. 
However, the driving force in these alternative sources is not the interest rate. Secondly, 
although Nigeria has been using credit controls and credit guide lines for monetary policy 
purposes, with varying degrees of success, its effectiveness as a tool of monetary policy 
arises directly through the money supply via the credit supply and not through the money 
demand function. The effectiveness of credit controls on the money stock has been 
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acknowledged even by the most ardent Post-Keynesians, (see for example, Moore 1988, 
p 163). The use of a credit restraint variable to represent the opportunity cost of holding 
money is not appropriate for the purpose at hand. 
4.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In a system where the money stock is endogenously demand determined, any 
change in the quantity supplied can only be achieved through a change in the demand for 
it. A necessary condition for the successful conduct of monetary policy in this system is 
therefore the stability of the money demand function. 
A stability test based on forecast accuracy and parameter constancy of estimated 
models revealed that money demand function specified in the traditional partial 
adjustment way, plus two other ways (specified with variables in levels and changes and 
in the form of error-correction and cointegration), are all stable. However, the interest 
rate variable is not significant in all cases. This implies that the Nigerian Monetary 
Authorities cannot significantly change the money demand by using the interest rate as an 
instrument. Therefore, they may not have any significant control over the money stock. 
However, it is important to note that the Nigerian Monetary Authorities, in addition to 
the interest rate, have been using direct credit controls, which by-passes the money 
demand function and directly work on the money stock. As discussed in chapter 1, this 
has had only a limited degree of success. 
ChapterS 
Monetary App"roach to Balance of Payments Theory and Offset 
to the Domestic Component of the Monetary Base 
5.1 Introduction 
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In Chapter 3 it was briefly stated that in a small open economy characterised by a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank may not be able to change the monetary base 
in the long-run because it is endogenous. Change in the domestic component of the 
monetary base, carried out with the aim of altering the monetary base for monetary 
policy purposes, is likely to be offset by an equal but opposite change in the foreign 
component. Within the framework of the money multiplier theory of money stock 
determination, this may mean that a country's monetary authorities are likely to have a 
very limited scope for an independent monetary policy. 
Investigating the degree to which a country's foreign component of the monetary 
base offsets changes in the domestic component requires estimating a term commonly 
known as "the offset coefficient", (see for example Kamas (1985), (1986». An equation 
expressing change in the net foreign assets of the central bank (/).NFA) as a function of 
the change in the net domestic assets (/).NDA) and other exogenous variables is normally 
specified and estimated. The coefficient of change in the net domestic assets variable is 
the offset coefficient. 1 
1 Offset to the domestic component of the monetary base by the foreign component, is common-
ly referred to as the balance of payments offset to domestic monetary policy. The justification lies 
in the fact that (1) in a fixed exchange rate regime, changes in the net foreign assets of a central 
bank reflects changes in the balance of payments position of a country. This definition of the bal-
ance of payments corresponds to the official reserve settlements (DRS) definition; (2) changes in 
the domestic component of the monetary base always reflects the desire by the central bank to 
change the monetary base for monetary policy purposes. 
1 Therefore, here and elsewhere in this and the next chapter, the terms "net foreign assets of 
the central bank", "the foreign currency reserves of the central bank" and "the balance of pay-
ments" are used interchangeably. While changes in the net domestic assets of the central bank 
(made up of its credit to the government, to the banks and to other non-bank public and private in-
stitutions) is taken to be synonymous with monetary policy, change in the money stock, or change 
in the money supply. 
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The offset coefficient is often fonnulated and estimated in the context of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory. The central point of this theory is 
that, the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon. Balance of 
payments disequilibria are basically identified with adjustment in the money market. A 
balance of payments deficit, for example, reflects excess supply of money as a stock. 
The most often utilised equations for the purpose of estimating offset coefficients 
are called the reserve flow and the capital flow equations, (see Laskar (1983), Kouri and 
Porter (1974), Watson (1988) to name but a few). The reserve flow equation expresses 
the rate of change in net foreign assets of the central bank (the foreign component of the 
monetary base) as a function of the rate of change in the net domestic asset (the domestic 
component of the monetary base), rate of change in the money multiplier and rate of 
change in the variables determining money demand. The capital flow equation, on the 
other hand, expresses the net private capital flow as a function of a change in domestic 
component of the monetary base, level of current account balances, and other exogenous 
variables. 
Generally, in these analyses, the domestic component of the monetary base (the net 
domestic assets of the central bank), is taken as an exogenous control variable, used by 
the monetary authorities as an instrument for controlling the money supply. The foreign 
component of the monetary base is assumed to be beyond the direct control of the 
domestic monetary authorities. The offset coefficient is represented by the estimated 
coefficient of the domestic component of the monetary base in the reserve flow and the 
capital flow equations. 
The value of the offset coefficient is expected to be between zero and minus one. A 
minus one value is taken to indicate that the offset to the domestic component of the 
monetary base is complete. Any change in the domestic component of the monetary base 
will be matched by an equal but opposite change in the foreign component, such that the 
monetary base remains at its initial level. If on the other hand, the offset coefficient turns 
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out to be zero, it means the domestic component of the monetary base is not affected by 
the foreign component and therefore, the central bank should be able to change the 
monetary base as desired. An offset coefficient value of between zero and minus one is 
an indication of some offset but not complete. 
The monetary approach to the balance of payments theory asserts that in a small 
open economy characterised by a fixed exchange rate regime, the offset coefficient is 
exactly minus one. This implies that in this type of economy the central bank cannot 
change the monetary base, and therefore, the money stock for monetary policy purposes. 
The monetary approach theory and its method of estimating the offset coefficient 
have been criticised on many grounds. For example, the approach has been criticised for 
ignoring the effect of the government budget deficit on the change in the domestic 
component of the monetary base. Furthermore, it has been argued that using the 
equations derived in the context of the monetary approach theory for estimating the offset 
coefficient, gives a result that is biased towards minus one. In fact, it has been shown 
that the estimated coefficient of the variable representing change in the domestic 
component of the monetary base in the reserve flow equation is nothing but an estimate 
of minus one, (see for example Frenkel et al 1980). The assumption that sterilisation 
does not occur, and that domestic income, prices, and interest rates cannot be changed 
even in the long-run is also considered to be too restrictive. 
Some of the above short-comings of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments theory are as a result of its concentration on the money market alone. These 
weaknesses can be partially corrected by the use of a more general model, encompassing 
not only the assets market, but the goods market as well as the external sector of the 
economy. 
The aIm of this chapter is twofold. Firstly it will try to discuss the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments theory, and how the offset to the domestic 
component of the monetary base is measured in that context. Secondly, it will explore 
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alternative ways of specifying and measuring the offset coefficient, that takes in to 
account some of the weaknesses of the reserve flow equation, with a view to using it in 
the next chapter to estimate the offset coefficient for Nigeria. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: In section (S.2) the 
proposition that the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon is 
examined in relation to a fixed exchange rate regime. In sections (S.3) and (S.4), the 
standard reserve and capital flow equations are derived and discussed. Section (S.S) 
looks at the sterilisation issue, discussing in detail how it can be measured. Section (S.6) 
examines the relevance of the monetary approach theory to the developing countries in 
general and the countries of ECOW AS in particular. Section (2.7) takes up the critique 
of the monetary approach. In section (2.8) broader models than those used by the 
proponents of the monetary approach are examined, showing how their use can handle 
some of the short-comings of the monetary approach, and how the monetary approach 
and the Keynesian approach to the balance of payments can be reconciled. Lastly in 
section (2.9) the summary and conclusion to the chapter is presented. 
5.2 Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments Theory 
The starting point of the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory is the 
assertion that the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon. The 
balance of payments can be broadly defined as the difference between aggregate receipts 
and aggregate payments by residents, (Johnson 1976, p. S). A balance of payments 
deficit would arise when there is an excess of payments over receipts by residents. Under 
a fixed exchange rate regime, this deficit would mean that domestic money stock is 
falling, as it is being transferred to the foreign exchange authorities. For a given desired 
level of money stock, this will create a disequilibrium in the money market (excess 
demand for money). To bring the money market back into equilibrium, the interest rate 
would have to rise. A rise in the domestic interest rate triggers two sets of events which 
work to eliminate the balance of payments deficit. Firstly, a higher interest rate will 
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cause a decline in investment, aggregate income, and thus aggregate expenditure on 
domestic as well as foreign goods and services. Secondly, it will encourage capital 
inflows. In both cases, the rise in the interest rate works to reduce excess of payments 
over receipts by residents (the balance of payments deficit). In the former case, payments 
by domestic residents for foreign goods and services are reduced, thus affecting the 
current account, while in the latter case, the residents' receipts from sales of assets 
increases, improving the capital account balance. This adjustment process will continue 
until the money market disequilibrium is corrected, at which point the balance of 
payments deficit would also have been corrected. 
The above analysis implies that a stock balance of payments deficit triggered by an 
exogenous factor, leads to a disequilibrium in the money market. It also implies that the 
process of re-establishing money market equilibrium automatically leads to a correction 
in the balance of payments deficit. In other words, a stock balance of payments deficit 
has monetary consequences, and in the long-run it will correct itself. 
The monetary nature of the balance of payments can also be shown from another 
angle. Starting from a full equilibrium condition, if the monetary authorities for 
example, increase the domestic component of the monetary base (the net domestic assets 
of the central bank) by open market purchases of government bonds, "ceteris paribus", 
the immediate (short term) effect is to create excess supply of money as a stock (a 
disequilibrium in the money market). To bring the money market back into equilibrium, 
the domestic interest rate would have to fall. At first this will lead to an increase in 
investment, and then income, and therefore expenditure on foreign, as well as domestic 
goods and services, thus creating a current account deficit. Secondly, it will encourage 
capital outflows and thereby leading to a capital account deficit as well. The excess 
supply of the money stock has ended up creating a balance of payments deficit as the 
excess money is transferred abroad. 
In a fixed exchange rate regime, the above type of deficit is financed through change 
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in the foreign reserves holding of the central bank (foreign component of the monetary 
base). Domestic residents wanting to invest abroad or to purchase foreign goods and 
services, for reasons given above, can only do so in foreign currencies. The necessary 
foreign currencies are obtained from the domestic monetary authorities, in exchange for 
the residents' excess domestic currency. This activity will lead to the following: As 
residents transfer their excess domestic currency to the monetary authorities, the 
difference between their desired and actual money stock will start to disappear. 
Secondly, the amount of foreign exchange reserves in possession of the monetary 
authorities will start to decline, which in effect leads to a decline in the monetary base 
and the money stock. These movements will go on until all excess supply of money is 
dissipated and the money market equilibrium is re-established. At this point the balance 
of payments deficit would have been automatically corrected as well. 
The adjustment process described above occurs in the short-run. In the long-run 
(when the adjustment is completed), the money supply would have returned to its initial 
level, and so have all real variables and prices. The only change would be the increase in 
the domestic component of the monetary base being matched, one for one, by an equal 
decline in the foreign component (foreign reserves in the possession of the monetary 
authorities). This conclusion is only true for a once and for all increase in the domestic 
component of the monetary base. In other words, a systematic neutralisation operation 
by the monetary authorities (sterilisation) is ruled out. The conclusion, however, stands 
irrespective of the assumption about capital mobility and its responsiveness to interest 
rate changes, (Swoboda 1976, Mundel 1962). 
A stock balance of payments deficit, initially triggered by either an exogenous non-
monetary factor or by an increase in the money supply over demand, is temporary 
because of the automatic adjustment process described above. This adjustment process 
may be prevented from setting in if the monetary authorities continue to expand the 
domestic component of the monetary base. In this case, the temporary balance of 
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payments deficit will be turned into a chronic balance of payments deficit. In essence, 
this would mean that a chronic stock balance of payments deficit is the result of the 
monetary authorities' excessive credit creation activities, and that a stock balance of 
payments deficit in the long-run is basically a monetary phenomenon. 
A definition of the balance of payments most often used in the monetary approach 
analysis is the definition in terms of official settlement, or the central bank balance sheet. 
The central bank balance sheet is made up of its foreign asset holdings (whose changes 
reflect the balance of payments position) and domestic asset holdings (central bank 
credit) on the assets side, and the monetary base on the liability side. The monetary base 
(high powered money) is created when the central bank acquires assets in the form of 
foreign assets (foreign currency, etc), or domestic assets (loans to domestic public and 
private institutions - central bank credit). The central bank pays for these assets by 
issuing cheques on itself which get deposited in commercial banks and end up as money, 
(Rivera-Batiz & Rivera-Batiz 1985). For a given amount of the central bank credit, any 
change in the monetary base is directly reflected in changes in the foreign reserves. This 
further asserts the monetary nature of the balance of payments. 
Generally a balance of payments problem is seen, by the proponents of the monetary 
approach, as a phenomenon representing a disequilibrium in the money market with the 
disequilibrium corrected by change in international reserves. An increase in the money 
supply, such that actual cash balances exceed desired cash balances, will lead to a 
balance of payments deficit as residents exchange excess money for foreign goods and 
assets. 
The proposition that the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon 
does not mean that the balance of payments is not affected by real forces but rather that 
these real forces operate indirectly through the money supply or the money demand, 
(Akhtar 1978). Assuming equilibrium in the money market and utilising the central bank 
balance sheet, the balance of payments can be expressed algebraically as NFA = M -
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NDA, (NFA stands for the central banks' net foreign assets, M for money demand and 
NDA for the central banks' net domestic assets) and taking the derivative with respect to 
time gives the following: dNFA/dt = dM/dt - dNDA/dt. This indicates that the overall 
balance of payments is identically equal to the difference between the rate of change of 
money demand and the rate of change of central bank credit. Both monetary and real 
influences on the balance of payments are reflected in the above equation. The money 
demand is, in addition to domestic prices and interest rates, determined by real income 
while the central bank credit component of the money supply is determined by fiscal and 
budgetary factors. However, these real influences must operate through monetary 
factors. The monetary factors, therefore, have the primary role to play in determining the 
balance of payments, since they transmit disturbances from the monetary side as well as 
the real side. 
Analysing the balance of payments as a monetary phenomenon has some interesting 
implications. The proponents assume the following: 1) the demand for money is a stable 
function of prices, real income, and interest rates, 2) that countries do not pursue 
sterilisation policy, either because they cannot sterilise over a long period or because they 
do not wish to do so, 3) in the long-run, output is at its full employment level, 4) 
domestic prices and interest rates cannot deviate from the world level for a long time, due 
to arbitrage, 5) the demand for and the supply of money are independent of one another, 
and the money multiplier is independent of the money market conditions, and conclude 
that: 
(i) Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a country has no control over its money supply 
in the long-run, and cannot conduct any effective monetary policy. The pursuit of 
any domestic objective, such as price stability, by altering the domestic component 
of the monetary base (NDA) will be frustrated by an offsetting change in the 
international component (NF A) leaving the level of the monetary base and thus the 
money supply unchanged, (Kreinin and Officer 1978, p. 10). This implies that the 
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monetary base in the long-run IS endogenous and cannot be controlled by the 
monetary authorities. 
(ii) Assuming the absence of monetary contraction abroad, a chronic stock balance of 
payments deficit (a continuous decline in the foreign reserves of the monetary 
authorities) is a symptom of excessive expansion in the money supply over the 
money demand. Such a deficit can be primarily corrected by reducing the rate of 
expansion of the money supply, (see Humprey and Keleher 1982, p.25). 
5.3 The Reserve Flow Equation 
In testing the propositions discussed above, which amounts to testing the validity of 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, the proponents often derive 
and estimate an equation known as "the reserve flow equation". The reserve flow 
equation expresses the rate of change of the foreign component of the monetary base (the 
central bank's net foreign assets) as a function of the rate of change of the domestic 
component of the monetary base (the central bank's net domestic assets), rate of change 
in the money multiplier and the rate of change in the variables determining money 
demand. The derivation of the reserve flow equation is presented below; (see for 
example Watson 1988, Wilford and Wilford 1978, Wilford and Zecher 1979, for more 
detail). 
Md=L(P, Y, i) 
Ms == U' (NFA +NDA) == U·H 
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Equation (5.1) is the demand for nominal money balances, which is a positive function of 
prices (P), real domestic income (Y) and a negative function of the opportunity cost of 
holding money (i). Equation (5.2) is the money supply identity. The money stock is 
defined, in the spirit of the money multiplier approach to money stock determination, to 
be identically equal to the money multiplier (U) times the monetary base (H). Where the 
monetary base is further divided into domestic component (approximately equal to the 
sum of the central bank's net claims on the government, banks and the other non-bank 
public and private institutions (NDA)) and the foreign component (the net foreign assets 
of the central bank (NFA). Equation (5.3) expresses the money market equilibrium. 
Equation (5.4) is derived by combining (5.1) (5.2) and (5.3) above and expressing the 
variables in rates of change. Equation (5.5) is arrived at after isolating the growth rate of 
the money demand into its various components and solving the resultant for ~FA 
H 
Equation (5.5) is the monetarists balance of payments equation popularly known as the 
reserve flow equation. The final estimated reserve flow equation is (5.6) which is 
identical to (5.5), where the rate of change of the variables determining the money 
demand are expressed as the first difference of their logarithm. The coefficient (a 5) is 
the offset coefficient. 
Under the assumptions about domestic prices, income, and interest rate made in the 
previous section, all the variables determining the money demand and the money demand 
itself are beyond control of the monetary authorities in the long-run. Therefore, the only 
variable in equation (5.6) that can be changed by the monetary authorities is the domestic 
component of the monetary base (NDA). If the proposition that in the long-run the 
monetary authorities can only change the composition of the monetary base and not its 
level is true, the estimated coefficients of the central bank's net domestic assets (the 
offset coefficient (a 5)) and the money multiplier variable (a 4) in equation (5.6) would 
both be equal to minus one. A one naira increase in the central bank's net domestic 
assets will, ceteris paribus, lead to a one naira decline in the foreign component of the 
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monetary base. In the tenninology of the literature, domestic monetary policy is said to 
be completely offset by the balance of payments. 
Although the reserve flow equation is derived solely from the money market 
equilibrium expression, the advocates of the reserves flow equation visualise a general 
macroeconomic model with real, financial, and external sectors. In practice they attempt 
to reduce the general equilibrium model to a manageable size by singling out money as 
the centre of the analysis. They argue that since the balance of payments is essentially a 
monetary phenomenon, research efficiency dictates that a simple (Occam's razor) 
analysis of the balance of payments should concentrate on examining the money market 
directly, (Magee, 1976). 
The "zero sterilisation" assumption IS very important to the conclusions of this 
analysis. To assume otherwise, would have some theoretical and empirical implications. 
This point is taken up in detail in section (5.7) below. 
5.4 The Capital Flow Equation 
The reserve flow equation discussed above places the money market at the center of 
the analysis. It also (at least implicitly) assumes that the offset to monetary policy arises 
through both current and capital accounts of the balance of payments. 
Another popular approach to examining the offset to domestic monetary policy is 
the capital flow approach, sometimes called the portfolio approach. Proponents of this 
approach argue that the offset to domestic monetary policy arises mainly through the 
capital account. The offset coefficient in the capital flow approach is interpreted as a 
measure of capital account sensitivity to change in the domestic component of the 
monetary base. Capital flow is viewed as the mechanism through which a domestic 
excess demand for money is removed. Money demand and supply are important in this 
approach, only to the extent that they determine the domestic interest rate, which further 
determines inflows and outflows of capital. 
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Central to the capital flow approach is the assumption that the flow of capital, in the 
form of financial assets, into and out of the country is relatively free of controls (capital is 
relatively mobile). Furthermore, foreign and domestic financial assets (bonds) are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Under these assumptions, an increase in the central 
bank's net domestic assets (NDA) (e.g through open market operations) would have the 
following effects: For a given demand for money, it would create an excess supply of 
money in the economy. To re-establish money market equilibrium, the domestic interest 
rate would have to fall. A decrease in the domestic interest rate vis-a-vis foreign interest 
rates would reduce the attractiveness of domestic assets and would encourage movement 
out of domestic currency denominated assets into foreign currency denominated assets, 
and thus capital would start moving out of the country. Investors wanting to invest 
abroad can only do so in foreign currencies, and therefore, in a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the necessary foreign currency is obtained from the monetary authorities in 
exchange for the domestic currency. If the fixed exchange rate is to be maintained, the 
above capital flow would translate one for one into a decline in the foreign currency 
reserves of the central bank. Under the assumptions given above, plus the implicit 
assumption of "no-sterilisation", the movement of capital out of the country, and thus the 
decline in the central bank's net foreign assets (NFA) will continue until the money 
market is brought back into equilibrium and a parity between domestic and foreign 
interest rates is re-established. At the end of the day (in the long-run), the increase in 
money supply, achieved through the increase in the domestic component of the monetary 
base, would have been completely offset by a decline in the foreign component of the 
monetary base (the central bank's net foreign assets) due to capital outflows. Money 
supply defined as the monetary base multiplied by the money multiplier remains at the 
initial level. For a given money multiplier, the domestic component of the monetary base 
has gone up, but the foreign component has gone down by exactly the same amount. 
If the assumptions given above strictly hold, proponents of the approach conclude 
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that the offset to monetary policy would be complete and immediate. This implies that 
the monetary authorities would have no control over the monetary base and, therefore, 
over the domestic money stock. If, on the other hand, there is an imperfect 
substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, and an imperfect mobility of capital 
between countries, offset to domestic monetary policy would neither be immediate nor 
complete; and therefore, the monetary authorities may have some short run control. In 
addition, if the domestic credit creation activity affects private wealth, and the demand 
for money is a function of wealth, the capital account offset would not be complete even 
under perfect capital mobility and unlimited assets substitutability, (Cumby and Obstfeld, 
1983 p.24). 
The capital flow equation, representing the relationship between the capital account 
balance and the change in the domestic component of the monetary base, and other 
variables, is normally derived from the financial assets market equilibrium conditions in 
the form of a portfolio equilibrium analysis. This method of deriving the capital flow 
equation, known as the reduced form approach, is mainly due to Kouri and Porter (1974). 
Applications include Obstfeld (1982), Laskar (1983), Kamas (1986) and Fry (1988) to 
mention a few. The main concern is with the mechanism through which equilibrium is 
obtained in the financial market of a small open economy. 
Generally the relevance to most developing countries of the capital flows approach 
(especially to the developing countries of ECOWAS) is very limited. We have noticed 
above that one of the basic axioms of the capital flow analysis is the existence of a 
relatively free inflow and outflow of capital. With the exception of Liberia, all member 
countries of ECOW AS control or restrict the outflow of foreign exchange in connection 
with acquisition of foreign assets by nationals. Capital outflows require explicit approval 
by the monetary authorities and in some cases are completely prohibited. Approval by 
the authorities is usually given only when special circumstances warrant it; otherwise it is 
denied. However, in the W AMU countries, capital flow to France and the operation 
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account countries2 are freely pennitted. 
With respect to capital inflow, a distinction is made between domestic residents 
borrowing from abroad and those resulting from foreign investors acquiring domestic 
real or financial assets. Borrowing from abroad by domestic residents requires approval 
in all member countries of the community, except in The Gambia and Liberia. In the 
WAMU countries of the community, special controls (in addition to any applicable 
exchange control requirements) are maintained over borrowing from abroad, inward 
foreign direct investment and all outward investment in foreign countries, as well as over 
the issuing, advertising, or offering for sale of foreign securities. Except for controls over 
foreign securities, these measures do not apply to member countries of ECOW AS and the 
operation account countries, (Mclenaghan et aI, 1982). 
5.5 Sterilisation 
We have seen above that, according to the monetary approach theory, under certain 
assumptions, 1) a one shot expansion in the money supply, achieved through expansion 
in the domestic component of the monetary base would be completely offset by the 
balance of payments (change in the foreign component of the monetary base). In the 
long-run, an increase in the domestic component would be matched by a decline of equal 
magnitude in the foreign component. The monetary base and, for a given money 
multiplier, the money stock are endogenous and cannot be changed by the central bank at 
will. 2) An excess supply of money as a stock leads to a balance of payments deficit, 
which will eventually correct itself. One of the most important assumptions that lead to 
the above conclusions is that the monetary authorities do not carry out sterilisation of the 
deficit from affecting the domestic money supply. 
2 These are former French colonies that have special convertibility arrangement with France 
to guarantee 100 percent convertibility of their local currency. The countries. in turn. maintain an 
operation account with the French treasury where all of their foreign reserve must be kept. 
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Sterilisation is said to occur when the monetary authorities of a country try to 
neutralise the effect of the balance of payments on the domestic money supply (foreign 
component of the monetary base on the domestic component). For example, if a country 
that operates a fixed exchange rate regime is running a balance of payments deficit, its 
domestic money stock will be falling as it is continuously being transferred to the foreign 
exchange authorities. A central bank can counter the falling money stock by expanding 
the domestic component of the monetary base. Although the most standard sterilisation 
procedure open to the central banks is the open market operations - sales or purchases of 
domestic assets (government bonds and securities) for the domestic base money - other 
procedures like the reserves requirements, special deposits, etc. can also be used. 
Violation of the non-sterilisation assumptions would imply the following: 1) the 
offset to the domestic component of the monetary base will no longer be complete and as 
such the central bank can have some control over the monetary base and thus the money 
supply. 2) As discussed above, an essential feature of the monetary approach is that 
balance of payments deficits and surpluses are consequences of stock adjustments in the 
money market, and in the long-run, stock equilibrium in the money market ensures a 
balance of payments equilibrium. If the monetary authorities were to sterilise (neutralise) 
the inflows and outflows of money associated with balance of payments deficits and 
surpluses, the link between the money supply and the balance of payments will be 
severed. At the same time, the automatic self correcting mechanism of a payments 
deficit discussed earlier will be prevented from setting in. 3) An OLS estimation of the 
reserves flow and the capital flow equations will give biased estimates of the offset 
coefficient. This point is taken up in detail in a later section of this chapter. 
The proponents of the monetary approach assert that monetary authorities cannot 
sterilise monetary inflows and outflows associated with the balance of payments 
surpluses and deficits for the following reasons: Firstly, the ability of the monetary 
authorities to carry out sterilisation for a long period of time is limited. Continuous 
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sterilisation of a deficit, for example, by buying up bonds in the open market will 
exacerbate the deficit. Purchases of bonds by the monetary authorities in the open market 
would lead to an increase in the demand for bonds. For a given supply of bonds, this 
would lead to an increase in the price of bonds, and therefore, a decrease in the interest 
rate. A decline in the domestic interest rate will encourage an outflow of capital, etc., 
adding to the balance of payments deficit and requiring a further sterilisation. A 
continuous sterilisation of surplus by selling domestic bonds would be brought to a halt 
by the exhaustion of the monetary authorities' stock of domestic bonds. Although the 
monetary authorities can get around this problem by continuously printing new bonds, 
there still exists the question of how to convince people to hold more of them. This can 
only be achieved if the the price of bonds were to come down continuously. A decrease 
in the price of bonds is tantamount to an increase in the domestic interest rate. A high 
domestic interest rate attracts more capital, further increasing the balance of payments 
surplus. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a balance of payments deficit also implies that 
the foreign exchange reserves of the monetary authorities are falling. This is the case 
because, foreign currency would have to be sold to prevent the incipient depreciation of 
the exchange rate, inherent in the increase in demand for foreign exchange. Since the 
foreign exchange reserves of a country is a component of the monetary base, its decline, 
ceteris paribus, is equivalent to a decline in the domestic monetary base and thus the 
money stock. Sterilisation, in this case, will take the form of an increase in the domestic 
component of the monetary base to maintain the monetary base, and thus the money 
stock at its initial level. Perpetuating the balance of payments deficit by sterilising its 
effect on the domestic money supply, and at the same time, maintaining the exchange 
rate fixed in the long-run is impossible. The stock of foreign reserves would be exhausted 
and either maintaining the fixed exchange would have to be abandoned, or the self-
correcting mechanism inherent in a stock balance of payments deficit would be allowed 
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to set in (abandoning the sterilisation exercise). 
Argy and Kouri (1974), who looked at the sterilisation issue in terms of the 
procedures and instruments for sterilisation open to the monetary authorities, have argued 
that monetary authorities may not be technically equipped with adequate monetary 
instruments to offset very large movements in the balance of payments. For example, the 
use of open market operations, one of the most efficient instruments available for 
carrying out the sterilisation exercise, can be restricted by the size and nature of the 
capital markets. To carry out sterilisation effectively, using open market operations, it is 
necessary for government bonds and securities to be bought and sold with ease, and as 
often as the need for sterilisation arises. This requires not only the existence of a capital 
market/stock exchange, which most developing countries do not have, but also a broad 
and effective one. The breadth and efficiency required for a successful sterilisation 
operation is hard to achieve even in the developed countries. 
With regards to using the reserve requirement as an instrument for sterilisation, 
central banks may hesitate using it continuously because of its disruptive effect on 
commercial bank operations and profitability. If a country has a continuous balance of 
payments surplus, its money supply would also go up continuously. To sterilise the 
effect of the balance of payments surplus through changes in the reserve requirement 
would mean a continuous increase in the reserve requirement. As the reserve 
requirement goes up continuously, the amount legally available to banks for lending out 
as loans falls, and as a result their profits would fall continuously. 
On the other side of the debate, some have argued that sterilisation, even if is not 
100 percent, does happen. Thirlwall (1980), for example, argues that monetary 
authorities in the developed countries can and do carry out open market operations with 
the sole purpose of neutralising the effect of changes in international reserves on the 
domestic money supply. 
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The common practice among proponents and opponents of the monetary approach 
alike, is not to draw conclusions about sterilisation on theoretical grounds alone, but to 
carry out empirical tests to determine the existence and the degree of sterilisation carried 
out by a country, (see Cumby and Obstfeld, 1983, Argy and Kouri, 1974, Obstfeld 1982, 
Darby, Kamas 1986, among others). Many different testing procedures for detennining 
the extent of sterilisation have been utilised in the literature. For example, Granger type 
causality tests can be employed to see if a causal relationship between the variables 
representing change in the domestic component and the foreign component of the 
monetary base is unidirectional (from the domestic component to the foreign component 
only or vice versa) or bidirectional. Causation flowing from the foreign to the domestic 
component indicates the existence of sterilisation. See chapter 3 for a discussion on the 
Granger-causality test. 
A popular procedure for investigating the existence of sterilisation, which gives the 
total percentage of the effect of balance of payments on domestic money supply 
sterilised, requires estimating a function commonly known as the "Monetary 
Policy/Money Supply Reaction Function". The money supply reaction function provides 
a formal statement of the behaviour of the monetary authorities with regard to money 
supply. It is usually specified as an equation expressing the money supply or change in 
the domestic component of the monetary base (MDA) as a function of change in the 
foreign component of the monetary base (MFA), and other exogenous variables that 
determine a country's money supply. The estimated coefficient of the change in the 
foreign component of the monetary base (flNFA) gives the sterilisation coefficient. 
The derivation of the most commonly estimated monetary policy reaction function 
is presented below; (see Porzecanski 1979, Darby 1983, for more details). 
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Equation (5.7) is the monetary policy reaction function, stating that change in the money 
I · f . f I1NFA supp Y IS a unctIOn 0 contemporaneous balance of payments, ( H ) and a vector of 
other variables that determine a country's money supply (X). The vector (X) for 
example, can contain the growth rates of income and inflation, or even the previous 
period's balance of payments balance. The variable (ex) is called the sterilisation 
coefficient. The value of ex is expected to lie between zero and one. An ex value of one 
means that no sterilisation is taking place at all. Changes in the foreign component of the 
monetary base are fully reflected in the money stock. If the value of ex turns out to be 
zero, it means a complete sterilisation exercise is practiced. This means the relationship 
between money supply and the balance of payments is completely severed, and therefore 
changes in the balance of payments will not affect the money supply. 
Money supply, as discussed earlier, is defined as the sum of net foreign assets and 
the net domestic assets of the central bank (H) multiplied by the money multiplier. If the 
assumption of pegged exchange rates is to be maintained, the foreign asset component of 
the money supply is completely beyond the control of the monetary authorities. It 
increases when the country's balance of payments is in surplus and decreases when it is 
in deficit. When the country's balance of payments is in surplus, the demand for 
domestic currency is going up, and to keep the price of domestic currency (exchange 
rate) fixed, the monetary authorities would have to sell domestic currency in exchange for 
foreign currency, thus increasing the foreign currency reserve of the monetary authorities. 
The opposite would be the case if a country's balance of payments is in deficit. The 
monetary authorities can only change the money supply through the domestic component 
of the monetary base. It is, therefore, most appropriate to express the monetary policy 
reaction function in terms of a variable representing change in the domestic component 
of the monetary base. Equation (5.8), assuming a constant money multiplier, expresses 
the change in the logarithm of the money supply as identically equal to the change in the 
logarithm of the monetary base (H). Isolating (H) into its two components (the domestic 
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component (NDA) and the foreign component (NF A», the change in the logarithm of the 
money supply is expressed as approximately equal to the sum of the change in the 
domestic component (flNDA) and the foreign component (flNFA) divided by the 
monetary base (H). Substituting (5.8) into (5.7), collecting like terms, and solving the 
result for the variable representing change in the domestic component of the monetary 
b ( flNDA) . . (9 . ase H gIVes equatIOn 5.). EquatIOn (5.9) is the money supply reaction 
function, expressed in terms of the change in the domestic component of the monetary 
base. 
Normally some form of equation (5.9) is estimated and the coefficient of the scaled 
contemporaneous balance of payments is used as a measure of sterilisation. This 
coefficient is the sterilisation coefficient when the money supply is expressed in terms of 
change in the domestic component of the monetary base. The estimated value of this 
coefficient (a. - 1) is expected to be between minus one and zero. A minus one value (an 
a. value of zero) is taken to indicate that the offset to the domestic component of the 
monetary base is completely sterilised. On the other hand an estimated coefficient of zero 
(an a. value of one) is taken as an indication that no sterilisation exercise is taking place 
at all. 
5.6 Relevance of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments 
One way of judging a theory is to look at the validity of its assumptions. The 
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, in its extreme form, as stated 
earlier, assumes the following: 
(1) The demand for money is a stable positive function of domestic prices, real income, 
and a negative function of the interest rate (the opportunity cost of holding money). 
(2) Wage-price flexibility fixes output at the full employment level, at least in the long-
run, such that output can only be increased through supply variables. 
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(3) Perfect substitution across countries in both products and capital markets ensures 
"one-price" for each commodity and one interest rate. 
(4) Countries do not pursue any sterilisation policies, either because they cannot or they 
do not wish to do so. 
Stability of the demand for money function is more of an empirical issue than a 
theoretical one. In the case of Nigeria, it was shown in the last chapter that it is possible 
to find a stable demand for money function, related to the determinants in the postulated 
way. 
The full employment of resources assumption is not very realistic if, for example, 
one looks at the countries of ECOWAS. Unemployment and underemployment, 
especially that of labour, are common features of these countries. This condition is partly 
due to the seasonal nature of their economic activities (agriculture oriented). Agricultural 
labourers in any given year are fully engaged for not more than six months (rainy season 
and the harvesting periods). Although supply factors like the weather and other natural 
phenomenon are important in determining output of the ECOW AS countries, demand 
factors also play a very important part. For example, cocoa production in Nigeria has 
gone up quite considerably since 1986, due to the increase in foreign demand for 
Nigerian cocoa, partly brought about by the devaluation of the Nigerian currency by 
about 500 percent. 
Perfect substitution across countries, in both products and capital goods, ensuring 
one price and one interest rate, is in reality not tenable in the developing countries of 
ECOWAS. Neither goods nor capital are perfectly, or even reasonably, mobile in these 
countries, such that arbitrage can establish one price and one interest rate. For example, 
as has been discussed in chapter 1, movement of capital in and out of Nigeria is 
characterised by a stringent set of controls. Moreover, the interest rate in Nigeria and the 
other ECOW AS countries are directly controlled by the authorities, rather than being 
determined by market forces. 
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With regard to the "non-sterilisation" assumptions, developing countries might be 
constrained in their efforts to sterilise, by lack of appropriate tools. For example, open 
market operations, one of the most often utilised tools for the purpose of sterilisation, has 
never been used for any purpose in the countries of ECOW AS. Other instruments 
(reserve requirements, etc.) that can be used to expand or contract the money supply for 
the purpose of sterilisation are very restricted in their ability to achieve the ends. As 
discussed in section (5.5) of this chapter, the question of validity of the "non-sterilisation 
assumption is an empirical issue. Procedures for the empirical test of this assumption 
have also been discussed in the same section; the outcome of the test using the Nigerian 
data will be reported in the next chapter. 
Proponents of the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, however, 
have argued that the approach is most suitable for analysing the developing country 
balance of payments, (see Wilford, 1978). Data on monetary variables in developing 
countries are the most reliable and most readily available, while data on trade of goods 
and services are very difficult to come by and are highly unreliable. For example, it is 
virtually impossible to get accurate trade data in most developing countries due to the 
prevalence of underground trading activities, etc. This problem is compounded in the 
case of the African countries, by the fact that the countries are all characterised by 
artificially demarcated land borders, which cannot be effectively policed. Given these 
special features of the developing countries, the monetary approach, which focuses 
directly on the money market and the relevant monetary aggregates, gives a less 
complicated and more reliable empirical framework for policy evaluations and policy 
prescriptions in these countries. 
5.7 Critique of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments 
It was stated earlier in this chapter that the essential element of the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments theory is the assertion that there is a direct link 
between the balance of payments and the total money supply - the balance of payments 
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affects and is in turn affected by the money supply. Specifically, the balance of payments 
deficits and surpluses are seen as a consequence of a stock adjustment in the money 
market. An excess money supply leads to a balance of payments deficit, while an excess 
money demand leads to a surplus. To test this assertion, the proponents of the monetary 
approach estimate the reserve flow equation by OLS estimation techniques. 
The monetary approach to the balance of payments has been criticised on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Currie (1976), for example, argued that the monetary 
approach is able to establish a direct relationship between the money supply and the 
balance of payments because it ignores the government budget constraint. A 
disequilibrium in the money market does not necessarily have to be reflected in a balance 
of payments deficit or surplus, because it could be offset instead by a deficit or surplus on 
the government's budget. When the balance of payments in a fixed exchange rate regime 
is in surplus/deficit, the government can acquire/lose foreign reserves continuously 
without disturbing the private sector equilibrium money holding, provided that it runs a 
budget surplus/deficit equal to the balance of payments surplus/deficit. Simply, it is 
believed that governments can sterilise the effects of payments surpluses and deficits by a 
deliberate policy of running a budget surplus/deficit. However, the non-viability of a 
continuous sterilisation of the balance of payments deficit is acknowledged by Curry 
(1976) in the quotation given below. 
"There is of course, a limit to the depletion of reserves, and a rather more 
elastic limit to official borrowing . However, we do not require monetary 
theory of balance of payments, or indeed any theory, to realise that a 
continuous depletion of reserves is eventually incompatible with the 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate system. The point is that, if governments 
choose to run a balance of payments deficit or surplus for extended periods, 
there need be no offsetting endogenous forces", (Currie, 1976 p. 510, Footnote 
no. 3). 
It has been mentioned earlier that the balance of payments deficit, caused by an 
excess supply of money, is self correcting if the monetary authorities do not carry out 
sterilisation.3 The continuous existence of a stock balance of payments deficit is possible 
3 see section on sterilisation in this chapter for definition and complete discussion of the term. 
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only if an excess supply of money is somehow maintained. Thirlwall (1980) argues that 
the observed excess supply of money is not necessarily the cause of the balance of 
payments deficit, but rather the outcome. Following the absorption approach, he shows 
that it is possible for planned expenditure and income/output to be in balance, but yet the 
balance of payments to be in deficit. This happens when domestic producers cannot sell 
all goods produced in any given year, after satisfying domestic demand. The end result is 
to reduce production (income/output) next period. A fall in income, following the 
transactions motive for holding money, would lead to a decrease in the money demand. 
For a given money supply, a fall in the demand for money would create an excess supply 
of money. 
Regarding the assumptions behind the monetary approach, Thirlwall(1980) believes 
that it is not realistic to assume exogeneity of income, prices and interest rates. In the 
real world, one would expect these variables, especially in the long-run, to vary 
significantly with variations in the quantity of money. This, he further argued, would rule 
out the conclusions of the monetary approach that there is a one to one relationship 
between changes in the domestic component and the foreign components of the monetary 
base. As a result, it would no longer be possible to predict movements in the balance of 
payments from changes in the money supply alone. 
On empirical grounds, it has been argued that estimating the popular monetary 
specification of the balance of payments (the reserve flow equation) using the OLS 
technique gives a result biased towards accepting the monetary approach's conclusions, 
(see Kamas (1986), Frenkel et al (1980), Magee (1976) among many others). 
The reserve flow equation (equation (5.6)), is derived from solving the money 
market equilibrium condition, equation (5.10) below for the rate of change of the foreign 
component of the monetary base variable ( t-..N: A ). 




The right hand side of (5.10) is an ordinary money demand equation, expressed in 
logarithmic first differences, while the left hand side is the money supply identity, also 
expressed in logarithmic first differences. Solving (5.10) for ( MVDA ) requires bringing 
H 
(~log U) and ( MV::A ) to the right hand side, where both terms become negative. If the 
money demand equation (right hand side of equation (5.10)) is correctly specified, and 
fits the data exactly, then it would clearly continue to fit exactly, even though the terms 
(~log U) and ( MV::A ) were brought over to the right hand side, as is the case with the 
reserve flow equation. Under this condition, the estimated coefficients of the money 
demand equation in the reserve flow equation would be the same as the true coefficients, 
while those of (~log U) and ( MV::A ) would be exactly minus one, as hypothesised by 
the monetary approach to balance of payments theory. An estimated offset coefficient 
different from minus one (not supportive of the monetary approach theory) simply means 
that the money demand function is either not correctly specified, unstable or both, 
(Frenkel et al (1980)). 
According to Taylor (1990), the reserve flow equation is in fact nothing more than 
the money stock identity in disguise. The disguise being the money market equilibrium 
assumption which allowed the money demand function to be used to replace the money 
stock variable. He argued that the reserve flow equation will always tend to produce 
results supportive of the monetary approach, irrespective of whether the implicit money 
demand function is correctly specified, stable or not. How close estimates of the reserve 
flow equation to what the monetary approach suggests it should be, would depend on 
how small a term called the "approximation error" is. The approximation error is the 
difference between growth of the actual money stock and the estimated growth of money 
demand. The smaller the approximation error, the more supportive are the coefficient 
estimates of the reserve flow equation to the monetary approach theory. 
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The money stock equation utilised in the derivation of the reserve flow equation is 
restated below, where all variables are as defined earlier. 
M == U'(NFA + NDA) == U'H (5.2) 
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.2) and expressmg it m first difference renders 
equation (5.11) below: 
M..o M == DLo U + twFA + twDA 
g g (NFA +NDA) (NFA +NDA) 
(5.11) 
Simple rearrangement of (5.11) produces (5.12) which is still a perfect identity: 
twFA = I1L M -Mo _ twDA 
(NFA +NDA) - og gU (NFA +NDA) 
(5.12) 
Equation (5.12) is the same reserve flow equation (5.6) where /1LogM is replaced with 
the term (ao +a1DLogY +a2DLogP +a3DLogi). The difference between these two 
terms [E = DLogM - (ao + a 1 DLogY + a2DLogP + a 3I1Logi)] is what Taylor (1990) 
calls the approximation error. The closer is the approximation error to zero, the closer 
will be the reserve flow equation (5.6) to the perfect identity (5.12) and the closer will be 
the estimated coefficients of the money multiplier and the domestic component of the 
monetary base to minus one. If 'E' is equal to zero, these coefficients will both be 
exactly minus one as predicted by the monetary approach theory. 
This argument reinforces the one presented by Frenkel et al (1980). The estimated 
offset coefficient from the reserve flow equation, instead of being an estimate of the 
reduced-form effect of the growth of the domestic component of the monetary base on 
the growth of the foreign reserve, is actually an estimate of minus unity. Estimates of the 
reserve flow equation, which are favourable to the monetary approach theory, are nothing 
more than a test of the size of the approximation error. 
If income, prices, and interest rates are affected by the money supply, and not as 
assumed by the monetary approach theory, estimating the reserve flow equation, using 
OLS techniques, would lead to simultaneity bias. An increase in the money supply, for 
example, brought about by an exogenous increase in foreign reserves, would lead to an 
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Increase In Income, pnces and a decrease in interest rates to re-establish the money 
market equilibrium. On the demand side, an increase in income and prices, and a 
decrease in interest rates would lead to an increase in money demand, which further leads 
to an increase in foreign reserves. The relationship between these variables and the 
foreign reserve are the same in the two cases. Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether 
the estimated parameters of the reserve flow equation are reflecting the effect of money 
supply or that of money demand. Furthermore, in both cases, the relationship is as 
predicted by the monetary approach theory, which implies that the above simultaneity 
bias would work to reinforce the conclusion of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments theory, (Magee 1976). 
Magee (1976) has further argued that existence of a partial sterilisation and an 
omission of a relevant variable from the reserve flow equation have opposite effects on 
the estimated value of the offset coefficient. If a relevant variable (for example, the 
exchange rate) were omitted from the reserve flow equation, OLS estimation of the offset 
coefficient can be significantly less than one. A percentage of any change in the domestic 
component of the monetary base (central bank's net domestic assets) would be absorbed 
by the excluded variable so that the foreign component of the monetary base (the central 
bank's net foreign assets) would not change by as much as the initial change in the 
central bank's net domestic assets, (see also Laskar, 1983). 
On the other hand, if an economy is truly characterised by a complete offset (an 
offset coefficient of minus one), a partial sterilisation would lead to an OLS estimate of 
the offset coefficient of greater than minus one (in absolute value). Suppose, there is an 
exogenous increase in the money demand, according to the monetary approach, it will 
lead to an inflow of reserves to meet this demand. If the government partially offsets the 
effect of this inflow on the money supply by reducing the domestic component of the 
monetary base by some fraction "S", then the domestic money demand will be unsatisfied 
by up to this amount. In the second round, reserves commensurate with the fraction "s" 
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will flow in. If the authorities further reduce the domestic component by a fraction "S" or 
a fraction "S 2" of the original level, and so on, the end result is an OLS estimate of the 
coefficient of the domestic component of the monetary base of "1/0-S)", which is greater 
than one in absolute value. The existence of partial sterilisation, therefore, biases the 
OLS estimate of the offset coefficient upward, while an omission of a relevant variable 
(e.g the exchange rate), biases it downward. The result from OLS estimation of the 
offset coefficient, using the reserve flow equation, is therefore, not a reliable test for the 
degree of the balance of payments offset to a country's monetary policy. 
Lastly, the monetary approach theory has been criticised on the grounds that it 
emphasizes a long-run equilibrium scenario, while totally neglecting the short-run 
adjustment path. The short-run adjustment path and the duration of this adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium is important because of the following: 1) The social cost of 
adjustment depends on the time it takes to reach the long-run equilibrium. 2) Policy 
makers work with a fairly short-run "political" horizon and therefore, an understanding of 
the adjustment path from the short-run to the long-run equilibrium situation is very 
important. 
5.8 Synthesis of the Keynesian and the Monetary Approaches to the Balance of 
Payments 
Most of the short-comings of the reserve flow equation discussed above can be 
overcome by the use of a general model encompassing real, financial, and external 
sectors of the economy. For example, the criticism of the reserve flow equation as being 
an estimate of minus one, rather than that of balance of payments offset to domestic 
monetary policy, arose because the equation was derived from the money market 
condition alone, neglecting all other sectors of the economy. By using a more general 
model, it is also possible to investigate the offset not only in the long-run, but also in the 
short-run, where domestic prices, income, and interests are allowed to change. 
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Furthennore, it is now widely accepted that the opposing Keynesian and Monetary 
approaches to the balance of payments theory can also be reconciled in a more general 
model (Magee, 1976). Frenkel et al (1980) carried out the exercise of reconciling the 
two approaches theoretically. Before going into the details it is necessary to give a brief 
summary of the Keynesian and the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory. 
The Monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, discussed in detail in 
earlier sections, can be summarised by the following equations: 
Md = L (P, Y, i) 
M S == U'(NDA +NFA) 





Equation (5.1) and (5.2) are the demand and supply of money equations described earlier. 
Equation (5.13) is the monetary approach to the balance of payments equation derived by 
expressing (5.1) and (5.2) in first differences, setting them equal to each other, and 
solving for the !1NF A variable. 
The Keynesian balance of payments theory can also be summarised by the 
following equations, (Frenkel et al 1980, p 584). 
c = c( Y, e/P) 
K = K (i) 
!1NFA ==p·C +K 





Equation (5.14) is the trade balance, or the current account balance defined to be a 
negative function of domestic real income (Y) and a positive function of the relative price 
of foreign to home goods (e/P). An increase in domestic income is in the familiar way 
expected to increase domestic imports, and thus worsen the current account. An increase 
in the relative price of foreign to home goods discourages imports and improves the 
current account balance. Equation (5.15) is the capital account balance, expected to be a 
positive function of the domestic interest rate (i). Equation (5.16) is the balance of 
payments identity, where the balance of payments is defined to be identically equal to the 
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sum of current and capital account balances. Equation (5.17) is the Keynesian balance of 
payments equation, derived from substituting (5.14) and (5.15) into (5.16). 
These two approaches to the balance of payments theory diametrically differ in their 
assumptions, conclusions, and policy prescriptions. The monetary approach, 
emphasising a long-run perspective, argues that the balance of payments is a monetary 
phenomenon, and therefore, any balance of payments problem reflects a problem in the 
money market. It also assumes that countries cannot sterilise surpluses or deficits of the 
balance of payments and concludes that in the long-run a small open economy, under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, would have no control over its domestic money supply. 
Increases in the money supply, achieved through expansion in the domestic component 
of the monetary base, will leak out of the country. The simple Keynesian approach, on 
the other hand, emphasises a short-run perspective and implicitly assumes complete 
sterilisation. Its main conclusion is that the balance of payments is affected by real non-
monetary variables and balance of payments problems (deficits and surpluses) can be 
corrected through non-monetary means. 
The two approaches also give different predictions of the effect of changes in 
certain variables on the balance of payments. The monetary approach predicts that an 
increase in income and prices would lead to an improvement in the balance of payments. 
The effect of these variables on the balance of payments arises indirectly through money 
demand. An increase in income and prices would increase the demand for money. This 
would reduce expenditures not only on domestic goods, but on foreign goods as well, and 
thus affect the balance of payments. Contrary to the monetary approach predictions, the 
simple Keynesian approach concludes that an increase in income would increase 
expenditures on both domestic and foreign goods, and as a result leads to a deterioration 
of the balance of payments. Likewise an increase in the domestic prices because it 
reduces competitiveness and reduces exports demand, leads to a deterioration of the 
balance of payments. 
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The two approaches however, have the following in common: both are partial 
approaches, in the sense that the Monetary approach uses only the money market 
condition to derive the balance of payments equation, while the Keynesian approach 
concentrates on the current and capital accounts. Both approaches also treat real 
domestic income (Y), domestic prices (P) and interest rate (i) as independent exogenous 
variables. The Keynesian approach assumes implicitly that these variables are 
determined elsewhere in a more complete model. The Monetary approach, on the other 
hand, assumes that in the long-run real domestic income (Y) is supply determined, while 
(P) and (i) may be taken to be fixed abroad for a small open economy on fixed exchange 
rates. 
Frenkel et al (1980) have argued that neither approach is entirely wrong 
theoretically. However, both have the weakness of being partial approaches. This 
weakness can be corrected by using a more general model where both the Keynesian and 
monetary approaches can be accommodated. The general model they use to show the 
above contention is made up of the following equations: 
Md = L (P, Y, i) 
M S == U'(NDA +NFA) 
!1NFA = _l_·L (p, Y, i) - !1NDA 
!1U 
!1NFA =Pc(Y, e/P)+K(i) 
Y = J (Y, i ) + G + c (Y, e / P ) 







Equations (5.1) to (5.17) are as described earlier. Equation (5.18) defines the domestic 
output as the sum of private expenditure (1), government expenditure (G), and net exports 
(C). Equation (5.19) is the aggregate supply function. The endogenous variables of the 






NFA =k1Y +k2G +k3e +NFAt - 1 




To focus on output and balance of payments, (5.19) was first solved for (P), to give 
equation (5.20). Further, (5.20) was substituted into (5.18) and solved for (i), to yield 
equation (5.21). Substituting (5.20) and (5.21) into (5.13) and (5.17) gave what Frenkel 
et al (1980) called the modified Keynesian balance of payments equation (5.22) and the 
modified Monetary balance of payments equation (5.23). The variables (k 1) and (k 2 ) are 
expected to be negative, while (k 3) is expected to be positive. On the other hand, (m 1) is 
expected to carry a positive sign while (m 2) and (m 3) are expected to carry negative 
signs. Plotting on NFA and Y plane, equation (5.22) gives a negatively sloping curve, 
while (5.23) gives a positively sloping curve, (see figure 1 below). This is the case 
because, as stated above, the relationship between NF A and Y in the modified Keynesian 
equation (5.22) is negative, but in the modified monetary equation (5.23) it is positive. 
Using this diagram (figure 1) they show how potentially misleading it is to regress flNFA 
on Y to see if the two are positively related, as predicted by the partial monetary 
approach, or negatively related as predicted by the partial Keynesian approach. In this 
more general model, NFA (or flNFA) and Y can move, in the short-run, in the same or 
opposite direction depending on what triggers the initial shock. 
Looking at (figure 1) below, when (NDA) changes the modified monetary schedule 
shifts, so that (Y) and (NFA) move in opposite directions. When (G) changes, both 
monetary and Keynesian schedules shift in the same direction. (Y) and (NF A), in this 
case may, move in the same direction, or in the opposite direction. When (e) changes, 
both schedules shift in the same direction, but it can be shown algebraically that (Y) and 
(NF A) move in the same direction, (see Frenkel et aI, 1980 p. 589). 
Following the suggestion of Magee (1976) about synthesising the Keynesian and the 
Monetary approaches to the balance of payments, which is carried out analytically by 
Frenkel et al (1980), Kamas (1986) tried to estimate by way of a general equilibrium 




k m (G, e, NDA) 





and Venezuela, using quarterly data. 
The adequacy and the robustness of Kamas' (1986) model and estimates are 
however questionable. The only diagnostic statistics reported are the standard errors of 
the regression and the adjusted R-squared. For the 2SLS results, only the standard errors 
are reported. No tests for the serial correlation of the error tenns are conducted. 
Although the Durbin-Watson test (dw) would not be valid in cases where lagged 
dependent variables are used as explanatory variables, alternative tests like the Durbin h 
could be used. An even stronger test for serial correlation, which can test for higher 
order serial correlation is the Langrange multiplier test. Further, no test for nonnality of 
the residuals has been carried out. A split sample chow-test or some other kind of test 
should have been used for the case of Mexico to see if periods before and after the 
devaluation of its currency in 1976 can be represented by the same model. 
5.9 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter the theory behind a coefficient Llsed for measuring the degree to 
which a country's domestic component of the monetary base is offset by the foreign 
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component (popularly known as the offset coefficient) is discussed. Knowledge of the 
offset coefficient is important, because it is one of the main determinants of a central 
bank's ability to change the monetary base for monetary policy purposes. For example, 
if the offset to the domestic component of the monetary base is complete, the monetary 
base is endogenous and the central bank cannot change it in the long-run. The offset 
coefficient is usually derived and estimated in the context of the monetary approach to 
the balance of payments theory. 
The starting point of the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory is the 
contention that the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon, and that 
balance of payments problems are a reflection of disequilibria in the money market. A 
balance of payments deficit, for example, is seen as only arising, and can only be 
sustained if actual cash balances exceeds desired cash balances (excess supply of money). 
According to this theory, analysis relating to balance of payments should concentrate on 
the money market alone. Supporters of this approach have argued that to say that the 
balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon does not mean that it is not 
affected by real variables, but the effect of the real variables would have to come through 
the monetary variables, specifically through the money demand. 
Proponents of the monetary approach, under certain assumptions4 argue that a small 
open economy operating a fixed exchange rate regime cannot change the monetary base 
in the long-run. Any change in the domestic component of the monetary base (a 
component of the money supply used as a control variable) carried out with the intention 
of altering the quantity of money stock in the economy would be offset by an equal but 
opposite change in the foreign component of the monetary base, such that the monetary 
base and the quantity of money stock remain unaltered. 
4 countries do not or cannot sterilise balance of payments surpluses and deficits, countries can-
not alter domestic prices and interest rates because they are price takers, countries cannot change 
their real income because it is determined by supply factors, and that their demandfor and supply 
of money are independent of one another 
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To test the above proposition, which also amounts to testing the monetary approach 
theory, two equations, known as the reserves flow and capital flow equations in the 
literature, are fonnulated and estimated. The reserve flow equation expresses the rate of 
change of the foreign component of the monetary base (net foreign assets of the central 
bank) as a function of the rate of change of the domestic component of the monetary base 
(net domestic assets of the central bank), rate of change of the money multiplier, and the 
rate of change of the variables determining the demand for money. The implicit 
assumption is that the offset to domestic monetary policy (changes in the net domestic 
assets of the central bank) arises through the balance of payments balance (synonymous 
with changes in the central bank's net foreign assets), and thus justifies the use of the net 
foreign assets as the dependent variable of the equation. In contrast, the adherents of the 
capital flow equation argue that offset to domestic monetary policy does not arise through 
the balance of payments as a whole, but rather through the private capital balance. The 
capital flow equation therefore, uses changes in the net private capital as its dependent 
variable, while change in the domestic component of the monetary base (the central 
bank's net domestic assets), the level of the current account balance and few other 
variables are used as the independent variables. Since the capital flow equation assumes 
a fairly free flow of private capital between countries, its relevance to most developing 
countries, especially the countries of ECOW AS where strict capital controls are 
practiced, is very limited. In both reserve flow and capital flow equations, the coefficient 
of the central bank's net domestic assets variable is taken to represent the offset 
coefficient, measuring the degree of offset to the domestic component of the monetary 
base. An estimated offset coefficient value of minus one is taken to support the 
conclusion of the monetary approach theory that the balance of payments is essentially a 
monetary phenomenon, and that in the long-run small open countries would have no 
control over their monetary base and thus the domestic money supply. 
The monetary approach theory and practice has been argued to be more suitable 
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than alternative theories for the purpose of analysing the developing countries' balance of 
payments. This is the case because it concentrates on the money market alone, is less 
complicated, and the data on monetary variables are most reliable and most readily 
available in the developing countries. This means that it is easier to carry out empirical 
studies for the purpose of policy prescriptions. The above proposition is quite reasonable 
when examining the developing countries of ECOW AS. Data on trade in the sub-region 
are very scanty and most often not very reliable because of the level of underground 
trade, encouraged by artificially demarcated borders between countries. 
The monetary approach and its methods of estimating offset to domestic monetary 
policy has been criticised on many grounds. It has been argued that disequilibrium in the 
money market (excess supply of money) is an outcome rather than a cause of balance of 
payments deficits. The non-sterilisation assumption of the monetary approach theory has 
been criticised on the grounds that it is unrealistic. Countries in general do expand or 
contract the money supply in reaction to a change in the balance of payments position. 
Furthermore, the assumptions that domestic real income, domestic prices, and domestic 
interest rates do not change in the long-run has been attacked as too restrictive. The most 
damaging of the criticisms is that the estimated coefficient of the rate of change in the 
domestic component of the monetary base, using the reserve flow equation, does not 
represent an estimate of the offset coefficient, but rather that of minus one. This is 
because the equation is derived from the money market equilibrium condition alone, 
neglecting other sectors of the economy. In addition, if some sterilisations are carried out 
by the monetary authorities, estimates of the offset coefficient, using either of the 
monetary approach equations, would be biased upward. 
By using a more general model, encompassing not only the financial sector, but also 
the real sector and the external sector of the economy, it is possible to overcome some of 
the short-comings of the monetary approach method of measuring the offset coefficient. 
In the next chapter, the offset coefficient from a general equilibrium model, which 
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gives the offset in the short-run, will be derived and estimated using the Nigerian data. 
For the purpose of making comparison, the reserve flow equation, derived and discussed 
earlier in this chapter, will also be estimated. Furthermore, a monetary policy reaction 
function, also derived and discussed in this chapter, will be estimated with a view to 
investigating the degree of sterilisation carried out. 
Chapter 6 
Derivation and Estimation of the Short-Run Offset 
to the Domestic Component of the Monetary Base 
6.1 Introduction 
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In the previous chapter a detailed discussion of the theory and practice of estimating 
the degree to which any change in the domestic component of the monetary base is offset 
by the foreign component was carried out, in the context of the monetary approach 
theory. It was shown that the monetary approach method of formulating and estimating 
the degree of this offset (the offset coefficient) is unsatisfactory because of the partial 
nature of the model used. It has been suggested that by using a more general model, 
some of the short-comings of the monetary approach could be removed. 
In this chapter, an attempt is made to estimate the offset coefficient for Nigeria, 
covering the period from 1960 to 1989. This is carried out first of all by estimating the 
monetary approach equation - the reserve flow equation, and then a quasi reduced form-
behavioural equation derived from a IS-LM-BP type general model. Unlike the reserve 
flow equation, the general model gives the offset coefficient in the short-run, where 
domestic income, domestic prices, and domestic interest rates are allowed to change. 
In addition to the two balance of payments equations, a domestic monetary policy 
reaction function, also formulated and discussed in the last chapter, will be estimated 
with the aim of investigating the possible existence and the extent of any sterilisation 
exercise undertaken from 1960 to 1989. A complete sterilisation implies the following: 
1) the foreign component of the monetary base is no longer allowed to offset changes in 
the domestic component. 2) A balance of payments problem may no longer be a 
monetary phenomenon, (see chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of these points). 3) A 
single equation estimation of an offset coefficient, using either the reserve flow equation, 
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or the equation derived from a general equilibrium model is likely to lead to a 
simultaneity bias. In both equations, one of the independent variables (change in the 
domestic component of the monetary base) will tend to depend on the dependent variable 
(change in the foreign component of the monetary base). 
Furthermore, an exchange rate change reaction function will be formulated and 
estimated. The exchange rate change reaction function will measure the degree to which 
Nigeria has changed its exchange rate in reaction to a change in the central bank's net 
foreign assets (its balance of payments position). If a country changes its exchange rate 
in response to the pressure from a balance of payments deficit, or surplus, the relationship 
between the balance of payments and the money market, postulated by the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments theory, will be weakened, or in the extreme case, 
completely severed. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In section (6.2), the general model is 
presented, and the equation used for estimating the short-run offset coefficient is derived 
and discussed. In addition, the reserve flow equation and the monetary policy reaction 
function, derived in the last chapter, are also presented and discussed in an empirical 
context. Also in this section, an exchange rate change reaction function is formulated 
and its components examined. A discussion of the econometric methodology and the 
estimation techniques employed to estimate the relevant equations is taken up in section 
(6.3). Section (6.4) presents the estimation results and the discussion of these results. 
Finally, section (6.5) presents the summary and conclusions of the chapter. 
6.2 The General Model 
The general model, which is made up of the real, financial, and the external sectors 
of the economy is outlined below: 
Md =L (Y, P, i, W) 
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Equations (6.1) and (6.2) are similar to equations (5.1) and (5.2) discussed in chapter 5. 
Equation (6.1) is the demand for nominal money balances. It is a function of the current 
real domestic income (Y) domestic prices (P) domestic interest rate (i) and net domestic 
wealth (W). Equation (6.2) is the money supply identity, defined to be identically equal 
to the sum of net domestic asset holdings of the central bank (NDA), and the net foreign 
assets (NFA), (which is also identically equal to the monetary base (H», multiplied by 
the money multiplier (U). Equation (6.3) is the money market equilibrium condition (the 
money supply is equal to the money demand). These equations (6.1 to 6.3) represent the 
financial sector of the economy. It is assumed, in the spirit of of the IS-LM model that 
there are two kinds of financial assets in this economy, namely bonds and money. 
Dropping the bonds market by way of the wealth constraint, the financial assets market is 
represented by the money market alone. Equations (6.4 to 6.7) represent the external 
sector, while equations (6.7 to 6.9) represent the real sector. Equation (6.4) is the nominal 
current account balance. It is expressed as a function of real domestic income (Y), real 
foreign income (Y *) domestic prices (P), import prices (PI), export prices (PX) nominal 
exchange rate (E) and the foreign price (P *). Equation (6.5) is the capital account 
balance, expressed as a function of domestic interest rate (i), the foreign interest rate (i *) 
and expected depreciation (!1E e ). In reality, in addition to the interest rates, flows of 
capital into and out of Nigeria are determined by un-measurable non-economic factors, 
such as political stability, percentage of profits allowed to be repatriated, etc .. Equation 
(6.6) expresses the balance of payments balance (defined to be the yearly change in the 
monetary authorities holding of net foreign assets MFA) 1 as the sum of the nominal 
1 This corresponds to the official reserve selliements (DRS) halance. definition of the halance of 
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current and capital account balances. Equation (6.7) is the Keynesian type aggregate 
demand function, made up of private consumption demand (J), which is a function of the 
real domestic income, investment demand (I), which is a function of the real interest rate 
(r), government expenditure (G) and the net foreign demand for domestic goods and 
services (c) (equivalent to the current account balance described in equation (6.4». 
Equation (6.8) is a simple aggregate supply function, expressing output as a positive 
function of domestic prices. Equation (6.9) is the Fisher equation, expressing the real 
interest rate as the difference between the nominal domestic interest rate (i) and the 
expected inflation rate. Finally, equation (6.10) gives the wealth identity, where the net 
domestic financial wealth is assumed to be equal to the sum of domestic money holding 
(M) and the domestic holding of bonds (B). 
The model represented by equations (6.1) to (6.10) is reduced to equations (6.11) to 
(6.13) below, by making the appropriate substitutions. 
~L(Y, P, i, W)=~U(~NFA +~NDA )=~U·~H 
Y(P)=J(Y)+I(i, -n;e)+G +c(Y, P, PI, PX, E, p*) 




Equation (6.11) is the money market equilibrium expressed in changes. It is arrived at 
after substituting (6.1) and (6.2) into (6.3) and expressing the result in changes. Equation 
(6.11) is the goods market equilibrium condition, derived from equating (6.7) and (6.8) 
after substituting equation (6.9) for the real interest rate. Equation (6.13) is the balance 
of payments equation (6.6), after substituting (6.4) and (6.5). The three equations (6.11) 
(6.12) and (6.13) are solved for the three endogenous variables (i), (Y), and (P). After 
substituting the derived values of (i), (Y), and (P) back into equation (6.13) and solving 
for the variable (~FA), we arrive at equation (6.14). 
* * ~NFA =Zl ~NDA +Z2 G +Z3 Y +Z4 PI +Z5 PX +Z6 E +Z7 i 
+Z8 n;e +Z9 W +ZlOP* +ZllM e (6.14) 
payments. (see Rivera-Batiz et ai, 1985 for more discussion on this concept) 
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Equation (6.14) is the reduced form balance of payments equation derived from the IS-
LM-BP type general equilibrium model. It expresses the balance of payments balance as 
a function of change in the domestic component of the monetary base and other 
exogenous variables. The coefficient on the change in the domestic component of the 
monetary base variable (Z 1) represents the short -run offset coefficient. 
Equation (6.14) is presented in an empirical form, as (6.15) below. 
!1NFA = Co + Cl !1NDA + C2 G + C3 y* + C4 i* + C5 PX 
+ c6 PI + c7 E + c8 11e + C9P* + clOM e + vt (6.15) 
The wealth variable has been dropped from (6.15), because it is impossible to define and 
measure wealth in Nigeria. Once again this equation tries to measure the short-run offset 
to the domestic component of the monetary base when domestic prices, income and 
interest rates are allowed to adjust freely. 
The short-run offset coefficient c 1 is expected to be negative. As explained in detail 
in the last chapter, an increase in the domestic component of the monetary base leads to a 
fall in the foreign component. The signs of C2, C3 and C4 are ambiguous (can either be 
positive or negative). An increase in the government expenditure (G) is expected to 
increase aggregate demand, and thus income. An increase in income could lead to an 
increase in imports; for a given amount of exports, the foreign currency reserves of the 
country would decrease, rendering a negative relationship between government 
expenditure and the net foreign assets of the central bank. On the other hand, an increase 
in income could, according to the monetary approach, lead to an increase in the money 
demand and reserves inflow. In this case the relationship would be positive. An 
increase in the foreign real income (Y *) is expected to encourage foreign countries to 
import more from the domestic country and thus increase the domestic country's foreign 
currency reserves. An increase in foreign income is also expected to increase foreign 
money demand. Following the monetary approach, this could lead to a reserves inflow 
into the foreign country and as such, a reserves outflow from the domestic country. An 
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increase in the foreign interest rate (i"), on the other hand, is expected to lead to outflow 
of capital from the domestic country, thereby leading to a fall in the domestic country's 
foreign reserve holding. It could also lead to a decrease in the foreign demand for 
money, which according to the monetary approach theory will lead to a foreign reserves 
outflow from the foreign country into the domestic country. In this case c 4 will be 
positive. 
An increase in import prices (PI) would, under normal circumstances, increase the 
foreign reserves of the country. Domestic residents will try to reduce the purchases of 
now expensive imported goods and thus cut down on foreign exchange expenditure. This 
would tend to suggest a positive relationship between import prices and the foreign 
reserves holdings. The story would, however, be different if goods imported are 
characterised by a very low import price elasticity. For instance, machinery spare parts 
and similar kinds of goods which constitute a large percentage of Nigeria's imports, are 
practically necessities such that even if the price goes up, a certain quantity would have 
to be bought to keep the factories, vehicles, etc. running. An increase in the import prices 
(PI) would, in this case, lead to a decrease in the foreign reserves and render a negative 
relationship between import prices and the net foreign assets of the central bank. An 
increase in the export prices (PX) is expected to make foreign countries substitute away 
from the now expensive domestic exports. A fall in domestic exports would lead to a fall 
in the foreign currency reserves. The relationship can go the other way, if the domestic 
country's exports are made up of goods that are not easily substitutable (for example, 
crude oil soon after the OPEC cartel was fomled). 
Devaluation (a decrease in E), assuming that the Mershal-Lerner condition holds, 
has been shown to unambiguously increase the net foreign assets of the central bank, (see 
Frenkel et al 1980, p. 69). A decrease in the amount of foreign currency a unit of 
domestic currency commands makes domestic goods cheaper and foreign goods more 
expensive. This will discourage imports and encourage exports as it will cost more in 
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terms of domestic currency, to import the same quantity now than before; while at the 
same time foreign countries will find domestic goods cheaper in terms of foreign 
currency, and thus buy more. The net effect, given that the Mershall-Lerner condition 
holds, is therefore to improve the trade balance and thus increase the foreign currency 
reserves of the central bank. 
An increase in the expected inflation (ne) will lower the real interest rate, increase 
investment and income. An increase in income will encourage imports and for given 
exports leads to a current account deficit, and outflow of foreign reserves. This tends to 
suggest a negative relationship between expected inflation and the net foreign assets of 
the central bank. Following the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, an 
increase in income which leads to an increase in money demand has the effect of 
encouraging reserves to flow into the country and thus suggests a positive relationship 
between the foreign assets of the central bank and the expected inflation variable. 
The reserve flow equation derived in the last chapter is presented in empirical form 
as equation (6.16) below. 
H 
MlDA 
=ao +al --H- +a2 Lllog Y +a3 LllogP 
MlFA 
(6.16) 
As discussed earlier, this equation relates the rate of change in the foreign component of 
the monetary base (net foreign assets of the central bank) to the rate of change in the 
domestic component (net domestic assets of the central bank), the rate of change in the 
domestic real income, domestic prices, domestic interest rate and the money multiplier. 
The coefficient of the rate of change in the net domestic assets (a 1) is the offset 
coefficient. This coefficient gives the degree to which any change in the domestic 
component of the monetary base is offset by change in the foreign component. 
Generally, the values of the estimated coefficients of equation (6.16) are expected to be 
as follows: a 1 = as = -1, a2 > 0, a3 > 0, a4 < O. 
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According to the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, under a 
fixed exchange rate regime the change in the foreign component of the monetary base 
induced by a change in the domestic component is equal in magnitude, but opposite in 
sign. Therefore, the value of the offset coefficient is always equal to minus one and 
monetary policy (!JNDA) is always completely neutralised by the balance of payments 
(!JNFA). Furthermore, since the money multiplier is a multiplicative factor in the money 
supply, its coefficient is also postulated to be equal to minus one. In the case of the 
remaining variables, their effect on the net foreign assets is believed to be indirectly 
through the money demand. Increase in domestic income and prices that leads to an 
increase in the money demand encourages an inflow of foreign reserves, while that of the 
interest rate which leads to a reduction in the money demand discourages it. 
The monetary approach in its extreme fonn postulates that since the income velocity 
of money is constant, and people do not suffer from money illusion, the coefficients of 
the domestic income and domestic price should be not only greater than zero, but exactly 
positive one. 
The monetary policy reaction function, also derived and discussed in chapter 5, is 
empirically presented as (6.17) below. 
!JNDA !JNFA 
"="':'H=---=--=- = bo + b 1 H 2 + b2 (~log Y )t-1 
+ b 3 (~logP )t-1 + b 4 ~logDDBT + Ut (6.17) 
The purpose of this equation as stated earlier, is to measure the degree to which the 
monetary authorities counter the effects of the foreign component of the monetary base 
on the domestic component (sterilisation). The coefficient of the contemporaneous rate 
of change in the net foreign assets of the central bank (b 1) represents the sterilisation 
coefficient. The sign is expected to be negative and a value of minus one is taken to 
indicate that a country completely sterilises the effect of its balance of payments on the 
money supply. There are other reasons, besides reacting to the balance of payments 
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situation, why a country might want to change its money supply by changing the 
domestic component of its monetary base. It is assumed here that the monetary 
authorities in Nigeria change their money supply in reaction to the previous year's rate of 
growth of domestic income (~log Y)t-l, the rate of inflation (~log P)t-l, and the current 
period rate of growth of domestic debt (~log DDBT). Both positive and negative signs 
for (b 2 ) and (b 3 ) can be consistently explained. A positive sign for (b 2 ), for example, 
could mean that the government is increasing the rate at which it expands the money 
supply, when there is an increase in the rate of change of real income. In this case, the 
aim could be to increase the money supply to cater for a possible increase in money 
demand brought about by the increase in real income. A negative sign on (b 2), on the 
other hand, could mean that the rate at which the domestic component of the monetary 
base is expanded, and thus the money supply is increased when the rate of change of 
income is declining. Monetary authorities may do that if the desire is to increase 
income/employment by increasing the level of aggregate demand. This situation is not 
possible under the monetary approach's assumption of full employment of resources. 
A positive sign on (b 3 ) may mean that the authorities expand the rate of change of 
the money supply when there is an increase in inflation. This may happen if the desire of 
the monetary authorities is to increase the money supply to make up for the possible 
increase in money demand brought about by the increase in domestic inflation. A 
negative sign on (b 3) may mean that the monetary authorities reduce the rate of money 
supply growth when the rate of inflation is going up. Here the aim of the monetary 
authorities may be to slow down the growth rate of inflation, by slowing down the growth 
of the money supply. The central bank is a major holder of the government debt 
instrument, and therefore, a positive relationship will be expected between the 
government domestic debt and the central banks net domestic assets. The coefficient b 4 
is therefore expected to be positive. 
One of the assumptions that underlies the contention that the balance of payments is 
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a monetary phenomenon is that a country operates a fixed exchange rate regime. Under 
this assumption, an excess of real money balances brought about by an expansion in the 
domestic component of the monetary base will lead to a desire to increase the 
expenditure on foreign goods and assets. This will raise the residents' demand for foreign 
currencies, and thus place a downward pressure on the exchange rate. If the authorities 
are to maintain the existing exchange rate, foreign currencies must be sold to the public 
to satisfy the rising demand. The monetary authorities' holding of foreign currency 
reserves, and the foreign component of the monetary base (the balance of payments 
balance) will start to decline. This decline will directly affect the domestic money 
supply, and will continue until the initial excess money supply is removed and the money 
market equilibrium is restored, (see chapter 5 for more discussion on this point). 
If the exchange rate were allowed to change in response to the downward pressure, 
the relationship between the domestic money supply and the change in the international 
reserve component of the monetary base would be weakened. In the extreme case, where 
the exchange rate is allowed to float freely, the relationship will be completely severed. 
When there is an excess supply of real money balances, devaluing the currency will lead 
to an increase in the domestic price level, and thus, reduce the real money balances. If 
enough devaluation of the currency is allowed to take place, the excess real money 
balances will be removed, and money market equilibrium will be restored without any 
change in foreign reserves. If the above statement holds, the balance of payments 
problem will no longer be a monetary phenomenon, and its correction will no longer 
depend on correcting disequilibrium in the money market. 
To look at it in another way, if there is a balance of payments deficit, caused for 
example, by an exogenous variable, it will mean that the demand for foreign currency by 
residents will be rising, placing pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, countries would have to sell foreign reserves to maintain the 
exchange rate. The act of selling foreign currency reduces the foreign component of the 
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monetary base, and as a result, the money supply. For a given money demand, this will 
create a money market disequilibrium. If the exchange rate were allowed to depreciate in 
response to the downward pressure, the price of foreign currency in terms of the 
domestic currency will go up and thus reduce the demand for it, without affecting the 
foreign currency reserves of the central bank and the money supply of the country. 
Chart 1.6 below shows that although the Nigerian exchange rate has been relatively 
fixed for the major part of the period under study (1960 to 1989), it has nevertheless, 
experienced some fluctuations. It is therefore, necessary to examine empirically the 
degree to which these fluctuations are in reaction to change in the balance of payments 
position of the country. This is mainly carried out by estimating an exchange rate change 
reaction function presented as equation (6.18) below. 
~logE =do +d 1 ~logNFA +d2~logP +d3 ~logEDBTt-l +€t (6.18) 
The rate of change in the nominal exchange rate in Nigeria is postulated to depend on the 
contemporaneous rate of change of the foreign component of the monetary base (NFA), 
rate of change of domestic prices, and the rate change of the government and government 
guaranteed external debt. 
Defining the exchange rate (E) as the amount of foreign currency a unit of domestic 
currency commands, one would expect d 1 to be positive. A decline in the central bank's 
foreign reserves, inherent in a balance of payments deficit, can be brought to a halt or 
reversed by devaluing the currency, that is, by reducing the amount of foreign currency a 
unit of domestic currency can buy. This means that the relation ship between the 
exchange rate and the net foreign assets of the Central Bank will be positive. A reduction 
in the strength of the domestic currency is expected to lead to an increase in domestic 
exports, and possibly, start improving the balance of payments position. As in the case 
of the sterilisation coefficient, the value of d 1 is expected to lie between zero and one. A 
value of one implies that any change in the foreign component of the monetary base (the 
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supply (change in the domestic component of the monetary base), by changing the 
exchange rate. On the other hand, d 1 equal to zero would imply that the balance of 
payments is not insulated at all from the effect of a change in the money supply, through 
a change in the exchange rate. 
The signs of d 2 can be either positive or negative, but that of d 3 is expected to be 
positive. When the inflation rate is high, the authorities may devalue the domestic 
currency to improve the competitiveness of domestic goods abroad, rendering a negative 
d 2 . On the other hand, if the inflation is as a result of increase in the price of imports, it 
can be relieved by revaluing the currency. This means d 2 will be positive. With regards 
to d 3 , a government might want to re-value its currency in the face of mounting external 
debt to reduce the value of the debt in terms of domestic currency. 
6.3 Econometric Methodology and Estimation Technique 
It has been discussed in chapter 5 that, if there is a sterilisation exercise going on, 
estimating anyone of the equations (6.15 6.16, or 6.17), using a single equation 
estimation technique, is likely to lead to a simultaneity bias. As a result, the equations 
would be first estimated using the OLS technique, and then by 2SLS. 2SLS would cater 
for possible simultaneity bias that might arise as a result of any possible sterilisation 
exercise undertaken. 
Besides using OLS and the 2SLS estimation techniques for the various equations, 
the final reduced form equation from the general equilibrium model (6.15) will be 
estimated using the time series techniques of cointegration and error correction discussed 
in chapter 4. 
The error correction modelling procedure as applied to the case of estimating the 
balance of payments offset to monetary policy would require that, in the long-run 
(equilibrium), the balance of payments should be balanced. Change in reserves (M) 
would be zero and Rl = R1- 1 = RI - 2 . The level of reserves would represent the long-run 
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balance of payments position, while its change (the first difference) would capture the 
short-run adjustment factors. This applies to all of the independent variables of the 
general equilibrium balance of payments equation. Running the equation in levels only, 
therefore, is synonymous to running a long-run (equilibrium relationship). Once again, 
the interest of this study in estimating the general equilibrium equation is to investigate 
the short-run balance of payments offset to domestic monetary policy. 
6.4 Discussion of the Estimation Results 
The coefficient estimates of the reserve flow equation (6.16) for a narrow and broad 
definition of money2 are reported in Table (6.1). Both models have passed the standard 
diagnostic tests. The Lagrange Multiplier test (LM-Test) shows that the null hypothesis 
that the errors are free of both first and second order serial correlation can not be rejected. 
The ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) test shows that the errors are 
free of heteroskedasticity while the hypotheses that the errors are normal is also accepted, 
(calculated F and Chi-squared values and their respective degrees of freedom are reported 
in the Tables). 
The offset coefficient in the narrow money reserve flow equation is -1.07, while the 
coefficients of the real income and the domestic price variables are 0.71 and 0.66 
respectively. These three coefficients are highly significant and their values fall within 
the prior predictions of the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory. The 
interest rate variable is both insignificant and has the wrong sign. However, this is not 
entirely surprising, since as mentioned in chapter 4, due to the narrowness of the financial 
markets and the limited choice of alternative financial assets to money in developing 
2 The difference between the reserve flow equations depends on the definition of the money mul-
d 'h .. . M 1 h·1 fi tiplier variable. The money multiplier variable utilised in the narrow epnllLOn lS II' w l e or 
the broad definition is ~2 ; where Ml = Cp + DD, M2 = Cp + DD + SD and fI = C + R. DD 
and SD are demand and savings/time deposits respectively. All other variables are as defined in 
chapter 2 
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economies like Nigeria, interest rates are not good measures of the opportunity cost of 
holding money. The readily available alternative assets to money open to the inhabitants 
of most developing countries are in the form of real assets (inflation hedges like grain, 
land, property, etc.). The common practice is therefore, to use the expected inflation rate 
as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money. Various definitions of expectations 
were used to create an expected inflation variable,3 but their use in the reserve flow 
equations proved to be no better than the interest rate variable. 
Table 6.1 
The Reserve Flow Equations 
(Narrow and Broad Definitions) 
Narrow money M 1 Broad Money M2 
VARIABLES OLS 2SL2 OLS 2SLS 
Canst. 0.031 0.044 0.063 0.060 
(0.78) (1.00) (2.02) (l.89) 
MVDA 
-1.07 -1.13 -0.96 -0.94 
H 
(-14.99) (-10.83) (-15.81) (11.82) 
/1 Log GDP 0.714 0.65 0.74 0.76 
(2.86) (2.45) (3.91) (3.91) 
/1 Log P 0.66 0.55 0.51 0.53 
(2.84) (2.31) (2.88) (2.91) 
/1 Log DRT 0.12 0.14 -0.053 -0.071 
(0.62) (0.72) (-0.36) (-0.48) 
/1 Log U -0.05 -0.03 -0.87 -0.92 
(-0.29) (-0.16) (-3.86) ( -3.77) 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 
Std. Err. 0.119 0.122 0.091 0.091 
LM-Test for JSI Order Serial COIT. F(1,19) 0.99 X2(1)/1 0.99 F(1 ,19) 0.16 X2(1)/1 0.06 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial carr. F(2,18) 0.50 X2(2)/2 0.57 F(2,18) 0.08 X2(2)(2 0.03 
ARCH -Test for lSI Order Hetero. X2(1) 0.05 X2(1) 0.57 X2(l) 0.05 X2(1) 0.06 
Normality Test X2(2) 0.317 X2(1) 0.295 X2(1) 0.305 X2(2) 0.3l3 
. /1NFA 
Dependent Vanable: H 
I1NDA 
H ' and one 
I1NFA 
Instruments: Constant term, first and second period lagged of H ' and 
period lagged and non-lagged values of all other independent variables. 
t-values are in parenthesis. 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990), PC-Give Version 6.0. 
3 Firstly the actual inflation rate was used. and secondly. expected inflation variable was 
designed by running the actual inflation rate on one period lagged value of itself and extracting 
the fitted values. 
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The coefficient of the money multiplier in the narrow money reserve flow equation, 
although of the postulated sign, is very insignificant and the value falls far short of the 
minus one predicted by the monetary approach theory. 
The result of estimating the reserve flow equation for the broader definition of 
money conforms better with the predictions of the monetary approach theory of balance 
of payments than the one from the narrow money definition. All variables carry theory 
consistent signs and are very significant, except the one representing the interest rate. 
The offset coefficient value of -0.96 and the coefficient of the money multiplier of -0.87 
are not significantly different from the minus one value suggested by the theory. It has 
been argued that using the broader definition of money (M2) for the purposes of 
analysing the offset to domestic monetary policy is more appropriate for a country like 
Nigeria, because in the banking institutional framework savings deposits can be turned 
into cash costlessly, (Ozo-Eson, 1982). 
The weakness of the reserve flow equation notwithstanding, the above estimates of 
the offset coefficients imply that in the long-run, the offset to the domestic component of 
Nigeria's monetary base is complete. The monetary base is therefore, endogenous and 
the Central Bank of Nigeria cannot control it in the long-run. Although as shown in 
chapter 2, the Nigerian money multiplier is fairly stable and predictable when the shocks 
to the economy are taken into account by the use step dummies, it is nevertheless, 
independent of the Central Bank control. It is determined by the behaviour of the banks 
and the non-bank public of Nigeria. Since the ability of the central bank to change the 
money stock in the context of the money multiplier method of money stock 
determination depends on its ability to change the monetary base for a given money 
multiplier, the above findings seem to suggest that the Nigerian Central Bank cannot 
control the money stock in the long-run. The coefficients of the income and price 
variable of 0.74 and 0.5, although below the positive one value expected to hold, under 
the assumption of constant income velocity of money and no money illusion, they 
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nevertheless confOIm to the theory in its less stringent fonn. 
This finding does not support the conclusion by Sohrab-Uddin (1985), and Bilquees 
(1989) that the monetary approach to balance of payments theory is not relevant to 
developing countries where restrictive credit and reserve policies are pursued. They 
showed how the coefficient estimates of the reserve flow equation for Pakistan and India, 
where monetary policy is restrictive and the foreign exchange and capital markets are 
controlled, are either of the wrong sign, insignificant, or both. For the case of Thailand, 
where a fairly liberal exchange control policy is maintained, the coefficient estimates are 
of the expected signs and values, and are significant. Exchange controls, and controls 
relating to inflow and outflow of financial assets have always been a common feature of 
the Nigerian financial system and yet its data seems to agree with the monetary approach 
theory. Watson (1988) reports a similar finding for Trinidad and Tobago. What Nigeria 
and Trinidad have in common is the fact that their economies are heavily dependent on 
crude oil. Although these countries have restrictive credit and reserves policy, their 
economies are very strongly linked to the world economy through crude oil in a way that 
those of India and Pakistan are not. 
The estimated coefficients from using the 2SLS techniques are very similar to those 
from the OLS techniques. This tends to suggest that simultaneity bias in the OLS results, 
brought about by the possible endogeneity of some of the independent variables, is 
unlikely. 
It has been discussed in chapter 5 that the most common empirical presentation of 
the balance of payments equation, in the context of the monetary approach theory (the 
reserve flow equation (6.16)) is inadequate on many grounds. For example, it has been 
argued that it is derived from the money market equilibrium conditions alone, neglecting 
all other sectors of the economy. Furthennore, the reserve flow equation presumes a 
long-run scenario, while for policy purposes, the short-run is more relevant. As a result, 
a balance of payments equation from a more general model, which is also suitable for a 
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short-run analysis (equation 6.15), will be estimated. As discussed earlier, this equation 
will be estimated using the dynamic modelling and estimation technique of error-
correction and cointegration. It has also been stated earlier that this form of dynamic 
modelling requires some prior testing and analysis of the individual series. The result of 
testing for the order of integration of each Nigerian series, using the ADF method, is 
reported in Table 6.2. The test indicates that all series achieve stationarity after 
differencing once. 
Table 6.2 
Order of Integration of the Series 
ADF-Tcst 
ORDER 
VARIABLES ADF-TEST FOR 1(0) ADF-TEST FOR 1(1) OF 
INTEGRATION 
(LEVELS) (FIRST DIFFERENCE) 
COEFF t-VALUES COEFF t-VALUES 
NFA -0.36 (-2.3) -1.34 (-5.04) 1(1) 
NDA 0.063 (0.53) -1.21 (-3.48) 1(1) 
E -0.002 ( -0.019) -0.67 (-2.85) 1(1) 
y" 0.006 (0.366) -1.03 (-3.90) 1(1) 
i -0.306 (-2.55) -1.11 ( -4.58) 1(1) 
PI -0.002 (-0.086) -0.60 (-3.30) 1(1) 
PX -0.09 ( -1.27) -0.86 (-3.35) 1(1) 
G -0.15 ( -1.43 -1.06 (-3.28) 1(1) 
1te** -0.53 ( -1.26) -3.30 (-9.40) 1(1) 
/1Ee** -0.67 (-2.80) -2.40 ( -6.25 1(1) 
ADF-Test requires running the following: 
n 
M t = a + bXt - 1 + I.Mt - i + et 
i=l 
Coeff. represents the estimates of b, with t-values in parenthesis. 
Critical t-values for ADF-Test are -3.75(1 %), -3.00(5%), -2.63(10%); for N=25. 
** Expected inf1ation and expected devaluation arc proxicd by the actual inf1ation and the actual 
devaluation. 
Testing for cointegration of the Nigerian data senes strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated. This is evident from both the CRDW 
statistics and the ADF-test for unit-root of the residuals from the cointegration regression 
(hereafter referred to as the ECT, see Tables 6.3 and 6.4). The calculated CRDW is 
2.20, while the calculated t-value of interest using the ADF-test is -5.10. The critical 
CRDW at 5% is 0.872, while that of the ADF-test for a unit root of ECT is about -4.67, 




Dependent Variable: NFA 
Critical CRDW at 5% = 0.827 
t-values are in parenthesis. 
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Table 6.3 
Cointegration Regression Equation 
E PX G Me CRDW 
-5076 42.85 0.089 3210.4 2.20 
(-11.41) (6.62) (7.11) (4.54) 
Note. The expected devaluation variable (Me) is proxied by the actual, and this may lead to a 
measurement error. 
Table 6.4 
Testing the Co integration Regression Residuals for 1(0) 
ADF-Tcst 
Const. (MCT)t_l (ECT)t-l R-Z: 
-2.24 0.39 -1.57 0.60 
( -0.03) 0.70) (-5.10**) 
Dependent Variable: MCT. 
ECT is the Residuals from the Cointegration Regression (Table 6.3). 
** Relevant t-value for cointegration test. 
Durbin -h 
-0.78 
Parsimonious models of the quasi reduced form-behavioural equation (6.15), using 
the Engle Granger two-steps approach, are reported in Table 6.5. Starting out from 
models with all the explanatory variables, a thorough specification search is conducted to 
arrive at the reported models. The models have passed the regular specification and 
validation tests (see Table for results). Adjacent to each variable in the Table (variables 
have been defined in an earlier section of this chapter) are the coefficient estimates and 
the t-values (t-values are in brackets). All variables that appear in the models are very 
significant. The estimated coefficient of the change in the net domestic assets (the short-
run offset coefficient) is -0.84. This value is almost as high as the offset coefficient 
derived from the reserve flow equations and it is not statistically different from minus 
one. This finding seems to suggest that, even in the short-run when domestic prices, 
income and interest rates are assumed endogenous, the offset to the domestic component 
of the monetary base by the foreign component is complete. The ability of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria to control the money stock is limited not only in the long-run, but in the 
short-run as well. 
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The coefficient of the change in the exchange rate variable is negative, confirming 
that devaluation of the Nigerian currency improves the balance of payments and thus 
increases the net foreign assets of the Central Bank.4 Specifically, a dollar reduction in 
the amount of US dollars one Nigerian naira can command, will lead to an increase in the 
net foreign assets of the Central Bank by more than 1000 million naira. A million dollar 
increase in foreign income raises the foreign assets by about 7 million naira. 
The estimated coefficient of the imports prices is negative in sign, indicating that 
when it goes up, the net foreign assets of the Central Bank declines. Normally one would 
expect the relationship to be positive, because an increase in the price of imports will 
reduce the quantity imported, improve the balance of payments position and increase the 
foreign reserves of the central bank. However, if a country's imports are the bare 
necessities, as in Nigeria, an increase in import prices will not lead to a decline in the 
quantity imported and with it the foreign exchange expenditures on these imports, but 
instead the same quantity would have to be imported at the now high price, and as such, 
there will be an increase in the total foreign exchange spent and a decline in the foreign 
assets of the central bank. 
Contrary to expectation, a rise in the price of Nigerian exports improves the balance 
of payments and increases the Central Bank's net foreign assets. This is mainly due to 
the advent of the OPEC cartel. Since its formation, the price of crude oil has gone up 
quite considerably. Given that crude oil was not easily substitutable as a source of 
energy, exporters of crude oil experienced a situation where the price of their exports was 
going up, but at the same time, the revenue they derived from such exports was also 
going up. It is therefore not surprising to see Nigeria's export price (a country whose 
export composition is more than 90 percent crude oil), and change in its foreign reserves, 
(which is mainly from crude oil sales) moving in the same direction. 




Reduced Form Equation for Short-run Offset with step Dummies 
Using Engle-Granger 2 Steps Approach 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
Const. -227.87 -227.17 
( -1.84) ( -1.83) 
!1NDA -0.84 -0.85 
(-19.83) ( -19.70) 
!ill -1168.31 -1165.49 
( -1.92) (-1.91) 
i1Y'" 7.22 7.23 
(1.93) (1.93) 
MI -30.48 -31.14 
(-2.32) (-2.36) 
MX 41.43 41.54 
(5.97) (5.99) 
i1G 0.087 0.086 
(8.64) (8.64) 
D1973/74 444.34 447.88 
(3.69) (3.71) 
D1985/86 1368.82 1378.50 
(5.74) (5.77) 
(ECT)I_l -1.16 -1.16 
(-6.75) (-6.76) 
R2 0.98 0.98 
Std. Err. 235.94 236.02 
LM-Test for 1 sl Order Serial correlation F(1, 16) 0.11 X2(1)/1 0.18 
LM-test for 2nd Order Serial correlation F(2, 15) 0.06 X2(2)/2 0.20 
ARCH-Test for lSI Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 0.75 X2(1) 0.75 
Nonnality -Test X2(2) 1.84 X2(2) 1.82 
Dependent Variable: !1NFA 
INSTRUMENTS: constant tenn, one period lagged !1NFA, !1NDA and one period lagged and 
non-lagged of all other independent variables. 
t-values are in parenthesis 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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Table 6.5.1 
Reduced Form Equation for Short-run Offset with no Dummies 
Using Engle-Granger 2 Steps Approach 
VARIABLES' OLS 2SLS 
Const. -334.08 -333.84 
(-1.80) (-1.80) 
MlDA -0.71 -0.72 
(-10.43) (-8.94) 
M -3544.95 -3575.23 
(-4.01) (-3.97) 
~y 13.31 13.41 
(2.13) (2.14) 
!::.PI 18.09 17.46 
(0.92) (0.87) 
!::.PX 51.43 51.84 
(4.42) (4.37) 




(ECT)I_l -l.46 -1.47 
(-4.86) (-4.77) 
R2 0.91 0.90 
Std. Err. 426.51 426.65 
LM-Test for FI Order Serial correlation F(1, 18) 3.91 X2(1)/1 3.81 
LM-test for 2nd Order Serial correlation F(2, 17) 1.61 X2(2)/2 1.68 
ARCH-Test for JSI Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 0.67 X2(1) 0.56 
Normality -Test X2(2) 1.28 X2(2) 1.40 
Dependent Variable: MVFA 
INSTRUMENTS: constant term, one period lagged MVFA, MVDA and one period lagged and 
non-lagged of all other independent variables. 
t-values are in parenthesis 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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Table 6.5.2 
Reduced Form Equation for Short-run Offset with Impulse Dummies 
Using Engle-Granger 2 Steps Approach 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS 
Const. -378.65 -386.80 
(-1.86) (-l.90) 
MVDA -0.70 -0.74 
(-7.33) (-6.26) 
M -3631.05 -4101.61 
(-2.31) ( -2.35) 
~y. 14.56 14.81 
(2.20) (2.22) 
MI 18.70 2l.95 
(0.68) (0.79) 
MX 47.04 47.97 
(3.53) (3.48) 
~G 0.10 0.10 
(5.08) (5.08) 
~D1973n4 477.l1 -627.93 
(0.83) (-0.40) 
~D1985/86 -236.73 378.90 
(-0.17) (0.63) 
(ECT)t-l -1.45 -1.54 
( -4.26) ( -4.18) 
R2 0.91 0.91 
Std. Err. 441.03 443.78 
LM-Test for Ft Order Serial correlation F(1,16) 1.43 X2(1)/l 2.18 
LM-test for 2nd Order Serial correlation F(2, 15) 0.69 
ARCH-Test for Ft Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 0.73 X2(1) 0.44 
Nonnality -Test X2(2) 2.60 X2(2) 2.03 
Dependent Variable: MVFA 
INSTRUMENTS: constant tenn, one period lagged MVFA, MVDA and one period lagged and 
non-lagged of all other independent variables. 
t-values are in parenthesis 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990) PC-Give Version 6.0. 
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An increase in government expenditure also increases the net foreign assets of the 
Central Bank. However, in this case the small coefficient of about 0.087 means that an 
increase in (G) by one million will increase the net foreign assets by about 87 thousand 
naira. Dummy variables to represent the 1973/74 oil price increase (D 1973n 4) and the 
devaluation of the Nigerian naira due to the introduction of the second-tier foreign 
exchange market in 1986 CD 1985/86) are both found to be very significant. As discussed 
in section 2.3.3 of chapter 2, the price of Nigerian crude oil went up by about 250 percent 
within a period of 4 months (October 1973 to January 1974). The foreign assets of the 
Central Bank of Nigerian went up from 389 million naira in 1973 to 3,586 million in 
1974. It was also discussed in the same section that in September, 1986 the Nigerian 
naira was devalued by over 66 percent. The effect of this on the Central Bank's foreign 
assets denominated in naira was to increase it from 1,686 million in 1985 to 3637 million 
by the end of 1986. 
Although the coefficient representing the error-correction term has the right sign and 
is very significant, it is greater than minus one in absolute value. This means that when 
the system is moving back to equilibrium after some disturbance, it will "over-shoot" the 
equilibrium before it settles down (a stable dynamic structure). 
The result of estimating the same equation (6.15) using the 2SLS technique is 
reported in the same table. As in the case of the reserve flow equations, the parameter -
estimates are found to be very similar to those obtained from using the OLS technique, 
(see Table for instruments utilised). 
Although effects of the 1973/74 oil price increase and the 1985/86 devaluation on 
the net foreign assets of the Central Bank has been explained above, as in the models in 
the earlier chapters, it may be interesting, for comparison purpose, to estimate the models 
without dummies and with impulse dummies. The result of these models are presented in 
Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. They are quite similar to the ones obtained by using step 
dummies (Table 6.5); with the exception of the fact that in the former cases, the import 
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pnce variable is not significant and the offset coefficients are slightly lower. 
Furthennore, the impulse dummies were found to be insignificant. Also, the standard 
error in the equation with step dummies is about half that of the other equations. 
The result of estimating the monetary policy reaction function (6.17) for Nigeria is 
reported in Table 6.6. The model passes all the regular diagnostic tests as well, (see 
Table for the results of these tests). All estimated coefficients are significant and of the 
expected signs. A positive relationship between the growth rate of the net domestic 
assets of the Central Bank, previous periods growth rate of real income, and the previous 
period's growth rate of domestic prices indicates that the money supply is increased 
when real income and the domestic prices are growing. This may mean that the Nigerian 
monetary authorities increase the money supply to meet the increase in the transactions 
demand for money inherent in growth of real income and prices. The positive 
relationship with the domestic debt variable indicates that increases in the Government's 
domestic debts increases the net domestic assets of the Central Bank. This simply 
confirms that the Central Bank of Nigeria is a major source of funds for the 
Government's deficit financing. 
The estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous rate of growth of the net foreign 
assets is -0.77; suggesting that over 70 percent of the effect the foreign component of the 
monetary base has on the domestic component is sterilised. The principal tool for 
sterilisation is open market operations. If there is an increase in the foreign component 
of the monetary base, securities can be sold in the open market, thus reducing the 
domestic component of the monetary base, and vice versa. However, as discusssed in 
chapter 5, this operation can only be successfully carried out if there is an efficient and 
fairly developed financial market. In Nigeria, as discussed in chapter 1, although 
Treasury bills are often bought and sold, open market operations in the traditional sense 
have never been conducted. Sterilisation in Nigeria basically takes the form of purchases 
and sales of treasury bills and other government securities by the monetary authorities 
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to/from the Central Bank, commercial banks, and government parastatals. For example, 
sterilising a payments deficit will require the monetary authorities to sell Treasury bills 
and use the proceed to finance government expenditure. Since the Central Bank is a 
major holder of Treasury bills, its holding of domestic assets go up. Conversely, if there 
is a payments surplus such that the net foreign assets of the Central Bank are going up, 
Treasury bills are bought back. This means that sterilising a surplus is going to lead to a 
decline in government expenditures. 
Table 6.6 








(~log GDP)t-l 0.54 
(3.12) 
(~log P)t-l 0.43 
(2.81 ) 
~ log DBBT 0.40 
(3.44) 
R2 0.96 
Std. Err. .084 
LM-Test for Ft Order Serial correlation F( I, 20) 0.45 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial correlation F(2, 19) 3.51 
ARCH-Test for Ft Order Heteroskedasticity X2(1) 0.71 
Normality-Test X2(2) 0.11 
. bl MVDA Dependent Vana e: H 
MVDA 
Instruments: Constant term, one and two periods lagged of H 
lagged and non lagged values of all other independent variables. 
t-values are in parenthesis. 



















and one period 
H 
Evidence does not seem to support that Nigeria sterilised both payments deficits and 
surpluses. In fact, looking at Table 6.7, it is clear that a decline in the foreign 
component of the monetary base was not allowed to affect the money stock. For 
example, in 1961 to 1963, 1976 to 1978, and 1981 to 1983, Nigeria experienced a decline 
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in the foreign component of its monetary base, but that did not lead to a decline in the 
money stock. Instead, the money stock went up in those periods. This is clear evidence 
that Nigeria did sterilise payment deficits. However, the same is not true of periods when 
there were increases in the foreign component of the monetary base. These increases are 
Table 6.7 
Net Foreign Assets, Money Stock and their % Changes 
YEAR NFA M1 %~NFA %~1 
1960 246 241 
1961 220 243 -10.57 0.83 
1962 206 253 -6.36 4.12 
1963 150 269 -27.18 6.32 
1964 163 318 8.67 18.22 
1965 171 328 4.91 3.14 
1966 154 357 -9.94 8.84 
1967 80 323 -48.05 -9.52 
1968 83 338 3.75 4.64 
1969 95 447 14.46 32.25 
1970 157 643 65.26 43.85 
1971 280 670 78.34 4.20 
1972 246 747 -12.14 11.49 
1973 385 926 56.50 23.96 
1974 3453 1757 796.88 89.74 
1975 3574 2605 3.50 48.26 
1976 3283 3864 -8.14 48.33 
1977 2762 5558 -15.87 43.84 
1978 1308 5101 -52.64 -8.96 
1979 3059 6147 133.87 20.51 
1980 5445 9227 78.00 50.11 
1981 2428 9745 -55.41 5.61 
1982 1042 10049 -57.08 3.12 
1983 727 11283 -30.23 12.28 
1984 1104 12204 51.86 8.16 
1985 1661 13227 50.45 8.38 
1986 3542 12663 113.25 -4.26 
1987 4620 14906 30.43 18.29 
1988 2243 21446 -51.45 43.87 
1989 11308 25812 404.15 20.36 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
almost always reflected in the money stock. For example, in 1970 when the Nigerian 
civil war ended, the net foreign assets of the Nigerian Central Bank went up by about 65 
percent, while the money stock went up by about 43 percent. The same goes for other 
periods of massive increases in the Central Bank's net foreign assets, for instance the first 
and the second oil price increase. Although the percentage increase in the money stock 
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was always lower than the increase in the foreign component of the monetary base, they 
nevertheless show that Nigeria did not completely sterilise payments surpluses. 
The above discussion seems to cast some doubt over the result from estimating the 
monetary policy reaction function that Nigeria sterilises nearly 80 percent of the effects 
of balance of payments on the domestic money supply. Moreover, Granger causality 
tests between the net foreign assets and the net domestic assets of the Central Bank 
showed that there is a bidirectional Granger-causality between the variables; implying 
that a clear cut claim for sterilisation cannot be made. 
It has been discussed in the last chapter that if a partial sterilisation is going on, it is 
likely that OLS estimates of the offset coefficient and the sterilisation coefficient would 
be biased. This is partly due to the likelihood of the simultaneity problem. The variable 
representing the domestic component of the monetary base in equation (6.16) and that 
representing the foreign component in equation (6.17) would both be endogeneous in the 
estimation process. Coefficient estimates from these equations, using OLS are likely to 
be biased and inconsistent. In the literature, in addition to OLS, 2SLS is used to estimate 
the reserve flow equation and the monetary policy reaction function. If no real difference 
is found between the estimates of the OLS and 2SLS, the possibility of the simultaneity 
problem is then discounted away, (see for example, Watson, 1988, Kamas 1986, etc.). 
The shortcoming of this method of checking for a possible existence of the simultaneity 
problem has been discussed in section 4.6 of chapter 4. These short comings are even 
clearer when looking at Tables 6.1 and 6.6. Although 2SLS estimates in both cases 
suggest that there is no simultaneity problem, coefficient estimates of the domestic 
component and the foreign component of the monetary base when used as independent 
variables are quite significant in the two equations, implying that they cause each other. 
In view of the above discussion, caution should be exercised in interpreting the 
results from the reserve flow equation and the monetary policy reaction function. This 
weakness applies to the whole of the literature on estimating offset and sterilisation 
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coefficients. 
A number of models for the exchange rate change reaction function, depending on 
the specification of the dummy variable5 are presented in Table 6.8. Column 2 of the 
Table gives the result of estimating the equation with a step dummy. Lagrange multiplier 
tests accept the hypothesis that the residuals from the regression are not serially 
correlated (first order at 10 percent level and second order at 5 percent level). The model 
also passes the other specification tests as well (see Table). All estimated variables of 
this equation are quite significant, and the coefficient estimates carry the expected signs. 
The coefficient of the contemporaneous change in the net foreign assets (NFA) which is 
equivalent to a change in the balance of payments balance, is about 0.000053. This 
seems to suggest that, all other things held constant, a one percent change in the balance 
of payments position of Nigeria leads only to a 0.005 percent change in the exchange 
rate. In other words, less than .005 percent of the changes in the exchange rate in Nigeria 
was due to the balance of payments position of the country. Estimated coefficients of 
change in the domestic prices, and the government and government guaranteed external 
debt are 0.015 and -0.0002 respectively. Other things being equal, about 15 percent of 
the change in the nominal exchange rate in Nigeria is due to the change in the domestic 
price level, while about 0.002 percent is due to the change in the foreign debt position of 
the country. 
Column 3 of Table 6.8 glVes the result of estimating the exchange rate change 
reaction function when an impulse dummy is used. The regular diagnostic requirements 
are met, except for the normality condition. The normality Chi-squared value of 14.32 
indicates that the errors are not nonnally distributed. However, this equation has a lower 
standard error and a higher R-squared than the one in column 2. The coefficient of the 
5 The dummy variable is to capture the 1985/86 devaluation of the Nigerian naira. Although 
the exchange rate of the Nigerian naira has been declining gradually since 1980, between 1984 
and 1985 it experienced a massive fall of over 300 percent (from 1 to 1 to 1 to 0.3 US dollars). As 
discussed in chapter 1, this massive devaluation was undertaken as part of the IMF -imposed 
structural adjustment programme. 
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!1NF A is the same in the two equations. The other coefficients of the model in column 3 
are not significant except that of the dummy variable. The result of estimating the 
equation without dummy variables is given in column 4 of the table. Although the 
coefficient of the MVFA is quite close to those obtained from the other equations, this 
model could not pass the first and second order serial correlation tests even at the 10 
percent level. 
Table 6.8 
Exchange Rate Change Reaction Function 
VARIABLES Step Impulse 
Dummy Dummy 
Const -0.043 0.00057 
(-1.75) (0.027) 
~NFA 0.00005 0.00005 
(2.64) (3.48) 
~P 0.010 -0.005 
(3.19) ( -1.21) 
~EDBT -0.000024 0.000002 
(-3.33) (0.61) 
D1985/86 0.69 -0.89 
(2.03) ( -4.83) 
iL, 0.62 0.78 
Std. Err. 0.107 0.082 
LM-Test for lSI Order Serial corr F(1,22) 5.51 F(l, 23) 2.02 
LM-Test for 2nd Order Serial corr F(2, 21) 2.40 F(2, 21) 1.22 
ARCH-Test for lSI Order Hetero X2(1) 2.77 X2(1) 0.033 
Normality-Test X2(2) 0.90 X2(2) 14.32 
Dependent Variable: till 
t-values are in parenthesis. 
Econometric Estimation Package: Hendry (1990), PC-Give Version 6.0. 















F(1, 23) 12.31 
F(2, 21) 5.89 
X2(l) 3.28 
X2(2) 3.26 
This chapter has investigated the degree to which the foreign component of the 
monetary base offsets the domestic component in Nigeria. Two sets of equations (the 
reserve flow equation and a quasi reduced form behavioural equation from an IS-LM-BP 
type general model) plus a monetary policy reaction function and an exchange rate 
change reaction function are estimated. The quasi reduced form-behavioural equation is 
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modelled and estimated using the dynamic modelling and estimation procedure of error 
co~ection and cointegration. In addition, all the equations are estimated using both OLS 
end 2SLS techniques. 
The estimated coefficients of the reserve flow equations, especially when a broad 
definition of money is used, is in conformity with the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments theory. The offset coefficient values of (-1.07) and (-0.96) for narrow and 
broad definitions of money respectively are not different from the (-1.0) value postulated 
by the theory. Also, the income and the price elasticities are both found to be positive as 
expected. The estimated coefficients of the opportunity cost of holding money, although 
of the postulated sign, are found to be insignificant. This can be explained by lack of an 
appropriate variable to represent the opportunity cost of holding money in a developing 
economy like Nigeria. The estimated coefficients of the money multiplier variables have 
the expected negative sign, but are significant with a value of close to minus one only in 
the broadly defined case. According to the reserve flow equation, the Nigerian monetary 
base is completely endogenous and the Central Bank cannot carry out any effective 
discretionary monetary policy by changing the domestic component of the monetary base 
in the long-run (when the income, prices, and interest rates are assumed to be constant). 
The coefficient estimates of the general equilibrium equation convey the same 
message as those of the reserve flow equation. The offset coefficient in this case, is 
between -0.70 and -0.84, depending on the specification the dummy variables. This 
suggests that, even in the short-run when domestic income, prices, and interest rates are 
allowed to vary, between 70 and 80 percent of any change in the domestic component of 
the monetary base is offset by the foreign component. 
The coefficient estimate of the contemporaneous change in the foreign reserve in the 
monetary policy reaction function of Nigeria is (-0.77). This seems to imply that Nigeria 
sterilises over 70 percent of the effect which the foreign component of its monetary base 
has on the domestic component. This means that the monetary base may in fact be 
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partially exogenous in the short-run. In the very long-run, continuous sterilisation of 
payments deficits and surpluses would be halted by exhaustion of either the foreign 
currency reserves of the Central Bank or its stock of domestic securities. Moreover, 
evidence seems to suggest that Nigeria only sterilises payments deficits completely, but 
allows payments surpluses, at least partially, to affect the money stock. The sterilisation 
coefficient of nearly 0.80 may therefore, be an overestimate of the actual level of 
sterilisation undertaken in Nigeria. Either way, the implication is that the Nigerian 
monetary base is likely to be endogenous and cannot be controlled by the Central Bank. 
The coefficient estimate of the contemporaneous change in the net foreign asset of 
0.00005 in the exchange rate change reaction function seems to suggest that Nigeria did 
not change its exchange rate, in reaction to changes in its balance of payments position. 
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General Summary and Conclusions 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an economIC 
organisation of 16 countries of Africa south of the Sahara. The aim of the organisation, 
which came into existence in 1975, is to form an economic union among the member 
nations. 1 A vital part of this programme is to establish a single central bank which not 
only issues a single currency for all member nations, but also pools their foreign 
exchange reserves and coordinates their monetary and fiscal policies. 
Although it may be beneficial for a country to be a member of this type of monetary 
cooperation, there are also costs associated with it. The most obvious of these costs is 
the loss of independence in carrying out macro-economic policies. Specifically, a country 
cannot change its money supply for monetary policy purposes, independent of the other 
countries, when and as it sees fit. Any monetary policy decision would have to be taken 
collectively and at certain agreed intervals. 
This study has assessed the degree to which Nigeria is likely to lose monetary 
policy independence in the event of a successful implementation of the ECOW AS 
monetary unification programme. Since the monetary union is not in operation yet, the 
issue was examined indirectly by addressing the following question: Does Nigeria have 
monetary policy independence at present? In other words, can the Nigerian Monetary 
Authorities conduct an effective monetary policy now? For the purpose of this study, 
monetary policy is defined as changing the money stock to achieve certain internal or 
external goals. 
According to the money multiplier theory of money stock determination, the money 
stock at any given point in time is identically equal to the money multiplier times the 
1 There is an interesting parallel with recent proposals for economic and monetary integration 
in the ECC. 
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monetary base. The money multiplier is determined by the non-bank public's currency 
to deposit ratio and the banks' reserve to deposit ratio. Therefore, it is generally assumed 
to be beyond the control of the monetary authorities. The monetary base, on the other 
hand, is made up of the liabilities of the central bank, and as such can be controlled. In 
other words, the monetary base is assumed to be exogenously determined by the 
monetary authorities: for a given level of the money multiplier, a change in the money 
stock requires changing the monetary base in the desired direction. Successful 
manipulation of the money stock will only occur if the money multiplier is stable and 
predictable. If the money multiplier moves around and its value cannot be predicted 
accurately, a given change in the monetary base may not lead to the desired level of 
money stock. 
Casual observation of the graphs of the Nigerian money multiplier and those of the 
determinants from 1960 to 1989 (Charts 2.1 to 2.3) suggests that they may be unstable 
because they have experienced some large year to year fluctuations. However, section 
2.3 showed that most of these fluctuations are a result of various random shocks which 
affected the Nigerian economy. For example, phenomena like the Nigerian Civil War, 
the first and second oil price increases, and the structural adjustment programme 
undertaken in the mid 1980s have all affected the money multiplier and its determinants 
quite considerably. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to come to a conclusion about 
the stability/instability of the Nigerian money multiplier simply by observing its year to 
year fluctuations. In fact, what may be more important for the purpose of analysing the 
ability of a country's monetary authorities to control the money stock in the context of 
the money multiplier approach, is the predictability of the money multiplier. One way of 
measuring how predictable the money multiplier and its components are is to model them 
econometrically and measure the degree to which the estimated econometric models can 
forecast the future. Looking at the stability of the money multiplier in this manner will 
allow the effects of shocks and regime shifts to be handled using dummy variables. 
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In the last part of chapter 2 the Nigerian currency to deposit ratio, reserves to 
deposit ratio, and the money multiplier are modelled as functions of a set of explanatory 
variables. The test of the models' abilities to forecast is carried out by omitting a certain 
number of observations from the models and allowing the models to forecast these 
values; then comparing the actual and the forecast values. Furthermore, Chow-Tests for 
parameter constancy between the sample and the forecast period to measure the overall 
stability of the models are also carried out. Forecast Chi-squared tests showed that all 
the models have good forecast ability, while the Chow-tests showed that the hypothesis 
of parameter constancy cannot be rejected. However, the broadly defined currency to 
deposit ratios (denominator is the sum of demand, savings and time deposits as opposed 
to just demand deposits) and the broadly defined money multiplier (M2/monetary base) 
are found to have a poor forecast ability. The models for the reserves to deposit ratios 
(both broad and narrowly defined) have very good forecast ability. These results seem to 
indicate that for the purpose of money stock control, the narrow definition of money is 
more appropriate for Nigeria, confirming an earlier finding by Ojo (1976). Despite the 
year to year fluctuations, the econometric models showed that the Nigerian money 
multiplier and the determinants are reasonably stable and their values in the future can be 
predicted with some degree of accuracy. 
These results are arrived at after step dummies were used to account for the major 
shocks to the Nigerian economy. When the equations were estimated without the dummy 
variables, or when impulse rather than step dummies were used, only the narrowly 
defined currency to deposit ratio has a good ex-ante forecast ability. Although the 
estimated models of the reserve to deposit ratios are found to have poor ex-ante forecast 
abilities, tests showed that the hypothesis that the models are stable can not be rejected. 
Being able to predict the value of the money multiplier is only one half of the task. 
The other half is to be able to control the monetary base. Although the monetary base is 
the liability of the central bank, it may in fact be endogenous and therefore cannot be 
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controlled at will. The Post-Keynesians argue that the monetary base and the money 
stock are both endogenous, responding only to a change in the credit demand. When the 
demand for credit goes up, the supply of credit will also go up. An increase in the supply 
of credit will lead to an increase in deposits with the banking institutions, since the 
proceeds of the loan would have to be eventually deposited. When deposits go up, the 
total reserves of the banking institutions go up, because a certain percentage of all 
deposits would have to be held as reserves. Deposits are a component of the money stock 
while banks' reserves are a component of the monetary base. The other component in 
both cases is the currency in circulation. Causation, according to the Post-Keynesians, 
runs from credit demand to money stock, and from money stock to the monetary base. 
The base is endogenous and cannot be controlled by the monetary authorities. 
An empirical test of the above proposition was carried out in chapter 3. It basically 
requires testing for the direction of causality between domestic credit and the money 
stock, and then between the money stock and the monetary base. In this study the 
Granger-causality test is used to measure whether the direction of causality between 
credit and money stock, and money stock and the monetary base in Nigeria is as 
postulated by the Post-Keynesians. According to this test, a series (X) causes another (Y) 
if taking account of past values of (X) leads to improved prediction for (Y). Applying 
this to the Nigerian data showed that when the narrow definition of money (Ml) is 
considered, causality runs from money stock to monetary base, but when the broader 
definition of money (M2) is considered, the relationship is that of feedback. When the 
test was applied to money and domestic credit, it was found that domestic credit Granger 
causes narrow money (Ml), but as in the case of money-monetary base, the causal 
relationship between domestic credit and broad money is that of feedback. These results 
seem to suggest that the money stock and the monetary base in Nigeria are likely to be 
endogenous and not exogenously determined by the monetary authorities. Although 
slightly weaker, similar results were obtained when the Granger-causality tests were 
235 
carried out without any dummy variable and with impulse dummies. The interpretation 
of the result from the Granger-causality test would have to be treated cautiously, because 
the test has been criticised as simply measuring which variable precedes the other. rather 
than causality in the theoretical sense. Nevertheless, if the result of this test can be 
accepted, the conclusion is that the Nigerian Monetary Authorities cannot change the 
monetary base, and are highly unlikely to change the money stock for monetary policy 
purposes in the context of the money multiplier approach to the money stock 
determination. 
Given that the monetary base and the money stock in Nigeria are likely to be 
demand determined, one possible way for the Nigerian monetary authorities to change 
the money stock for monetary policy purposes is to change the money demand. To 
successfully change the money stock through the demand for it, there has to be a stable 
money demand function which is significantly linked to a control variable. To test the 
stability of the Nigerian money demand function, chapter 3 estimated three different 
specifications using Nigerian data. The result of estimating the partial adjustment model 
showed that it is possible to obtain a stable money demand function for Nigeria. Models 
for narrow and broad definitions of money pass all the regular specification and 
validation tests. The estimated coefficient value of about 0.50 on the lagged dependent 
variable indicates that it takes about two years for an equilibrium to be re-established 
after a disturbance. The short-run and the long-run income elasticities of money demand 
in Nigeria are about (0.88) and (1.40) respectively. Although the interest rate variable in 
the money demand function has the expected sign, it is nevertheless not significant. 
Like in the case of the money multiplier and the determinants, these results were 
obtained when the step dummies were allowed for in the modelling process. The 
relevance of these dummies in the money demand functions is not clear, since most of 
the major shocks are likely to be reflected in the real income. The result of estimating 
without the dummy variables showed that the function is still stable. The adjustment 
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coefficient of about 0.6 obtained when no dummies were used is slio-htly hio-her while a o 0' 
short-run income elasticity of about 0.5 is slightly lower. The long-run elasticity of real 
income value of about 1.44 is not very different from those obtained when the step 
dummies were used. 
The short-comings of the partial adjustment specification of the money demand 
function are well documented. For example, it assumes the same adjustment coefficients 
for disturbances emanating from different sources. This may cast some doubts on the 
results obtained from the partial adjustment specification of the money demand function. 
Checking the robustness of these results requires estimating other specifications of the 
money demand function. One of the specifications estimated is that suggested by David 
Hendry, using variables in levels and changes. In this case, the short-run coefficients are 
read off directly from the change variables, while the long-run coefficients are obtained 
when the level coefficients are divided by minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable. The result obtained from this specification showed that the Nigerian money 
demand function is stable. Most interestingly, the short-run and the long-run elasticities 
are quite similar to the ones obtained by using the partial adjustment specification. This 
seems to suggest that the partial adjustment specification may in fact be an adequate 
representation of the money demand function in Nigeria. This is true only when the 
shock dummies were allowed for in the modelling process. Without the step dummies, 
the models are still stable, but the long-run income elasticities of about 1.80 is higher 
than the value of about 1.40 given by the partial adjustment specification. 
The third specification estimated is that of error-correction and cointegration. In 
this type of specification, an error-correction term is incorporated into the model to cater 
for movements away from the steady-state relationship between the variables. The 
results from this equation also indicates that a stable money demand function for Nigeria 
can be obtained. Further, the short-run income elasticities of money demand obtained are 
quite close to the ones arrived at by estimating the other functions. The error-correction 
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specification requires that cointegration should exist between the variables. Without the 
step dummies it was discovered that cointegration could not be established. This 
specification can not therefore, be estimated without the step dummies. 
All three different specifications with the step dummies and two without the 
dummies indicate that the money demand function for Nigeria is stable. However, in all 
the specifications, the interest rate variable, although of the correct sign, is found to be 
insignificant. The interest rate variable utilised is the treasury bills rate. Two other 
interest rate variables - the discount rate and the deposit or savings rate not only have 
statistically insignificant coefficients, but signs which are inconsistent with the theory. 
Since the interest rate is the only control variable that can be used by the monetary 
authorities to change the money demand, the above result seems to suggest that the 
monetary authorities would not be able to change the money demand significantly. The 
interest rate variable may have been insignificant because, being pegged by the 
authorities, its year to year variability may not have been enough to be estimated 
precisely in a regression analysis. In a standard money demand analysis for developing 
countries, other proxies, besides the interest rate, are often used to represent the 
opportunity cost of holding money. The most commonly used one is the expected 
inflation rate. The use of this variable is not expected to be of any benefit in this study, in 
that it cannot be used as a control variable to alter the quantity of money demanded. 
Moreover, there is always a great difficulty in defining exactly what an expected inflation 
variable is. Other proxies utilised include a credit restraint variable. This is expected to 
be relevant when direct credit control is used as a tool of monetary policy. The theory of 
endogenous money supply accepts that direct credit control could be effective but its 
effect is directly on the money stock and not through the money demand. A reasonable 
conclusion is that the monetary authorities in Nigeria, despite the fact that the money 
demand function is stable, cannot significantly alter the quantity demanded when the 
interest rate is used as the control variable. 
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The first four chapters concentrate on a closed economy analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 
take up the issue of the edogeneity of the monetary base in the context of an open 
economy. Utilising the assets side of the central bank's balance sheet, the monetary base 
can be defined as the sum of the central bank's net domestic assets and net foreign assets. 
The net domestic assets is made up of the central bank's credit to the central government, 
and other domestic private and public institutions. The main item in the foreign assets is 
the foreign exchange reserves. Central banks can only attempt to change the monetary 
base through the domestic component (domestic assets). The foreign component of the 
monetary base is determined by external factors e.g imports/exports, capital movements, 
etc.. However, in a small open economy under a fixed exchange rate regime, any change 
in the domestic component of the monetary base is likely to be offset by an opposite 
change in the foreign component. Implying that the central bank may not be able to 
effect a sustaining change on the monetary base. Offset to the domestic component of 
the monetary base by the foreign component is often analysed in the context of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory. 
A detailed analysis of the monetary approach to the balance of payments theory and 
how the offset to the domestic component of the monetary base is measured, is carried 
out in chapter 5. According to this theory, an increase (decrease) in the domestic 
component is offset by a decrease (increase) of the same magnitude in the foreign 
component, such that the monetary base remains at the initial level. Assuming the 
following: countries do not sterilise balance of payments deficits and surpluses, domestic 
income, prices, and interest rates are exogenous in the long-run, and countries operate a 
fixed exchange rate regime, an equation commonly known as "the reserves flow 
equation" is used to test the offset proposition empirically. The reserves flow equation, 
derived from the money market equilibrium condition, defines the change in the net 
foreign assets of the central bank as a function of change in the net domestic assets, 
change in the domestic real income, domestic prices, domestic interest rates, and the 
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money multiplier. The estimated coefficient of the net domestic assets is known as the 
the offset coefficient. An offset coefficient value of minus one is taken to indicate that 
offset to the domestic component of the monetary base is complete and therefore, the 
monetary base cannot be changed. The non sterilisation assumption is very important to 
the above conclusion. To assume otherwise means that the initial offset can be undone, 
for example, by a continuous increase in the domestic component of the monetary base, 
thus enabling a sustaining increase in the monetary base. An empirical test for the degree 
of sterilisation is carried out by estimating an equation known as the monetary policy 
reaction function, which defines the domestic component of the monetary base as a 
function of the foreign component and other variables that determine the monetary policy 
decisions of a country. In a similar manner to the reserves flow equation, the estimated 
coefficient of the foreign component of the monetary base is called the sterilisation 
coefficient. A value of minus one is taken to indicate that a complete sterilisation of 
payments deficits and surpluses is practiced, and as such change in the monetary base can 
be sustained. 
The reserve flow equation has been criticised because, firstly it is derived from the 
money market conditions alone to the exclusion of the other sectors of the economy, and 
secondly it measures the offset in the long-run, while the short-run may be more 
important. These conditions can be remedied by deriving the offset coefficient in the 
context of a macro-model where domestic income, prices, and interest rates are allowed 
to change. 
In chapter 6, for the purpose of testing to see whether the domestic component of 
the Nigerian monetary base is offset by the foreign component, the reserve flow equation, 
a quasi reduced form - behavioural equation from a macro-model, and a monetary policy 
reaction function are estimated using Nigerian data. The results from the reserves flow 
equation showed that the offset coefficient is equal to minus one, tentatively suggesting 
that the monetary base is endogenous in the long-run and cannot be controlled by the 
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Central Bank of Nigeria for monetary policy purposes. The reduced fonn equation 
estimated using the error-correction and cointegration technique, gave an offset 
coefficient of about -0.85. This value is almost equal to minus one, indicating that even 
in the short-run, when domestic variables are allowed to chano-e the offset to the 
0' 
domestic component of the monetary base is still complete. 
Estimating the monetary policy reaction function gave a sterilisation coefficient 
value of -0.77. This indicates that over 70 percent of the offset to the domestic 
component of the monetary base in Nigeria has been sterilised in the past. The 
implication of this is that, as far as the offset to the domestic component of the monetary 
base is concerned, Nigeria could have a sustained change in its monetary base. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that a continuous sterilisation of payments deficits and 
surpluses is not possible because the country has a limited amount of foreign exchange 
reserves and govenunent securities. Furthermore, evidence showed that Nigeria only 
sterilised deficits and not surpluses. A continuous sterilisation of payments surplus 
implies a continuous decline in the Government expenditures; a position not tenable in a 
developing country with a large public sector like Nigeria. In addition, the classic 
problem of simultaneity inherent in this type of analyses is likely to lead to a biased 
estimates of the coefficients. Therefore, the over 70 percent sterilisation given by the 
monetary policy reaction function may not represent the actual degree of sterilisation 
undertaken in Nigeria. 
Summing up, this study suggests that the Nigerian Monetary Authorities have a 
very limited scope for an effective independent monetary policy carried out in the 
traditional way. In effect, one may say that, as far as monetary policy independence is 
concerned, Nigeria does not stand to lose much by surrendering it to an ECOW AS-wide 
body. This conclusion, to a large extent, also applies to the other member countries of 
ECOW AS, and especially to the member countries of the West African Monetary Union 
(W AMU) who have had a single currency and a single central bank for over 25 years. 
Appendix I 
Definitions of Variables and the Description of 
Data used in the Estimations 
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Annual Values of Real Gross Domestic Product - from IM:F International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 99b.p 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Deflator 1985 = 100 - from IMF 
International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 
99bip 
Currency with the non-bank public - from IM:F International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 14a. 
Reserves of the commercial banks - from IM:F International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page (line 14 minus 14a plus the end 
of period Treasury Bills held by the commercial banks. 
CPI: Consumer Price Index 1985 = 100 - from IMF International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 64. 
LRT: Period Average of the Commercial banks' lending rate - from IMF 
International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 
60P. 
SRT: The Period Average of the Rates Offered to Resident Customers for 
Savings/Deposits - from IMF International Financial Statistics Year 
Book, 1990 Country Page line 601. 
DRT: The end of period rate at which the Central Bank of Nigeria lends or 
discounts eligible papers - from IMF International Financial Statistics 











The end of period value of the Demand Deposits with the commercial 
banks, net of the Federal Government's deposits - from IMF International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 24. 
The end of period values of the Time plus Savings Deposits with the 
commercial banks - from IMF International Financial Statistics Year 
Book, 1990 Country Page line 25. 
Nominal Narrow Money (Cp + DD) - from IMF International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 34. 
Nominal Broad Money (Cp + DD + TD/SD) - from IMF International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line 351. 
Domestic Credit (the sum of end of period net claims on the Federal 
Government, claims on the private sector and claims on other financial 
institutions - from IMF International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 
Country Page line 32. 
Monetary Base (R + C p) 
Money Multiplier (M/H) 
Net Domestic Assets of the Central Bank, made up of the Central Bank's 
claims on the Federal Government and other domestic institutions - from 
IMF International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page 
lines (12a + 12d + 12e + 12f - 16b -16d - 17a - 17r) 
The end of period Nominal Exchange rate, defined as the amount of US 




Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page line ag.-
Net Foreign Assets of the Central Bank - from IMP International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1990 Country Page lines (11 - 16c) 
Number of bank branches at the end of each year - from various issues of 
Central Bank of Nigerian (CBN) Annual Reports and Statements of 
Account. 
TBR: The period average Treasury Bills rate - from various issues of Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Economic and Financial Review. 
Y*: Foreign income, calculated as a weighted average of the real GDP in US 
dollars of the following countries: US, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, and Japan. The weights are the percentages of 





Foreign prices - Weighted GDP deflators of the countries mentioned for 
Y*, where the weights are the percentage of Nigeria's imports from each 
one of the countries in 1985. 
Foreign Interest Rate (the period average of Eurodollar rate in London) -
from IMF International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1990 country page 
(United Kingdom) line 60d. 
The end of period nominal values of Government expenditures deflated by 
the GDP delator - from various issues of CBN Economic and Financial 
Reviews 
Federal Government domestic debt outstanding at the end of each year -
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from various issues of CBN Economic and Financial Reviews 
EDBT: Government and Government guaranteed external debts outstanding at the 
end of each year - from various issues of World Debt Tables and World 
Bank World Tables. 
PI: Imports Price Index, cif 1985 = 100 - from various issues of the World 
Bank World Tables. 
PX: Exports Price Index, fob 1985 = 100 - from various issues of the World 
Bank World Tables. 
DUMl\1IES D1967/68: ones until 1968 and then zeros for the rest of years 
D1970/71: ones until 1971 and then zeros for the rest of years 
D1973/74: ones until 1974 and then zeros for the rest of years 
D 1981/82: ones until 1982 and then zeros for the rest of years 
D1985/86: ones until 1985 and then zeros for the rest of years 
DCW: ones for the civil war period (1967, 1968, and 1969) and ones 
for the rest of period. 
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Appendix II 
Some Basic ECOWAS Statistics 
Table A2.1 
Some Basic Statistics 
For the ECOW AS Countries 
Countrie! GOP Pop. W orlcing Pop. GOP Sectoral Contribution to GDP 
mills $US mills as a % of Total Percapita as a % of Total** 
Agric Indust 
1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 
Benin 960 1710 4.0 4.4 49 50 240 389 48 40 16 13 
Burkina 
Faso 930 1750 7.9 8.5 44 51.9 118 206 45 39 22 23 
Cape 
Verde 114 280 0.33 0.35 348 796 
Cote 
D'lvore 5220 7650 10.1 11.2 54 49 517 683 36 36 26 25 
The 
Gambia 172 189 0.75 0.82 230 230 
Ghana 4860 5230 12.7 14 48 50.2 383 374 41 49 15 16 
Guinea 1980 2540 5.4 6.2 52 54.3 319 470 40 30 22 32 
Guinea 
Bissau 158 135 0.89 0.94 178 143 
Liberia 1000 990 2.2 2.4 52 51.5 455 413 37 37 28 28 
Mali 1100 1940 7.5 8.0 50 50.5 147 242 50 49 13 12 
Mauri-
tania 600 900 1.7 1.9 53 52.6 353 474 29 38 25 21 
Niger 1580 2400 6.4 7.3 51 50.5 247 329 47 36 16 23 
Nigeria 175300 29370 99.7 110.1 49 49.4 755 267 36 34 32 36 
Senegal 2560 4980 6.6 7.0 52 50.5 388 711 19 22 29 18 
Siera 
Leone 1190 127C 3.7 3.9 55 54 322 326 44 46 14 12 
Togo 700 136C 3.0 3.4 50 49.3 233 400 30 34 24 21 
Sources: World Bank World Development Report (various issues) 
World Bank World Tables (various issues) 
** Agric covers: Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing 
Industry covers: manufacturing, mining. construction, Electricity, Water and Gass 














































1 aOH:: i'\.~.~ 
Imorts and Exports Matrix for ECOW AS 
Millions of $US in 1988 
Faso Verde D'Ivoire Bissau 
Imports 
~
-Mij .. Benin Burkina Cape Cote Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger NigeriaSenegalj Siera I Togo 
Leone ECOW AS Indust 
\ij.h Counts. Counts. Total 
-- ---
Ht'nin 0.35 19.9 0.8 0.59 1.08 1.0 3.69 1.62 29.03 253.4 473.991 
1111IIina - --
lasp 0.04 .r17.4 0.2 3.82 0.18 1.62 2.84 3.10 129.20 240.95 424.02 
[',ire - -
Verde 1:2 0.01 1.21 77.851 95.58 
Cote 
!I )'Ivoire 0.67 2.60 =1= 
I(iambia 0.1 0.04 0.01 4.29 0.11 4.55 127.45 189.91 
(ih3na OJ)] 4.42 19.1 0.23 ______ 109.0(\ 0.06 37.32 170.44 717.84 931.32 
4.23 0.1 0.03 O.S 6.33 0.02 0.2e 11.41 336.72 390.72 
1.0 9.26 22.45 2.4~ l23.0~ 19.12 0.491 0.621 181.61 11333.8911990.17 
( iuinea 
ItJmea 
'Rissau I I I 1 0.15 0.08 4.14 4.37 64.921 86.961 
Liberia 18.3 0.02 0.39 1.53 2.10 2.0 0.91 1.140.13 26.52 1274.582084.2~ 
~1c11i I 0.011 0.84 116.9 10.60 0.07 1.77 24.25 1.46 155.90 268.82 445.91 
Mauritania 0.4 0.09 18.15 18.64 307.35 402.191 
Niger 5.11 1.61 32.4 0.14 5.0 O.SI 3.96 48.73 235.95 343.31 
- ~ 
Nigeria 3.60 3.69 14.3 0.01 1.6 0.11 8.60 0.26 1.59 15.12 2.77 0.01 1.66 53.32 3431.70f4.658.40 
Senegal 55.7 0.01 0.9 0.07 0.4 0.1 O.SO 1.31 0.71 43.00 0.14 0.01 102.49 641.70 971.69 
Stera 
L~~ne 0.12 0.5 0.01 0.06 0.9 52.00 0.85 54.44 73.96 140.251 
logo 1 1.12 0.86 33.0 35.9 0.25 0.5 0.58 3.47 0.65 1.59 77.92 388.26 643.70 
To 
ECOWAS 110.68 14.37 ~ 429.1 4.66 40.7 11.451 0.21 10.8 16.18 31.77 23.351 335.001 89.51 1.911 50.08 
11'0 Indst. 
Countries 153.321 89.921 3.1 12051.101 86.10 1 773.101419.661 6.76 1839.6 I 73.841 350.14 1334.0916606.001349.20 I 69.571194.14 
Total 
Exports 171.051154.5816.7013107.101 96.27 11075.301476.991 9.71 1883.50~72.4(~ 507.62 1359.96j7638.0oj591.19I106.451329.37 
Sour.:es: IMF Direction Trade Statistics Year Book 1988 
.\. i i: Ex ports of Country i to j 
~ 1 ij' Imports of Country i from j 
Imports are Excluding c.i. f. 
Benin Burkina Cape Cote 
Faso Verde D'Ivoire 
~enin 0.23 0.64 
Burkina 




D'lvore 0.94 1.68 
The 
Gambia 





Mali 0.01 0.54 3.76 
Mauri-
tania 0.1 
Niger 7.20 1.04 1.04 
Nigeria 5.07 2.39 0.46 
Senegal 1.80 
Siera 
Leone 0.17 0.02 
Togo 1.58 0.56 1.06 
To 
Ecowas 15.03 9.03 13.81 
To 
Indust. 75.05 58.17 46.30 66.01 
TableA2.3 
Exports of the ECOW AS Countries 
Percentage of Total 1988 
Gam- Ghana Guinea Guinea Libe Mali 






4.39 0.01 0.29 0.06 
0.16 0.01 0.02 




0.01 0.15 1.08 0.97 0.15 
0.01 0.08 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.29 
0.01 0.01 0.10 
3.34 0.05 0.6 0.34 
4.84 3.78 2.40 2.16 1.22 9.39 
89.44 71.90 88.0 69.55 94.96 42.83 
Calcualted from IMP IPS Direction of Trade Year Book 
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Mauri- Niger Nige- Sene SierraiTogo 
tania na gal Leone 
0.12 0.30 0.01 0.62 0.49 
0.04 0.45 0.48 0.94 
4.42 0.67 1.61 3.23 0.46 0.19 
0.73 0.10 2.40 
1.43 0.01 11.33 
1.(17 0.02 0.06 
0.70 
0.41 0.03 0.15 1.07 0.04 
0.01 0.49 4.10 0.44 
3.(17 
0.07 0.09 1.20 
0.31 4.20 0.47 0.01 0.50 
0.26 0.20 0.56 0.13 
0.68 0.14 
0.68 0.18 0.27 
6.26 6.49 4.39 15.14 1.79 15.20 












































































Burkina Cape Cote Gambia Ghana 
Faso Verde D'Ivoire 






5.60 24.20 0.36 
6.69 0.09 
0.2 0.23 
23.20 0.3 0.1 
1.06 147,90 0.1 
0.6 0.01 
2.03 41.00 0.01 
3.63 14.30 0.01 1.2 
0.01 70.50 0.02 1.20 
0.6 0.01 
1.08 41.70 45.4 
p 
17.13 0.21 539.80 7.62 50.60 
92.15 3.8 2163.90 125.68 1043.50 
157.11 8.40 3511.40 168.27 1365.90 
')(Jurces: IMF Direction Trade Statistics Year Book 1990 
\ij: Exports of Country i to j 
\ lij: Imports of Country i from j 
Imports are Excluding c.i.f. 
Table A2.4 
Imorts and Exports Matrix for ECOW AS 
Millions of $US in 1990 
Guinea Guinea Liberia Mali lMauritani2 Niger 
Bissau 
0.04 0.16 1.3E 
4.8-, 0.01 2.0~ 
0.fl3 
11.71 33.66 3.cL 
~--
_. 
0.05 (). () I 
--
0.45 
0.04 0.7 0.04 
0.10 
-~~--~ 
0.49 1.94 5.38 
-------





0.10 6.80 0.2E 14.89 
0.09 0.05 0.1 0.64 0.54 0.9C 
0.06 0.6 0.03 
0.32 0.6 0.71 1.47 0.83 
14.48 0.24 9.15 20.34 41.86 25.3: 
499.33 6.55 1697.5 113.77 348.48 ~35.54 





















Siera Togo Imports 
Leone ECOWAS Indust 
Counts. Counts. Total 
2.05 36.92 251.122 441.1 'i 
~ ~-
3.92 163.17 267.80 491.3( 
2.17 106.29 125.91 
0.67 0.78 226.38 1239.66 1992.69 
0.1 ~ 5.75 109.55 184.02 
47.21 209.22 923.31 1248.84 
O.O? 0.26 15.99 384.14 455.18 
5.77 81.25 105.77 
1.54 0.17 36.01 2571.30 ~044.87 
1.84 197.33 280.61 504.81 
2.81 382.90 491.50 
5.01 61.33 211.19 341.98 
0.01 1.63 48.47 4136.40 ~493.6C 
0.19 0.02 117.41 911.53 1282.37 
52.92 113.02 185.79 













D'Ivore 0.92 2.09 
The 
Gambia 





Mali 0.02 0.67 
Mauri-
tania 
~iger 6.99 1.29 
~igeria 3.83 2.31 
Senegal 0.16 0.01 
Siera 
ILeone 
rrogo 1.53 0.69 
rro 
Ecowas 113.54 10.90 2.47 
To 
















Exports of the ECOW AS Countries 
Percentage of Total 1990 
Gam- Ghana Guinea Guinea Libe- Mali 




0.09 4.34 6.92 
0.01 0.71 
0.21 0.02 
3.98 0.01 0.47 0.04 
0.14 0.02 
0.18 0.01 0.08 0.72 
0.01 2.26 0.00 
0.00 0.2 
0.00 0.06 
0.00 0.09 1.34 0.37 0.10 
0.01 0.09 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.24 
0.01 0.01 0.033 
3.32 0.05 0.03 0.27 
4.53 3.70 2.44 3.16 0.50 7.53 
61.62 74.69 76.40 84.28 86.18 91.97 42.13 
Calcualted from IMP IPS Direction of Trade Year Book 
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Mauri- Niger Nige- Sene- Sierra Togo 
tania na gal Leone 
0.03 0.51 0.02 0.70 0.70 
0.00 0.78 0.53 1.32 
0.01 
1.14 1.16 3.58 0.37 0.26 
0.00 0.80 0.08 
0.09 1.03 0.01 15.96 
0.01 1.20 0.02 0.09 
0.78 
1.12 0.02 0.17 0.85 0.06 
0.02 0.84 4.54 0.62 
0.02 0.31 
0.05 0.10 1.69 
5.62 0.31 0.01 0.55 
0.11 0.34 0.33 0.11 0.01 
0.01 0.4 0.09 
0.30 0.31 0.00 0.30 
8.60 9.56 3.02 13.2 13.32 1.44 
















Principal Exports of Some ECOW AS Counti.res 
as a % of Total Export 
PRODUCTS 1975 








Groundnut Products 93.31 
Wood 9.02 
Cocoa 59.89 




Live Animals 12.54 
Fish 9.20 
Iron Ore 82.28 
Uranium 60.76 
Live animals 18.68 
Crude oil 94.01 
Cocoa 3.7 
Petro. Products 7.10 










Sources: IPS Supplements On Trade Statistics 
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